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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Due to the limitations of the extant literature on the impact of microfinance funding 
on performance, with particular regard to a cross-country analysis and case study of 
Vietnam, this thesis has been written in an effort to fill this major gap by conducting an 
empirical investigation into the link between funding and the performance of microfinance 
institutions. It also employs the most common indicators for microfinance performance and 
introduces new evidence and possible explanations from an explicit perspective that might 
be relevant in the context of scale of operation, profit status, regulated status and legal 
status. First, the link between funding and microfinance performance varies with the 
heterogeneity of microfinance institution’ characteristics. Second, profitable and regulated 
microfinance institutions which take on considerably more commercial funds are therefore 
shown to have higher sustainability, efficiency and outreach. Third, a large scale of 
operation helps microfinance institutions achieve higher efficiency, profitability, 
sustainability and outreach (breadth and depth). Fourth, there is no trade-off between the 
breadth of outreach and efficiency. Fifth, larger loan sizes are associated with higher loan 
costs. Sixth, the global financial crisis has had a minor impact on the performance of 
microfinance institutions since they have a low level of self-sufficiency, associated with a 
low degree of financial integration. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
With daily income below the minimum level for basic needs, the poor are 
households with very little income and no assets. They need access to basic financial 
services such as credit, savings, insurance and money transfers to manage their 
precarious lives, together with the provision of basic social services such as basic health 
care, primary education, water and sanitation. Lack of access to basic financial services 
tends to deprive them of the means to improve their incomes, secure their existence, and 
cope with emergencies. Poor households in developing countries face a number of risks 
and are difficult to reduce these risks ex ante and cope with shosks once they have not 
been materialised. Therefore, the provision of financial services to poor households by 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries can help to transform their 
lives permanently and lift them out of poverty. It also provides them with opportunities 
to take active roles in the economy through income, bargaining power and the building 
up of social empowerment in their communities. With this approach, the poor have 
opportunities to become self-sufficient in the long run by using these funds to build 
small businesses for future cash flow. 
Microfinance has proven to be an appropriate, effective and powerful tool for the 
poor and for poverty reduction in order to reach the Millennium goals. We provide a 
comprehensive review of the main challenges of microfinance and address several 
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important issues based on the existing literature. First, microfinance is clearly not a 
machine or a potion which can immediately turn the poor into the non-poor. The point 
is that microfinance is basically a long-term process which tends to support the poor 
financially so that they can combine their skills, knowledge, experience and financial 
capital to break away from poverty and change their lives. Second, donor funding tends 
to become insufficient to meet the continual demand for well-designed financial 
products by new and existing clients. Therefore, access to commercial funds is likely to 
encourage MFIs to move out of heavily subsidised operations and to enter into 
commercialisation in order to achieve efficiency and sustainability. Third, several 
studies have focused on investigating the impact of microfinance or the trade-off 
between social mission and financial sustainability, while neglecting the possibility for 
MFIs to remain viable in providing financial services to the poor in the long run. Fourth, 
the funding of microfinance plays important roles in the economic viability and 
sustainability of MFIs. Fifth, lending methodologies, savings, empowerment of women 
and the impact of microfinance are likely to depend heavily on the legal status, profit 
status and regulated status of MFIs.  
Responding to profit incentives, MFIs have tried to increase revenues and 
decrease total expenses (including costs of capital). The positive returns of several MFIs 
all over the world have continued to attract new investment funds. Microfinance around 
the world continues to evolve, with consistent emphasis on efficiency and growth in 
outreach. It is relying increasingly on commercial financing to fund this potential 
growth, either through debt or equity financing. However, there has been very little 
research on the effects of financial structure in terms of funding on the performance of 
MFIs by a cross-country analysis and country case study. 
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The existing empirical studies have basically focused on the determinants of 
financial structure to explain how an MFI can finance business activities by using debts 
and equity to maximise the benefits for shareholders based on their advantages. A 
natural extension of this line of inquiry is to investigate the effects of financial structure 
on the performance of MFIs. However, previous studies have tended to be fairly 
limited, focusing only on the links between financial leverage, profitability (financial 
performance) and outreach (social performance), and thereby missing other important 
aspects of financial performance: sustainability, efficiency and portfolio quality. In 
addition, MFIs are far from homogeneous; their performance therefore responds in 
different ways to changes in return to firm-specific internal factors (such as scale of 
operation, legal status, profit status and regulated status) and macroeconomic factors 
(such as inflation, GNI per capita and global financial crises). Clearly, this argument 
increases the need to address the issue of the heterogeneity of MFIs by investigating the 
relationship between microfinance funding and the different aspects of performance. 
From this point of view, the results of the investigation will help the internal and 
external funders determine financing decisions or take corrective actions when needed 
based on the key performance indicators mentioned above. 
In developing countries, microfinance programs are carried out by MFIs that have 
been sponsored by local governments, donors and international organisations because of 
poor participation by the private sector, particularly with regard to local commercial 
banks. The number of MFIs increased rapidly during the period from 1995 to 2012. 
Several MFIs improved their efficiency, became self-sufficient and played an 
increasingly important role as financial intermediaries in local economies for poverty 
reduction. Achieving higher efficiency and sustainability associated with operating at 
the most competitive size tends to offer MFIs more opportunities to have cheaper access 
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to outside financing and to diversify their financing sources. Therefore, understanding 
the differences in scale of operation and their relationships to microfinance performance 
is necessary in order to provide any additional information funders and MFIs may need 
regarding financing decisions.  
1.2. Motivation 
Due to the limitations of the extant literature on the effect of funding on the 
different aspects of microfinance performance, this study is believed to be a pioneer in 
filling the gap in the literature by investigating the relationship between funding and 
microfinance performance based on a cross-country analysis. First, the most common 
performance indicators for microfinance were employed to investigate the impact of 
financial leverage on microfinance performance with the heterogeneity of MFI 
characteristics. Second, this study introduced new evidence and possible explanations 
from an explicit perspective that might be relevant in the context of scale of operation, 
profit status, regulated status and legal status. Third, this study employed system GMM 
to avoid the possibility of reverse causation from dependent variables (performance 
indicators) to independent variables (financial leverage and scale of operation). 
Therefore, this study provides several new and interesting findings which contribute 
additional empirical evidence to the existing literature on the impact of financial 
structure in terms of funding on microfinance performance.  
In addition, microfinance performance responds in different ways to changes in 
return to firm-specific factors and macroeconomic factors because of the heterogeneity 
of characteristics. This fact increases the need to carry out an empirical investigation of 
previous theoretical and empirical works that focus on a particular country in order to 
improve the contribution of firm characteristics to the impact of financial leverage on 
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microfinance performance. There are a number of reasons for choosing Vietnam to 
carry out the investigation. First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study is 
available which investigates the relationship between financial leverage and 
microfinance performance in the Vietnamese context. Second, Vietnam is one of the 
fastest growing developing economies which is classified as a poor country. Therefore, 
microfinance is playing an increasingly important role in poverty reduction in the 
country (see Chapter 6 for more detailed information on microfinance in Vietnam). 
Third, international investment is important to most economies and can be particularly 
vital for developing countries, including Vietnam, which are seen as having significant 
potential for investment. 
All the above issues have encouraged me to conduct this research, with the belief 
that this study proposes possible explanations from an explicit perspective that might be 
relevant in the context of firm-specific characteristics, with particular regard to profit 
and regulated status, as well as scale of operation, for the impact of funding in terms of 
financial leverage on microfinance performance. 
1.3. Research Objectives  
The main purpose of this research is to provide in-depth analysis and to introduce 
possible explanations for the relationships between funding, scale of operation and 
microfinance performance to help funders to determine financing decisions or to take 
corrective actions based on the key performance indicators of MFIs. In order to achieve 
these objectives, this study conducted an empirical investigation into the impact of 
financial leverage and scale of operation on the performance of MFIs by using a cross-
country analysis and case study of Vietnam.  
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1.4. Research Questions 
The aim and objectives of our research are inspired by the belief that funders can 
determine financing decisions or take corrective actions based on the relationships 
between the key performance indicators of MFIs, and that MFIs can improve their 
performance based on financial leverage and scale of operation. Therefore, five research 
questions (RQ) were formulated to explore the issue.  
(RQ1) How does financial structure in terms of financial leverage affect the different 
aspects of microfinance performance (including efficiency, sustainability and depth and 
breadth of outreach)? 
(RQ2) Is there any trade-off between the financial and social performance of MFIs? 
(RQ3) Is there any trade-off between the depth and breadth of outreach? 
(RQ4) How does scale of operation affect microfinance performance (social and 
financial performance)? 
(RQ5) How did the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 affect microfinance 
performance?  
1.5. Methodology 
The goals of this research are realised by employing both theoretical and empirical 
analysis. The theoretical analysis consists of a literature review. The literature review is 
desk-based research which uses various sources of secondary data. The empirical analysis 
consists of econometric analyses. The econometric analyses use secondary data from 
MIX Market and the Central Bank of Vietnam. The researcher used Microsoft Excel to 
create spreadsheets for data collection and build graphs for analysis, Microsoft Word to 
write up the results and Stata to analyse the data. 
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1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, including the Introduction. 
Chapter 2 provides comprehensive reviews and assessment of  poverty reduction, 
microfinance and the main challenges of microfinance. The objective of this chapter is 
to provide an in-depth review of the main roles of microfinance in poverty reduction in 
order to shed new light on the importance of microfinance funding and previously 
unstudied topics: the link between funding and performance. 
Chapter 3 carries out investigation into funding and the link between funding and 
microfinance performance in order to establish gaps in the existing literature which need 
to be research. The most influential economic theories and empirical evidence which are 
presented here attempt to provide statements for the empirical analysis presented in the 
following chapters. 
Chapter 4 conducts an empirical investigation to examine the effects of financial 
leverage on the different aspects of microfinance performance with the heterogeneity of 
MFI characteristics. This chapter provides in-depth analysis and introduces possible 
explanations that might be relevant in the context of firm-specific characteristics to help 
funders to determine financing decisions based on key performance indicators. This 
chapter also sheds new light on the important role of scale of operation and the effect of 
the global financial crisis on microfinance performance. 
Chapter 5 carries out an empirical investigation into the relationships between 
scale of operations, financial leverage and performance, as well as the effect of the 
global financial crisis of 2007/2008 on microfinance performance. The findings of this 
study are expected to contribute to the existing knowledge by providing possible 
explanations for both funders and MFI managers who seek recommendations and 
8 
 
solutions for improving their performance so as to avoid the negative impact of the 
global financial crisis, as well as solutions for the trade-off between depth and breadth 
of outreach. 
Chapter 6 determines the impact of financial structure on microfinance 
performance in Vietnam in an effort to compare the results of this country against a 
cross-section of others. This study provides an overview of the relationship between 
financial structure and performance in Vietnam to help funders evaluate and determine 
financing decisions. 
Chapter 7 summarises the key findings, discusses their limitations, and suggests 
some ideas for further research. Figure 1.1 shows the structure of the thesis. 
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Figure 1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 
MICROFINANCE 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
According to Ravallion et al. (1991), Ravallion (2008 and 2009) and Aigbokhan 
(2008), the poor are frequently mentioned as households or families with no assets and 
daily income below the minimum level for basic needs. Lack of access to basic financial 
services tends to deprive them of the means to improve their incomes, secure their 
existence, and cope with emergencies. Therefore, they need financial services together 
with the provision of basic social services to play active roles in the economy through 
income, bargaining power and the building up of social empowerment in their 
communities.
1
 Providing financial services can help the poor transform their lives 
permanently and lift them out of poverty by using these funds to build small businesses 
for future cash flow in order to become self-sufficient in the long run. 
Over the years, many studies have been conducted and have come to different 
conclusions about the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction (i.e. these studies 
investigate whether or not microfinance really helps the poor escape poverty). Most 
studies provide evidence in support of the positive effects of microfinance on increasing 
the income
2
 of the poor or in reducing their vulnerability
3
. There have been a few 
                                                 
1
 See Yunus (1999 and 2003), Rutherford (2000) and ACCION (2011). 
2
 See UNICEF (1997), Khandker (1998 and 2001), Wright (2000), Morduch and Haley 
(2002), Bansal (2011), Akinlabi et al. (2011) and Pande et al. (2012). 
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studies with largely conclusive and positive evidence on health, nutrition and education 
(Wright, 2000). These studies suggest that microfinance is clearly not a machine which 
can immediately turn the poor into the non-poor. The point is that microfinance is 
basically a long-term process which tends to support the poor financially so that they 
can combine their skills, knowledge, experience and financial capital to break away 
from poverty and change their lives for a better and brighter future. Thus on balance, the 
majority of research appears to indicate that microfinance does have positive and 
significant effects on the poor in certain situations. It is, however, extremely difficult to 
separate and measure the contributions of microfinance to poverty reduction in 
developing countries since poverty is a big social problem that permeates every 
dimension of culture and society. In addition, there are strong potential synergies 
between microfinance and the provision of other non-financial programs, since the 
benefits derived from these programs are interconnected (Morduch and Haley, 2002). 
From a social point of view, lending money to the poor can at least help them survive or 
give them a chance to improve their standard of living.
4
 
Providing loans to the poor with no collateral and uncertain cash flows is usually 
considered as a risky business by traditional commercial banks
5
. Therefore, banking 
with the poor was mostly carried out by government and donors through non-profit 
programs, with poor participation from the private sector, especially from local 
commercial banks. However, microfinance institutions (MFIs) can maintain and expand 
                                                                                                                                               
3
  See Swain and Floro (2007), Wright (2000), Zaman (2000). 
4
 See WB (1980), UNDP (1997), Yunus (1999 and 2003), BBC News (2005), 
Daley_Harris (2003, 2007), Roodman (2009) and IFAD (2010). 
5
  See Baydas et al. (1997), Curran et al. (2005) and Westley (2006). 
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their activities only if they can cover all of their costs and generate net income in 
providing financial services to the poor (Gibbons and Meehan, 1999). It has been 
pointed out repeatedly that MFIs need to be economically viable and sustainable in the 
long run, since the sustainability of MFIs is not possible without sound financial 
performance. Therefore, commercial microfinance has been expanding over the last few 
years and is considered as the future of microfinance or a new trend in poverty 
reduction (Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2008). This suggests that MFIs are relying 
increasingly on commercial financing, either through debt or equity investments, to 
fund their potential growth (Hsu, 2007; Hermes et al., 2011). Clearly, an in-depth 
understanding of how MFIs choose their financial structure to improve performance has 
become more important in microfinance.
6
 
This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive review of the main roles of 
microfinance in poverty reduction in order to shed new light on the importance of 
microfinance funding and previously unstudied topics: the link between funding and 
performance, including social as well as financial performance. The chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first two sections present the main issues concerning poverty 
reduction and microfinance, with the aim of showing the important roles of 
microfinance in reducing poverty. The third section investigates the main challenges of 
microfinance to identify gaps in the existing literature which need further investigation, 
as mentioned above, and presents the main aspects which microfinance funders need to 
consider in order to determine financial decisions. The funding of microfinance, the 
theoretical models and empirical evidence are presented in the following chapters, 
showing how funding and performance are interrelated. 
                                                 
6
 See Thapa (2007), Bogan (2009) and Imai et al. (2011) 
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2.2. Poverty Reduction  
2.2.1. Poverty 
According to Piachaud (1987), the concept of poverty
7
 is a moral question. There 
are many definitions of poverty due to the context of the situation and the points of view 
of the person or organisation making the definition. Therefore, there is no single correct 
or generally agreed definition of the word “poverty,” although it is mentioned regularly 
and has become a commonly used term in discussing effective solutions to improve the 
living standard of citizens all over the world. 
According to the World Development Report of 1980, it was also defined as a 
condition of life so characterised by malnutrition, illiteracy and disease as to be beneath 
any reasonable definition of human decency, based on the state of poverty (to lack food, 
to be uneducated and to lack access to basic health care) (WB, 1980). This definition 
does not focus on the lack of income as a main characteristic, although income is an 
important factor in obtaining such basic necessities. The broader definition, often called 
human poverty in contrast to income poverty, with different sets of indicators used to 
describe it, was given by UNDP in 1997. This definition mentioned issues such as the 
ability to access health services, education, clean water, life expectancy, infant mortality 
rates and literacy levels. According to the European Union, poverty is also defined as 
individuals or groups whose resources are limited and below the minimum acceptable 
level (CPSW, 2011). This has become one of the most common definitions, since 
poverty not only concerns personal income but also the effective exclusion of people 
from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities. 
                                                 
7
  The term “poverty” is originally from Latin (“pauper”) via Anglo-Norman (“povert”) 
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Clearly, the definition of poverty that is widely accepted is in terms of a situation 
in which people live with very little income and no asset, are hungry and lack shelter. It 
is described as the state of being sick without access to treatment from a doctor; not 
knowing how to read due to not going to school; not having a job; living one day at a 
time with fears for the future and lack of freedom and representation. In more detail, a 
person is only considered as poor if their daily income is below the minimum level for 
basic needs (Aigbokhan, 2008). This minimum level is called the “poverty line” and 
varies from time and place; each country uses lines which are appropriate to its level of 
development, societal norms and values. “US$1.0 per day” was the absolute line widely 
used by the World Bank from 1990 (Ravallion et al., 1991), and was updated to “US$ 
1.25 per day” and “US$ 2.0 per day” by Ravallion (2008 and 2009).   
Poverty is commonly divided into two broad categories: absolute poverty 
(extreme poverty) and relative poverty. Absolute poverty is when basic subsistence 
needs for survival are not being met (such as food, clean water, health, clothing, 
education, information and shelter). Relative poverty, on the other hand, typically refers 
to when income is insufficient to reach the average standard of living (OECD, 2001; 
Jensen, 2009). 
In banking and finance, people are basically divided into three groups based on 
their income (cash flow) and collateral: bankable, near bankable and non-bankable 
(International Year of Microcredit 2005). Since the poor are people living below the 
poverty line, they are typically near bankable and non-bankable (Aigbokhan, 2008; 
Hammill et al., 2008). Microfinance tends to focus on these near bankable and non-
bankable people, while rural finance tends to focus on bankable people in rural areas.  
15 
 
 Bankable people are those accepted for money lending processing by banks 
since the term “bankable”8 simply means being acceptable to or qualifying for a bank 
loan. They are wealthy or ideally not poor people since they have sufficient collateral 
from their current income, future cash flows, and high probability of successful 
acceptance by banks for financing. 
 Non-bankable people are those who have very little income, no track 
record and no collateral to be offered for loans from banks. “Non-bankable” is used 
together with the term “absolute poor” in traditional poverty demographics. They are 
the main subjects of traditional microfinance (non-profit). According to the World 
Bank, the absolute poor are the group of people living below the poverty line (on less 
than US$ 1.25 per day) and the moderately poor are the group of people living on more 
than US$ 1.25 per day but less than US$ 2.0. These non-bankable people are not 
creditworthy
9
 (they have very little income), are not able to save (they have no money 
left to save once they spend most of their income on daily food and other basic 
expenses) or are not able to invest money in setting up small businesses (Zeller and 
Sharma, 2000; Rutherford, 2000).  
 Near bankable people are those who have a higher income than non-
bankable ones and may have collateral, but who are not granted requested loans as local 
                                                 
8
 This concept is used regularly from the International Year of Microcredit 2005. 
9
 There are several arguments against the statement that the poor are not creditworthy. 
The poor have been historically considered as not creditworthy and non-bankable by 
local commercial banks based on their low incomes, uncertain cash flows and lack of 
collateral for their borrowings. According to the microfinance approach, the poor are 
creditworthy and bankable with MFIs if they are included and integrated or 
marginalised into a group (for group lending). 
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commercial banks tend to have insufficient funds to lend to those who are not bankable. 
This term is also used to describe the relatively or moderately poor people who are the 
main subjects of commercial microfinance
10
 (Hammill et al., 2008). It is the percentage 
of the total population with income less than the average income but higher than the 
poverty line (US$ 2.0 per day). To make near bankable and non-bankable people 
bankable, the poor are included and integrated or marginalised into a group (i.e. banks 
tend to use group lending to lend to near bankable and non-bankable people). This is 
also a part of the process of empowering the poor and helping them access finance in 
order to build up assets, engage in a wider range of income-generating activities, reduce 
their vulnerability to economic shocks and prepare for lifecycle events. 
Adapting Cohen (2003), Hammill et al. (2008) divide people into two groups 
based on the poverty line: poor and non-poor people. According to this study, the 
economically active poor, or those who are hovering just above the poverty line, are 
ideal candidates to be offered loans by MFIs to help them continue to stay above the 
line (see more in-depth discussion in the following section in this chapter). This 
suggests that not all the poor have the same ability to take on loans and there is no 
template for success.
11
 
The poor have very little income and spend a larger proportion of it on food than 
rich people. Any increase in the cost of living tends to make everyone poorer unless our 
income increases in proportion; especially this is especially true for poor households 
                                                 
10
 Commercial microfinance basically means doing microfinance with the application of 
market-based principles and the expansion of profit-driven operations (Charitonenko 
and Rahman, 2002). This will be discussed in detail in the following part of this chapter. 
11
 Some people require direct basic assistance and are typically not suitable for 
microfinance, such as the sick, mentally ill or destitute. 
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since they must spend more income on food
12
 and have fewer savings. Therefore, 
poverty is the term used to describe the condition of not having daily basic needs. 
Poverty had been accepted as inevitable as economies produced little before the 
industrial revolution while the population grew too fast, which made wealth scarce.
13
 
2.2.2. Poverty Reduction 
According to reports by the World Bank, there are large regional differences in 
the global picture of poverty reduction.
14
 In East Asia, poverty was reduced from 80% 
of the population in 1981 to 18% in 2005 (about 340 million people), largely owing to 
dramatic progress in poverty reduction in China (Urbanomics, 2008). During the period 
1981 to 2005, the number of poor was reduced by around 600 million in China. Apart 
from China, poverty was reduced from 40% to 29% over the same period, although the 
total number has remained unchanged at around 1.2 billion. In South Asia, it also fell 
from 60% to 40% between 1981 and 2005, but this was not enough to reduce the total 
number of poor, which stood at about 600 million in 2005. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
poverty rate has been around 50% with no markable decline from 1981, and the number 
of poor doubled from 200 to 380 million during the period 1981 to 2005. Poverty 
declined from 58% in 1996 to 50% in 2005 (WB, 2008; IFAD, 2010). 
                                                 
12
 Basic needs are the needs to satisfy essential requirements, such as food, health care, 
clean water, clothing and shelter, for a minimum standard of living, generally measured 
by real income per person and poverty rate (Aigbokhan, 2008; Chen and Ravallion, 
2009; Ravallion, 2009; FAO, 2010). 
13
 See McDougall (2010) and Bloom and Rosenberg (2011). 
14
 Poverty reduction (or poverty alleviation) is a long-term process to reduce the level of 
poverty in a community, or among a group of people or a country (Haughton and 
Khandker, 2009; UNDP, 2011). It improves the living standards of households, and lifts 
them out of poverty or transfers them from being non-bankable into bankable people. 
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According to the FAO (2010), there were 925 million hungry people in 2010 
(13.6% of the world population of 6.8 billion). Asia and the Pacific had 578 million 
people (62.5% of the number of hungry people in the world). Based on 2005 statistics, 
the World Bank estimated that as of 2008 the poverty rate was 25% of the total 
population who were living below the poverty line of US$ 1.25 a day in 2005, while the 
figure was 50% in the early 1980s (about 1.9 billion poor people)
15
 (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2008; UN, 2009). Recently, it is expected to be around 15% by 2015 (under 
the 23% target of the United Nations). Poverty in East Asia was reduced from 80% to 
20% over this period. By contrast, it was still around 50% in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN, 
2011) (See Panels, Appendix 2.1). 
There is commonly a wide range of poverty reduction strategies based on either 
increasing the supply of basic needs (i.e. making more of the basic human needs 
available for the poor), or increasing the personal income needed to purchase those 
needs. Some basic needs, such as improving access to education and health care, may 
also help increase income. On the other hand, Forum for the Future (2007) established 
the Five Capitals model
16
 and mentioned that financial capital plays an important role in 
allowing other capitals to be owned and traded; it has no real value itself, but is 
representative of all other capitals. It refers to a fund or an amount of money called 
savings or the principal of loans, provided by lenders (investors) to borrowers 
(businesses or individuals) to purchase equipment or fixed assets to carry out business. 
The lenders are private, public or institutional entities, which make funds or money 
                                                 
15
 According to the Rural Poverty Report 2011, around 35% of the total rural 
populations of developing countries are classified as extremely poor (IFAD, 2010). 
16
 The five capitals are natural capital, human capital, social capital, manufactured 
capital, and financial capital (Forum for the Future, 2007). 
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available to others to borrow. The lenders provide loans (an amount of money called the 
principal) to the borrowers and get back the principal and the interest
17
 at a later time. In 
an economy, there are many people who have money available to lend and also people 
who need to borrow amounts of money. In any economy, there are many households, 
which are net savers (in financial surplus), and also always borrowers whose incomes 
are insufficient for their current spending plans and need to borrow money from others 
(Bain, 2003; Bain and Howells, 2007).  
Normally, people need a loan when they do not have enough money to spend. The 
poor often spend most of their low income on daily food to fulfil the basic needs as 
previously mentioned; therefore, they are sometimes threatened by hunger and do not 
have sufficient savings to deal with emergencies or any unforeseen cash requirements 
(Yunus, 1999 and 2003; Rutherford, 2000). Therefore, lending them money can 
basically improve their lives since they can buy food for basic needs in the short run or 
conduct small profit businesses in the long run.
18
 However, with little income and no 
collateral, the poor cannot access the basic financial services (loans) from traditional 
commercial banks and other formal financial providers. Even if they do have minor 
assets, the amounts are too small to be used as collateral with the banks. Therefore, they 
borrow money from moneylenders who always provide loans with very high interest 
rates if their relatives have no money to lend them (Ngo and Nguyen, 2007; Rosenberg 
et al., 2009; BBC News, 2011).  
                                                 
17
 Interest is calculated by using a simple or compound formula (interest is earned on 
prior interest in addition to the principal) as follows: Simple Interest = Principal x 
Interest Rate x Time or Compound Interest = Principal x [(1 + Interest)
Time
 -1] 
18
 See WB (1980), UNDP (1997), Morduch and Haley (2002), Yunus (1999 and 2003), 
Daley-Harris (2003 and 2007) and Vetrivel and Kumarmangalam (2010). 
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The poor spend the money they borrow to buy rice and daily food, or to buy 
machines and land for long-term production. They can also establish a small profit 
business for stable returns and repay debts after a period of time or a business cycle 
(Yunus, 1999 and 2003; Rutherford, 2000). This means the poor take out a loan and 
repay it through a series of savings from their income. This process is called “saving 
down” (Rutherford, 2000). According to this approach, the loan is considered as half of 
the whole process since the poor use the money borrowed for daily living and 
investments; after that they need to save and accumulate income and assets for 
repayment. On the other hand, they must accumulate money by putting aside many 
small saving amounts until they build up to a larger sum as needed. This strategy is 
called “saving up” (Rutherford, 2000) (see Appendix 2.2). Clearly, MFIs must offer 
savings and loans to the poor since saving and repaying are both similar activities, in 
that the poor use loans for investment instead of expenditure.  
Therefore, providing savings and small loans (microcredit) to the poor at 
subsidised or reasonable interest rates
19
 means giving them chances to become self-
sufficient (ACCION, 2011). However, it is not a charm or a machine that can 
automatically turn the poor into the non-poor. The point is that it is basically a long-
term process which tends to support the poor financially so that they can combine their 
skills, knowledge, experience and financial capital to break out of poverty and change 
                                                 
19
 To break even, the interest rate of bank loans is generally set to cover the cost of 
funds, loan losses and administrative costs (Christen et al., 2003). The interest rate is 
charged in microfinance to cover running costs, but it can help the poor become 
financially independent and competitive under normal market conditions. The 
reasonable interest rate is the rate at which MFIs can cover their costs and the poor can 
earn a profit (VisionFund, 2011). 
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their lives for a better and brighter future (for more detailed discussion of this issue, see 
the following sections of this chapter). 
2.2.3. Microfinance 
Microfinance was mentioned regularly as a new term in the field of development 
in the late 1970s
20
, but it became more popular after 2006 after the United Nations had 
declared 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. It attracted the attention of 
governments, organisations and researchers.
21
 
Microfinance is simply a term referring to micro- or small-scale financial services 
(including small loans and other financial facilities) provided to the poor, who are 
excluded from commercial financial institutions because they have low income and no 
collateral.
22
 The poor have basic needs like everyone else (such as basic health care, 
primary education, water and sanitation) and need financial services (loans, savings, 
insurance and money transfers) to manage their precarious lives, together with the 
provision of basic social services. Access to finance provides them with opportunities to 
take active roles in the economy through income, bargaining power and building up of 
social empowerment in their communities. They have opportunities to become self-
                                                 
20
  Prior to the late 1970s, the provision of financial services by governments and donors 
was in the form of subsidised rural credit programs. 
21
  See Wenner (1995), Meyer and Nagarajan (1992), Mullineux et al. (1998), Rhyne 
(1998), Hollis and Sweetman (1998), Morduch (1999a and 1999b), Ledgerwood (1999), 
Robinson (2001), Christen and Drake (2001 and 2002), Beck et al. (2004), De Aghion, 
and Morduch (2005), Seibel (2005), Dichter (2007), Hermes and Lensink (2007), IFAD 
(2010) and Pande et al. (2012). 
22
  For more detailed discussion of these issues, see Otero (1999), Robinson (2001), Var 
der Sterren (2008) and Pande et al. (2012). 
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sufficient in the long run by using these funds to build small profit businesses to obtain 
future cash flows (Pande et al., 2012).  
Microfinance is also mentioned as the right financial products and services 
specially designed to meet the financial needs of the poor, as well as their income-
generating activities. It is also linked to non-financial services such as education, health 
and nutrition. Clearly, microfinance is a long-term process which encourages the poor 
to save and accumulate their small incomes to reduce the impact of economic 
vulnerability.
23
 It can also help to combat the temporary poverty generated by crisis 
situations. Therefore, microfinance is considered an efficient tool for poverty reduction 
in rural areas, where most of the world’s poorest people live. It should ideally be 
amongst the top priorities of economic development in most developing countries for 
poverty reduction
24
. Microfinance continues to evolve, and the goal of industry leaders 
is to develop a fully inclusive financial service. This is the background for establishing 
the best microfinance providers who can provide relevant and useful services to the 
poor based on their advantages and disadvantages. 
2.2.4. Microfinance vs. Microcredit 
In the literature, the terms microfinance and microcredit are usually used 
interchangeably. However, they refer to the provision of different and distinct levels of 
financial services provided to the poor for poverty reduction.  
                                                 
23
 See Rutherford (2000), Morduch and Haley (2002), Khandker (2003), CGAP (2003), 
Epstein and Crane (2005), SEEP (2005), Ledgerwood and White (2006), Kiiru (2007), 
Chowdhury (2009), ADB (2009) and IFAD (2010). 
24
  See Khandker (2003) and Morduch and Haley (2002). 
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Microcredit simply refers to all types of small loans (or small amounts of money) 
provided directly to an individual or indirectly through groups by commercial banks or 
other financial institutions, with or without collateral
25
. Microcredit avoided the pitfalls 
and solved the problems of development lending by fostering better repayment, 
charging interest rates, and focusing on the poor.     
Microfinance, as mentioned above, refers to the financial service package 
(including a broader range of services, such as credit, savings, insurance, and other 
financial services) targeted at the poor.
26
 This means that microfinance includes 
microcredit and other financial products and services (such as savings, insurance and 
money transfer). 
Over the past few years, microfinance and microcredit are used interchangeably to 
refer to small loans while microcredit is simply a component of microfinance 
(ACCION, 2011). However, microfinance empowers the poor in a new way by 
providing them with access to formal and secured financial services. It is widely 
accepted that the poor need a wide range of financial services to meet their different 
needs, not just microcredit. 
Clearly, the difference between microfinance and microcredit suggests that MFIs 
need to regulate themselves in order to offer full financial services (particularly savings) 
to the poor.
27
 Transformation
28
 generally results in an improved governance and 
                                                 
25
  See Rutherford (2000), Rosenberg (2010) and KIVA (2011) 
26
  See CGAP (2003), Ledgerwood and White (2006) and ADB (2009) 
27
  See Segrado (2005), Ledgerwood and White (2006) and Pande et al. (2012) 
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ownership structure and is the only way an MFI can commercialise or “manage on a 
business basis” (Christen and Drake, 2002, p.4). By doing this, MFIs can expand their 
outreach by increasing the number of clients served, improving customer satisfaction 
and loan repayment and stabilising the sources of funds to create a viable business. 
2.3. Microfinance Providers and the Developmental Stages 
2.3.1. Microfinance Providers Category 
According to recent poverty reports, the demand for microfinance
29
 was from 925 
million hungry people in 2010 (13.6% of the world population of 6.8 billion) and 
around 35% of the total rural population were classified as extremely poor (IFAD, 
2010; FAO, 2010). However, the poor population is estimated to vary greatly in 
developing countries. According to USAID, the number of potential clients in 1995 was 
around 200 million (Christen et al., 1995). By December 31, 2007, the statistics on 
global outreach of MFIs show that 133,030,913 clients had access to microfinance 
services. Among them, 92,922,574 were the poorest (see Appendix 2.3). 
Robinson (2001, p.215) calculates as follows: “Assuming five people to a 
household among the 4.5 billion people living in the poor countries in 1999 (WB, 
2001), there are 900 million households. If, estimating conservatively, we assume that 
moneylenders supply credit to 30% of these households at least once a year, it means 
there are 270 million households borrowing from moneylenders in a year. Undoubtedly, 
                                                                                                                                               
28
  In most countries, regulatory policies prohibit unregulated financial institutions from 
taking deposits from the public and thus it is necessary to become licensed and change 
into a deposit-taking institution. 
29
  The demand refers to the poor population or the number of poor people who need 
microfinance under any circumstances. 
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however, many households borrow multiple times within a year." Although this is a 
very rough estimation, assuming big differences in different countries, the number 
seems to be most meaningful for the further development of microfinance. 
In contrast to the estimate of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, microfinance 
demand does not include every single household living on less than US$ 1 per day, but 
it counts everyone who has no regular access to traditional financial institutions. 
Obviously not all people who draw on moneylenders have financial needs that could be 
matched through MFIs. On the other hand, interest rates charged by moneylenders tend 
to be considerably higher than those of MFIs. The former normally charges monthly 
rate of between ten and several hundred percent per month. The latter generally charge 
between 1.5% and 5%, which enables them to attract additional clients (Gibbons and 
Meehan, 1999). 
In spite of the impressive growth of microfinance around the world, the 
population needs for microfinance are far from being met. By the end of 2007, the 
number of clients reached had increased from 67 million in 2003 to around 133 million 
(Daley_Harris, 2007). The number of the poorest clients increased because of an 
expanded definition of the term “poorest” in developing countries (Daley_Harris, 2003). 
Since the contribution of microfinance was expected to decrease dramatically, the 
growth rate cannot be used to predict the future of microfinance. This factor likely to 
slow down growth is in some Asian countries where almost 90% of the poorest clients 
live today. Even if one takes into consideration the relative size of Asia’s population 
and the fact that many customers in Latin America are relatively better off and are 
therefore not included in this number, the coverage of this part of the world far exceeds 
the others. 
26 
 
Based on their financial characteristics, microfinance providers are traditionally 
divided into three categories: formal, semi-formal and informal providers. These are 
also popular categories used by ADB and in many studies in microfinance (Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 1992 and 2000; ADB, 2011) (see Panel A, Appendix 2.4). 
Formal providers are the formal financial institutions such as commercial banks 
or credit cooperatives and regulated MFIs. In this system, the government plays an 
important role in providing financial services (almost solely on credit) to the poor via 
public-owned banks with nonprofit programs. They have been criticised for not being 
able to reach the targeted poor communities because of limited funds from the public 
sector and the lack of participation from the private sector. 
Semi-formal providers are organisations who have various structures of 
decentralised financing which offer microfinance. This system is relatively small and 
covers around 5% to 10% of the overall rural credit market. It includes Government 
Ministries and Programs, Mass Organisations, Specialized Microfinance Funds 
(including unregulated MFIs) and International Organisations (International NGOs and 
Inter-governmental organisations). 
Informal providers are informal lenders, including family, friends and 
moneylenders. Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)
30
 are also 
considered as informal providers. This system used to be the main funding source for 
the poor. Money borrowed from relatives or friends is usually at zero or low interest 
                                                 
30
  Loan sharks are people who offer illegal unsecured loans at very high interest rates to 
individuals and often use blackmail or threats of violence from the underworld to secure 
the repayments. 
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rates, while moneylenders (loan sharks
31
) charge five or ten times more than the market 
interest rate from formal financial institutions. The poor are always short of money 
before their harvests. Moneylenders lend money to them without any written contracts 
as short-term loans and collect repayments daily or weekly, as agreed with the 
borrowers. With no collateral in the simple procedures, moneylenders rely on the local 
underworld to collect debts if they are not paid on time.
32
 Over the past few years, the 
expansion of local commercial banks and credit cooperatives, as well as MFIs, has 
restructured the rural credit markets, and the poor have more opportunities to access the 
different sources of funds. 
The poor have no assets to pledge as collateral to obtain loans from local 
commercial banks
33
. Microfinance providers target the poor (non-bankable or near 
bankable people) directly and indirectly. This is considered as the main factor to 
determine exactly whether they are microfinance providers or other financial providers 
(commercial banks). In the literature, the formal financial provider system in rural areas 
(rural financial providers) is used to describe microfinance providers
34
. There are some 
                                                 
31
 ROSCAs are groups formed by individuals who agree to save and borrow together 
during a fixed period based on regular meetings. Each member contributes the same 
amount of money at each meeting, and one member is chosen to take the whole sum 
only once in a fixed period (Besley et al., 1994; Rutherford, 2000). ROSCAs are not 
accepted officially by any laws or written rules though they have existed for many 
generations. 
32
  See Chin (2003), Ngo and Nguyen (2007), VBSP (2009) and SBV (2009 and 2011). 
33
  See MFC/EMN/CDFA (2007), Norland (2010), Menkhoff et al. (2010) and 
Lammermann (2011). 
34
  See Dao (1998), Putzey (2002), BWTP (2004), Quach (2005), Nghiem et al. (2006) 
and APEC TATF (2011).  
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differences between microfinance and rural finance (Seibel, 2005; IMF and WB, 2005). 
Rural finance refers to financial activities in rural areas; therefore, microfinance is part 
of rural finance
35
. 
Helms (2006) extended the traditional categories by classifying microfinance 
providers into four general categories: formal financial institutions, NGOs, member-
owned organisations, and informal financial service providers. In this paper, the semi-
formal providers are divided into NGOs and member-owned organisations to emphasize 
the important roles of NGOs in microfinance. 
Based on funding sources, microfinance providers are divided into two systems: 
internal (local) providers and external (international) ones (Ledgerwood and White, 
2006; Isern et al., 2008) (see Panel B, Appendix 2.4). These categories are the 
background for defining the best providers and the co-operation between internal and 
external ones. Internal providers with limited funds for microfinance are still the main 
forces but external providers play important roles in improving poverty reduction by 
providing international funds to local organisations. 
According to Segrado (2005), microfinance providers can be divided into three 
groups based on customer classification (see Figure 2.1). The growth of the customer 
from beneficiary to client shows the growth in the way MFIs serve the needs of the 
poor. This finding is totally consistent with Ledgerwood and White (2006). 
 
                                                 
35
 Rural finance includes traditional banking and microfinance in rural areas. 
Microfinance refers to the provision of financial services specially designed for the poor 
in both rural and urban areas. Microfinance can be considered as a part of rural finance 
only in the rural areas. 
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Figure 2.1 Microfinance Providers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Segrado (2005), Ledgerwood and White (2006) and Isern et al. (2008) 
“Beneficiary” means that the poor are provided with microfinance together with 
food aid, water and sanitation, amongst other benefits. These programs provide the poor 
with awareness of their rights and some skills concerned with credit and saving. 
“Customer” means that the poor are well aware of what they need (also in 
financial terms) but have no access to a normal financial system that could meet their 
necessities. They are served by MFIs, who are specialised in providing minor financial 
services and specific technical assistance to the poor. 
By the term “clients," the poor seem to have higher awareness, and different 
needs. They could be small entrepreneurs who might be interested in leasing machinery 
or taking out insurance for their businesses. They are considered as clients and are 
easily approached by commercial banks or other financial institutions. 
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Over the past few years, the speed of the poverty reduction progress has become 
slow and microfinance has met some obstacles (Baydas et al., 1997). Among them, the 
limitation of local funds and poor participation of the private sector are the primary 
barriers. In fact, microfinance has been almost recognised by government as regulators 
and active participants via state-owned banks under nonprofit programs (Hossain and 
Knight, 2008). International organisations give some support based on training 
programs or nonprofit programs. Government and donors have exhausted the limited 
subsidised funds to cover the expanding demand of the microfinance industry, while 
they were unsuccessful in persuading the private sector to take part over the long term 
(MCI, 2004a and 2004b). Therefore, the applications of private sector (commercial 
microfinance) and the transformation of nondeposit taking MFIs into deposit taking 
MFIs are considered as innovative solutions to bring microfinance into the commercial 
realm with market-based principles or the expansion of the profit program 
(Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). It is also considered as a new approach for financial 
providers to secure stable growth in the global financial market (Banker, 2005). 
2.3.2. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
MFIs are broadly defined as different types of business organisations that 
provide microfinance services, ranging from small non-profit organisations to large 
profit ones, such as microfinance banks, credit unions, credit cooperatives, rural banks 
and NGOs. This definition includes a wide range of organisations based on their legal 
structure, mission and lending methodology. Among them, microfinance banks, rural 
banks and credit unions have the operational structures to conduct profitable business 
(MIX Market, 2011). 
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The number of MFIs has increased rapidly over the last few decades (see the 
detailed analysis in Chapter 5). The background for the development of MFIs was the 
subsidized programs of governments and donors. They provided subsidised loans to 
farmers to raise productivity and incomes in rural areas from the 1950s. Microcredit was 
also provided to women in small businesses from the 1980s to enable the poor to 
accumulate income and assets for production. The period from 1950 to 1980 saw the 
emergence of the participation of NGOs in microfinance (KIVA, 2011). From the late 
1990s, a number of NGOs started to transform themselves into formal financial 
institutions in order to access and on-lend client savings, thus enhancing their outreach 
(ARCP, 2011). 
MFIs show evidence that the poor can be treated as bankable people by applying a 
modern approach to traditional banking, such as group lending. They have provided 
some useful lessons to formal institutions concerning small transaction banking. Many 
of the newer players, such as commercial banks, have large existing branch networks, 
vast distribution outlets such as automatic teller machines (ATMs), and the ability to 
make significant investments in technology that could bring the right financial services 
closer to the poor.     
2.3.3. The Developmental Stages of MFIs 
Microfinance has grown over time with more and different types of investors 
involved, with new types of products and services being developed, and with new 
technologies to support it (Littlefield et al., 2003; Latifee, 2006;). There is a growing 
realisation in the international arena that the profit programs and participation of the 
private sector will give more opportunities to fulfil the social objectives of expanding 
access to a range of demand on a sustainable basis. Commercial microfinance, 
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therefore, is considered as the next stage of microfinance (Charitonenko and Campion 
2003; Ugur, 2006). Together with traditional microfinance, it will be the optimal 
solution, since the poor need money to buy daily food to survive in the short term, and 
to make some investments to become self-sufficient in the long term (ACCION, 2011). 
Figure 2.2 The Developmental Stages of MFIs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Charitonenko and Campion (2003) 
The future of microfinance will be based on the efficient performance of MFIs, 
increasing participation of the private sector, and the development of financial markets. 
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international organisations, and the role of financial intermediaries is to provide 
critically important deposits, recycling these savings into productive loans.  
2.4. The Main Challenges of Microfinance  
Microfinance has proven to be an appropriate, effective and powerful tool for the 
poor and poverty reduction in order to reach the Millennium goals.
36
 In fact, it has been 
extensively examined over the past 15 years, and the resulting studies show that MFIs 
need to move out of heavily subsidized operations and into to commercialization to 
achieve efficiency and sustainability.
37
 Since donor funding is becoming insufficient to 
meet the continual demand for well-designed financial products from new and existing 
clients, access to commercial funds tends to help MFIs improve their performance 
(Ledgerwood and White, 2006). This clearly suggests that MFIs may obtain 
sustainability to achieve a targeted outreach. However, there are some sceptics who 
argue that there is a trade-off between financial sustainability and social mission. 
Therefore, this section will provide a comprehensive review of some of the main 
challenges of microfinance in order to shed light on the importance for MFIs to achieve 
financial sustainability. It is suggested that funding microfinance plays an important 
role in MFIs being economically viable and sustainable and able to provide financial 
services to the poor in the long run. 
2.4.1. Does Microfinance Have an Impact on Poverty Reduction? 
This section aims to provide a comprehensive review of the impact of 
microfinance on poverty reduction in order to shed light on the importance of 
                                                 
36
 See Morduch and Haley (2002), Dichter and Harper (2007), Dichter (2007), Hossain 
and Knight (2008), Aigbokhan (2008), Roodman (2009) and IFAD (2010) 
37
 See Christen and Drake (2002) and Ledgerwood and White (2006). 
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commercial microfinance (commercial funds) in the developmental stages of MFIs, as 
presented in the previous section. This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first 
sub-section examines whether or not microfinance really helps the poor, while the 
second sub-section examines who benefits from microfinance (i.e. the poorest or the 
poor who live near the poverty line benefit from microfinance). 
2.4.1.1 Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? 
Over the past few years, many studies have been conducted and have come to 
different conclusions concerning the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction (i.e. 
these studies investigate whether or not microfinance really helps the poor). Most 
studies provide evidence supporting the positive effects on increasing the income
38
 of 
the poor or reducing their vulnerability
39
. There are a few studies with largely 
conclusive and positive evidence on health, nutritional and education (Wright, 2000). 
It is widely accepted that poverty is a social problem and a deeply embedded 
wound that permeates every dimension of culture and society. Poverty reduction, 
therefore, is ideally a long-term process integrating numerous financial and non-
financial programs for generations of poor households (Aigbokhan, 2008). Lack of 
money and low personal income are basic measures and also symptoms of poverty 
(Bartle, 2008). For that reason, lending small amounts of money to the poor (especially 
the poorest) theoretically has a positive impact on poverty reduction since it possibly 
helps them overcome hunger to survive and also gives them a chance to conduct small 
                                                 
38
 See UNICEF (1997), Khandker (2001 and 1998), Wright (2000), Morduch and 
Haley, (2002), Bansal (2011), Akinlabi (2011) and Pande et al. (2012). 
39
  See Wright (2000), Zaman (2000), McCulloch and Baulch (2000) and Swain and 
Floro (2007). 
35 
 
businesses for future cash flows to improve their standards of living.
40
 Clearly, from a 
social point of view, lending money to the poor (microfinance) really helps them and 
has a positive impact on poverty reduction. 
There have been numerous empirical studies conducted to examine the effects of 
microfinance in different countries by using the double difference approach or panel 
data with the fixed effect model. The results show that the personal incomes of 
borrowers are different with or without microfinance programs in different areas. 
Gertler et al. (2003) test for a relation between access to finance and consumption 
shortfalls associated with ill health. Their results show that microfinance is likely to 
reduce vulnerability and access to finance tends to help the poor smooth their 
consumption in the face of a decline in health. Clearly, a significant positive impact is 
found in personal income and consumption or a reduction in the vulnerability of the 
poor. Roodman (2009) therefore states that it is strange that researchers are still asking 
whether or not microfinance can reduce poverty. 
Using surveys and empirical work conducted in the 1990s by the Bangladesh 
Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) and the World Bank, Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
and Khandker (2001) assume that borrowing (Sijt) is affected by characteristics (Xijt) 
(Equation 1.1) and consumption is dependent on current and past characteristics 
(included borrowings) (Equation 1.2). 
Sijt  +   (1.1) 
Cijt  +  (1.2) 
                                                 
40
 See WB (1980), UNDP (1997), Yunus (1999 and 2003) BBC News (2005), 
Daley_Harris (2007 and 2003), Roodman (2009) and IFAD (2010). 
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where X is a vector of characteristics
 
(such as age and education) and  is a vector
 
of the unknown parameters to be estimated.  and µ are unmeasured determinants of 
credit demand that are time-invariant and fixed within a group or village.  is a 
nonsystematic error. S refers to the
 
credit demand.  and  measure the effects
 
of current 
and past credit and C refers
 
to the consumption of the borrowers. According
 
to equation 
1.2, the return to consumption is the sum of returns from past and current credit. If 
current credit (Sijt) is zero (this means the poor stop borrowing after period 1), past 
credit (Sij (t–1))
 
may continue to benefit the borrower (  > 0).  
Despite the success and popularity of microfinance as mentioned above, there is 
no clear evidence that microfinance has a positive impact on poverty reduction (De 
Aghion and Morduch, 2005 and 2010). Odell (2010) and Orso (2011) have examined 
the impacts of microfinance. Their results show that the rigorous quantitative evidence 
of microfinance impact is still scarce and inconclusive. Overall, it is widely 
acknowledged that no well known study robustly shows any strong impacts of 
microfinance (De Aghion and Morduch, 2005). According to Dichter (2007), the impact 
of microfinance seems unrealistic based on the recent experience of developed 
countries, where microfinance might leave some poor people worse off, as in case of 
credit cards and mortgages. 
Straus (2010) found that there was an insignificant and negative effect of 
microfinance on consumption, and no effect on new business creation, education or 
women’s empowerment. Karlan and Zinman (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2009) also 
found no impact from a number of large-scale MFIs. Roodman and Morduch (2009) 
took a different tack, revisiting the works of Pitt and Khandker (Khandker, 1998; Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998), and reported that there was very little solid evidence which 
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showed the real role of microfinance in poverty reduction in measurable ways 
(Bateman, 2011). 
Thus on balance, the majority of research appears to indicate that microfinance 
does have positive and significant effects on the poor in certain situations. In spite of the 
fact that some studies were conducted by using different approaches and point to 
different conclusions, they are all ready to accept that it is extremely difficult to separate 
and measure the contributions of microfinance to poverty reduction, since poverty is a 
significant social problem that permeates every dimension of culture and society. In 
addition, there are strong potential synergies between microfinance and the provision of 
other non-financial programs since the benefits derived from these programs are 
interconnected (Morduch and Haley, 2002). In conclusion, these results tend to suggest 
that microfinance cannot immediately turn the poor into non-poor. The point is that 
microfinance is a long-term process which tends to support the poor financially so that 
they can combine their skills, knowledge, experience and financial capital to break away 
from poverty and change their lives for a better and brighter future.  
2.4.1.2. Who Benefits from Microfinance? 
There have been some discussions about the poorest
41
 or just the poor near the 
poverty line who really benefit from microfinance. Since donor funding is becoming 
insufficient to meet the continual demand for well designed financial products from new 
and existing clients, MFIs tend to access commercial funds to improve their 
performance and also achieve a targeted outreach (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). 
Therefore, there has been some discussion about the incentives to serve the poorest of 
                                                 
41
  The poorest refers to the extremely poor or absolute poor people who have no land, 
limited access to basic social services and daily income of under US$ 1.0. 
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the poor. Several MFIs tend to serve the poor who are near or just above the poverty 
line, instead of the poorest. It is sometimes argued that microfinance has contributed 
positively to the well-being of the poor in general, but it has failed to reach the poorest 
in particular.   
Simanowitz (2002) states that the poor are not bankable and cannot access finance 
services from the formal financial institutions (such as commercial banks) as they have 
no collateral, as previously mentioned. The experiences of Grameen Bank, BRAC and 
SEWS show that microfinance delivered in financially sustainable ways can assist the 
poor achieve better outcomes by encouraging them to save what they can, borrow only 
what they can afford to repay and have responsibility for planning and repaying MFIs. 
The financial strategies for the poor, therefore, make a little difference at all for 
extremely poor people.
42
 
According to Morduch and Haley (2002), microfinance can be effective for the 
poor, including the poorest. However, well designed financial services are unlikely to 
have a positive effect on the poorest, unless they specifically seek to reach them 
(Wright, 2000). The poorest will be missed or they will tend to exclude themselves 
since they do not see the programs as being for them (Navajas et al., 2000).  
Hashemi (1997) concludes that nearly half of the rural poor in Bangladesh are the 
poorest. Microfinance programs in Bangladesh
43
 have succeeded in reaching only half 
of this population. Based on a case of BRAC’s Rural Development Programme, 40% of 
those eligible did not participate in any development activities, microfinance or 
                                                 
42
  See Khandker (1998), Simanowitz (2002) and Morduch and Haley (2002). 
43
 This refers to the Grameen Bank, BRAC, and all of the other non-government and 
government agency programs (see details in Hashemi, 1997). 
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otherwise (Matin, 2002; Husain, 1998). Concerning non-financial development 
services, almost 75% of the poorest did not participate (Rahman and Razzaque, 2000). 
The poorest tend to exclude themselves from microfinance activities since they do not 
have the capacity to be accountable for regular, sustained repayments or husbands do 
not permit their wives to join.
44
  
Rhyne and Drake (2002) argue that a business model always allows for a 
significant number of defaults, is unreasonable even if the revenue can cover the losses. 
They conclude that MFIs must provide the right financial services to the right customers 
to avoid defaults. The pressures
45
 may lead MFIs to make too many poor-quality loans 
by not providing credit to the right borrowers (i.e. over-lending) (Silva, 2012). Over-
lending and multiple borrowing may make the poor struggle to pay back their loans, as 
in the microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh in 2010.  Therefore, MFIs tend to have 
trouble in refinancing themselves or raising funds for lending activities (Mader, 2010). 
It appears that investors are beginning to wonder about the quality of their loans to 
MFIs. Funding microfinance and the relationship between funding and over-lending 
will be discussed in detail in the following section of this chapter. 
Although microfinance is clearly aimed at helping the poor access financial 
services and taking part in local economic activities to improve their lives, it has 
become increasingly apparent that it rarely serves the poorest unless these programs are 
intentionally designed to reach them since microfinance is unsuitable for all poor 
                                                 
44
 See Rutherford (1995), Hashemi (1997), Husain (1998), Choudhury (2000), Fernando 
and Meyer (2001), Morduch and Haley (2002) and Adjei and Arun (2009)  
45
 The pressures come from the social mission to provide microfinance to the poor, 
especially to the poorest or come from microfinance investors to obtain more returns. 
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people.
46
 Microfinance can work for the poorest, but there is no template for success. 
Clearly, microfinance is not suitable for all categories of the poor, and not all the poor 
have the same ability to take loans.
47
 This finding is totally consistent with the findings 
of many studies.
48
 Microfinance is generally most appropriate where ongoing economic 
activity and sufficient household cash flow already exist (CGAP, 2005). Therefore, 
rather than exclusively reaching the poorest, MFIs tend to reach the economically active 
poor or the non-poor who are hovering just above the poverty line based on their 
participation in economic activities. Not providing loans to the right borrowers clearly 
leads MFIs to make too many of poor quality loans and also makes the poor become 
over-indebtedness more easily. This suggests that MFIs may not intentionally target the 
poorest based upon the funders’ requirements.  
2.4.2. Financial Sustainability in Microfinance 
Ultimately, microfinance gives the poor opportunities to overcome poverty and 
become self-sufficient by running small businesses. Commercial microfinance typically 
does not reach the poorest people (outreach), who are intentionally reached by the 
government and donors with non-profit programs. Whether the focus is primarily on the 
poorest or not, microfinance tends to depend heavily on the community where people 
live together, interact with others, and build their relationships like fishing nets 
(Worakul, 2006). Therefore, the combination in microfinance between commercial and 
non-profit programs is ideally for the development of the community instead of 
                                                 
46
 See Hammill et al. (2008) and Adjei and Arun (2009). 
47
 There are some people who need direct basic assistances and are typically not suitable 
for microfinance, such as the sick, mentally ill and destitute. 
48
 See Morduch and Haley (2002), Hammill et al. (2008) and Adjei and Arun (2009). 
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focusing on a specific group of the poor, such as the poorest or the moderately poor.
49
 
Clearly, microfinance has two main functions: a social mission and financial 
sustainability (Zeller and Myer, 2002; Copestake et al., 2005a and 2005b) (see Figure 
2.3). In spite of the fact that MFIs can improve their financial performance (i.e. achieve 
sustainability) to achieve a targeted outreach, there are some sceptics who argue that 
there is a trade-off between financial sustainability and social mission. 
The social mission
50
 refers to the developmental objective of governmental and 
non- governmental players in microfinance (Hossain and Knight, 2008). This mission 
may be achieved by the number of target borrowers from subsidised or non-profit 
programs that focus on using microcredit primarily provided to the poor, particularly to 
the poorest at subsidized interest rates. However, there are some arguments as to 
whether subsidising interest rate is justified (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995; 
Morduch, 2000; Fernando, 2006). This concept is always mentioned in the early 
developmental stages of microfinance. The literature on the social role is descriptive 
and normative. Peer-reviewed papers focus on the theoretical and empirical research on 
the impact of microfinance
51
. It is often feared that there are insufficient public funds 
for the subsidized microfinance programs, and MFIs cannot remain viable. 
 
                                                 
49
  The moderately poor refer to poor people who are near the poverty line and have a 
daily income of between US$1.25 and US$ 2.0 (Cohen, 2003; Hammill et al., 2008). 
50
 The social mission is sometimes called the poverty approach or the capital to outreach 
in microfinance (Schreiner, 1996 and 2000). 
51
  See Hulme and Mosley (1996), Pitt and Khandker (1998), Coleman (1999), Morduch 
(1999b), Bhalotra et al. (2001), Zeller and Myer (2002), Morduch and Haley (2002), 
Khandker (2003) and Copestake et al. (2005a and 2005b). 
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Figure 2.3 Sustainable Microfinance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Schreiner (1996), Robinson (2001), Zeller and Myer (2002), Charitonenko and 
Rahman (2002), Copestake et al. (2005b), Copestake (2010) and Gonzalez (2010a). 
Financial sustainability,
52
 on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of 
economic viability (Arsyad, 2005; Srinivasan and Sriram, 2006). It refers to the ability 
to cover all administrative costs, loan losses, and financing costs from the operating 
incomes. It has been pointed out repeatedly that MFIs need to be economically viable 
and sustainable in the long run since the sustainability of MFIs is not possible without 
sound financial performance. In addition, some studies have found that there is a strong 
link between financial sustainability and the achievement of the social objectives of 
                                                 
52
 The financial role is called financial sustainability or self-sufficiency. Financial 
sustainability is a status when service and infrastructure levels and standards are 
delivered according to a long-term plan without the need to increase rates or reduces 
services. In microfinance, sustainability refers to the state of MFIs being economically 
viable (Christen and Drake, 2001; Robinson, 2001; Zeller and Myer, 2002). 
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MFIs (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). The poor tend to borrow from financially viable 
MFIs (Zeller and Meyer, 2002), which seems to suggest a win-win situation in which 
MFIs and the poor can earn profits. For those reasons, MFIs ideally focus on viability 
by reaching the economically active poor with small potential profit businesses instead 
of focusing on the number of borrowers (Hammill et al., 2008). Clearly, the social role 
seems to lead MFIs to over-lend in certain situations (i.e. reach the massive outreach) 
by not providing microfinance to the right people. 
There are a large number of MFIs which still depend on government nonprofit 
programs or donor subsidies (NGOs) since microfinance is a costly business with high 
transaction and information costs. Nevertheless, the importance of sustainability led to 
an important debate between financial sustainability and social mission in the 1990s. 
Both approaches agree that the poor should be served, but in different ways. 
Sustainability is ideally the premise for the future of microfinance. 
The advocates of the social approach would argue that the poorest cannot afford 
higher interest rates; therefore, financial sustainability in microfinance goes against the 
aim of serving large groups. The empirical evidence neither shows that the poor cannot 
afford higher interest rates, nor that there is a negative correlation between the financial 
sustainability of the institution and the poverty level of the clients (Hermes and Lensink, 
2007). However, the financial approach is focused more on near-bankable people than 
on non-bankable people. Clearly, the balance between these approaches is also 
recognized by Charitonenko and Rahman (2002) who argue there are still existing profit 
and non-profit programs in microfinance. 
This issue is a new paradigm in financial performance and the efficiency of 
MFIs (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). By using the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI), 
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Yaron (1992a and 1992b) indicates how much higher the interest rate needs to be for 
borrowers to cover all operating costs. In addition, almost all MFIs are still subsidy 
dependent (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; MIX Market 2009 and 2011). Morduch (1999a) 
provides a similar calculation for the Grameen Bank, and shows that, in order to 
become subsidy independent, it would have needed to increase lending rates by some 
75% between 1985 and 1996.         
According to the SDI, a rise in lending interest rates brings higher profits. This, 
however, need not to be the case since higher rates could lead to lower profits in the 
case of adverse selection and moral hazard effects (Cull et al., 2007). A more accurate 
assessment would need to compare the costs and benefits of subsidies. Unfortunately, 
only a few studies are concerned with this issue (Townsend and Yaron, 2001); 
Khandker, 2003). These studies suggest that the social benefits exceed the costs. 
Most studies focus on financial sustainability and the effects of sustainability on 
outreach, or more specifically on the number of borrowers (breadth) and the 
socioeconomic level (depth) (Goldberg, 2005). Weiss and Montgomery (2004) 
summarize the evidence in Asia and Latin America, while Lafourcade et al. (2005) 
focuses on Africa. They provide mixed evidence regarding depth of outreach. The 
existing studies do not systematically explain differences, nor do they explicitly explore 
whether there is a trade-off between the depths of outreach versus the struggle for 
financial sustainability (Hermes and Lensink, 2007).   
Cull et al. (2007) provides a new dimension of literature on the financial 
performance of MFIs based on an extensive comparison of 124 MFIs from 49 countries. 
This study gives some empirical evidence for a trade-off between the depth of outreach 
and profitability by examining whether more profitability is associated with a lower 
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depth of outreach, and whether there is a move from serving absolutely poor people to 
wealthier ones in order to achieve higher financial sustainability (mission drift). This 
study also examines whether an increase in lending interest rates affects the loan 
portfolio due to adverse selection and moral hazard. According to Fernando (2006) and 
Rosenberg (1996), there is overwhelming empirical evidence which shows that the poor 
have enough returns from their businesses to pay an interest rate at the market rates. 
These results are ideally a background for the development of commercial microfinance 
by increasing the participation of the private sector.  
In summary, the literature shows that neither financial sustainability nor outreach 
(social mission) is better or more important for MFIs. Rather, it is necessary to have the 
right mixture because they are typically similar to each other. Ultimately, this 
combination assures that an MFI can make profits which are reinvested into the 
business, so it may operate longer. The crucial intention of microfinance is not to have a 
return on equity but to help the poor to alleviate poverty by making them bankable. 
Nevertheless an MFI has to take many aspects
53
 into account and decide, even before 
setting up a business, which goals should be achieved. This suggests that good 
governance is the first step to a sustainable enterprise that can only become sustainable 
with profitable elements. 
2.4.3. Lending Methodologies 
Microfinance is basically provided to the poor through group or individual 
lending (Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Lehner, 2009; Gine and Karlan, 2010). Most MFIs 
are traditionally based on group lending to make the poor become bankable after being 
                                                 
53
 These aspects tend to differ from place to place, and from country to country, since it 
depends on the country and local circumstances, but also on the availability of MFIs. 
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non-bankable or near bankable by reducing the information asymmetry in credit 
activities (Cull et al., 2007; Kono and Takahashi 2009). On the other hand, some MFIs 
prefer to make individual lending since they have more history information and it is 
easy to manage the lending operations with the poor as individuals. This seems to 
suggest that MFIs tend to make group lending instead of individual lending at the early 
stage of development.
 54
  However, using the right lending methodology results in better 
performance, although each case depends on the specific circumstances of each country 
and firm, as noted. 
2.4.3.1. Group Lending 
The poor with weak balance sheets (no cash, no collateral and no guaranteed 
income) are unlikely to have access to sources of finance (Tirole, 2005). A number of 
recent and apparently successful MFIs have tried to strengthen the balance sheet of 
small borrowers by lending to groups rather than to individuals. A comprehensive 
overview of institutions, incentive considerations, and empirical data in microfinance 
can be found in De Aghion and Morduch (2005).  
The poor organise themselves in small groups, and each participant accepts joint 
responsibility for the loan (called joint liability) (De Aghion and Morduch, 2000; 
Chowdury, 2005; Hermes, 2006; Hermes and Lensink, 2007). Some empirical studies 
show that self-selected groups perform better than groups selected by MFIs as problems 
of under-investment may be ameliorated and repayment rates are also improved 
(Natarajan, 2004).  Village banking
55
 is considered as one kind of group lending. There 
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 See the developmental stages of MFIs in the previous part of this chapter. 
55
 Village banking refers to the lending methodology in which clients - typically women 
in a specific village - form groups of approximately 10-30 individuals.  
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is cross-pledging among several projects, which means the projects are not those of a 
single borrower, but rather of different ones.  
Table 2.1 Lending Methodologies of MFIs (%) 
Methodology 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Individual 34.98 35.80 38.08 41.38 37.45 
Individual/Solidarity
56
 45.96 44.59 44.44 40.06 43.83 
Solidarity
57
 8.74 9.23 7.98 9.87 9.98 
Village Banking 10.31 10.0 9.49 8.69 8.74 
Source: MIX Market 
 Group lending by using social capital as collateral: Tirole (2005) focuses 
on physical capital (assets and income). Capital can be given a broader meaning, some 
of which is relevant for our present concern. Relations among people matter 
substantially, even in economic situations such as lending relationships. One view of 
group lending is that social capital can supply an insufficient amount of physical capital 
and thereby facilitate financing. “Social capital” is a complex notion (Coleman, 1999). 
 Group lending by peer monitoring:  The competing rationale for group 
lending is peer monitoring. Peer monitoring can occur at two stages: ex ante (before the 
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 Individual/Solidarity is the combination of individual and solidarity lending. 
57
 Solidarity, sometimes called solidarity lending or solidarity groups, is the lending 
practice where small groups of the poor borrow collectively and group members 
encourage one another to repay. Solidarity groups are very small, typically including 
five individuals. 
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investment decision) and ex post (after the investment decision). In either case, group 
lending is one way of eliciting the information that borrowers have about each other. Ex 
ante, entrepreneurs may have information about each other that is not available to 
lenders (Ghatak and Kali, 2001). An entrepreneur’s willingness to team up with another 
entrepreneur under a joint liability lending arrangement is good news about the ability 
or willingness of the latter to be successful. In other words, group lending reduces the 
adverse selection problem (Natarajan, 2004). 
Ahlin and Townsend (2007) and Karlan (2007) provide new insights into why and 
how group lending works in enhancing repayment rates. Groups of borrowers are 
established to ensure the repayment of loans because group members have joint 
liability. Non-repayment means all members must cover this loss or will be denied 
future access to loans. For this reason, group lending creates incentives for screening 
and monitoring between members of the loan repayment (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). 
Moreover, members always live close to each other and have social ties (considered as 
social capital). Therefore, they are better informed about each other’s activities.58  
Until now, there has still been a little empirical evidence of the reduction of 
information asymmetries. This is, at least partly, due to the difficulty of obtaining 
reliable data on the working of these programs and the behaviour of their participants. 
Most of the current studies focus on the impact of group lending on the repayment rates 
by using different types of proxies for screening, monitoring and enforcement (Hermes 
and Lensink, 2007; Gine and Karlan, 2010). 
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 See Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), Banerjee et al. (1994), Wenner (1995), Besley and 
Coaste (1995), Sharma and Zeller (1997), Zeller (1998), Ghatak (1999 and 2000), De 
Aghion (1999), Wydick (2001), Chowdury (2005), Gangopadhyay et al. (2005) and 
Hermes et al. (2005 and 2006). 
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2.4.3.2. Individual Lending 
Individual lending is a traditional and common lending methodology of financial 
institutions in which individuals are provided loans directly by the lenders based on 
their own personal credit worthiness such as their reputation among peers and society, 
and income sources (Lehner, 2009; De Aghion and Morduch, 2000).   
In microfinance, individual lending is associated with larger loans per person than 
in group lending. MFIs provide loans to the poor based on collateral or individual 
guarantors who are friends or relatives well known to the borrowers. Guarantors have 
the responsibility of repaying the loan to the lender in case the borrower fails to do so 
(Flaming, 2007). According to the findings of Lapenu and Zeller (2001) and Lehner 
(2009), MFIs prefer to offer individual loans rather than group ones since refinancing 
costs become high and competition between MFIs is low when the loan size within the 
group is larger. However, the screening and monitoring by peers in group lending 
reduce the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Hermes and Lensink, 2007).  
Individual lending is predicted to gain in importance in the future if MFIs continue to 
gain better access to capital markets (Lehner, 2009).  
2.4.4. Interest Rate 
The interest rate of loans provided to the poor is one of most important issues in 
microfinance (especially in commercial microfinance). A few years ago, interest rates 
were established below cost recovery levels since MFIs and the international 
communities were focusing on the access to loans of poor households by the subsidized 
programs (Fernando, 2006). It was supposed that the poor were viewed as bad credit- 
risk people, who were unable to invest borrowed money in a way that would allow them 
to repay the loans and interest (Ghatak, 1983; Yunus, 1999; Robinson, 2001).  
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Clearly, they can always repay the borrowed money once they earn profits or 
have positive cash flows from their investments. Being in debt is basically not a good 
thing, since the poor have to pay back borrowed money and they cannot afford to lose 
it. If there are losses in investment, they will be in big trouble. Borrowing for 
investments is typically not a bad idea since people sometimes do not have sufficient 
funds to invest in good business ideas, as well as borrowing for emergency financing 
needs if they are useful to the poor and they can repay loans. However, there is always a 
probability of failure, even if the risk is low or high. If the poor do not have innovative 
minds or the knowledge to start their own business, using borrowed money for 
investment may be a bad idea. Investment always needs time to become established and 
gradually earn a profit. The poor, therefore, cannot expect to earn a profit immediately 
and must also repay their debt and interest on time. In addition, to earn profit, the rate of 
return from their businesses must be higher than the interest rate of the loans.  
Providing small loans to the poor is typically a costly business due to high 
transaction and information costs
59
 (Yunus, 2007; Hermes and Lensink, 2007; 
Gonzalez, 2010b). In order to remain viable, MFIs either need to be heavily subsidized 
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 Loan sizes depend on what the poor are going to do with the money (the purposes of 
the loans). According to the Grameen’s experiences, some people need only US$ 20, 
others US$ 100 or $500; $25 is a huge amount for a villager (Yunus, 1999, p.205). 
Providing loans is like giving the poor pride, and makes them pay back every penny. In 
the United States, microcredit refers to loans under $35,000, and more than 90% of 
loans are between US$1,000 and $10,000 (Opportunity Fund, 2011). In Vietnam, loan 
sizes are limited to US$1,000 for business purposes, US$450 for housing and US$650 
for individuals (Ngo and Nguyen, 2007; VBSP, 2009). 
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or to charge for loans at market interest rates.
60
 Microfinance programs with subsidised 
interest rates are traditionally operated or backed by local government and donors for 
poverty reduction. Subsidised interest rates generally benefit only a small number of the 
poor over a short period. These programs usually have lower repayment rates than 
commercial microfinance since the poor know that they will be provided with loans 
again as long as the government keeps funding these programs. Therefore, MFIs have 
no incentive to become sustainable, show institutional dependency and limited growth, 
and lack discipline to enforce the poor to make repayments. The poor tend to view these 
loans as one-off gifts that do not need to be repaid (CGAP, 2002). In fact, the poor are 
willing to pay high interest rates for better services and continued and reliable access to 
finance (Ledgerwood, 1999). Clearly, these subsidized rates may effectively undermine 
the competition that is essential for the development and efficiency of MFIs.    
MFIs, on the other hand,  must set interest rates that cover all administrative costs, 
plus the cost of capital (including inflation), loan losses, and a provision for increasing 
equity with the aim of providing viable, long-term financial services on a large scale 
(CGAP, 2002). Therefore, the break-even interest rate (r*) (equation 1.4) for MFIs to 
operate without subsidies is calculated by the volume of loans outstanding before 
adjustments (L), the fraction expected to be repaid (1-d), total investment income (I), 
total costs (including the cost of capital) (C), and the total value of implicit subsidies (S) 
based on the expected income and total costs (Equation 1.3)
61
. 
L (1+r* ) (1-d) + I = L + C + S                   (1.3) 
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 Viability refers to the ability to maintain operations, to develop or become established 
in the long run. 
61
 See Yaron (1992b) and Morduch (1999b, p.244) 
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r* = [ C + S –I + dL] / [(L (1-d)]  (1.4) 
Rosenberg (1996) outlines the standard method of setting sustainable interest rates 
for MFIs. The annual effective interest rate (I) should be calculated by the transaction 
costs (TA), the annual loan loss (LL), the cost of funds
62
 (CF), the capitalisation rate
63
 
(K), and the investment income (II). However, this model ignores the timing of cash 
flows and does not take taxes into account. It has to be regarded as fairly imprecise and 
hence should not be used for business plans. Nevertheless, it can be used as an 
approximation of the interest rate that an MFI would need to charge to provide its 
services as planned. 
  (1.5) 
 
Although most MFIs charge interest rates below the annual effective rate 
according to Rosenberg (1996) - equation 1.5, many critics have vehemently argued 
against any rates exceeding those of traditional banks. Many practitioners believe in a 
strong negative correlation between the interest rate and the demand for loans 
(Morduch, 1999a and 1999b; Karlan and Zinman, 2006). Others have argued more 
generally that concentrating on profitability and thus charging high interest rates diverts 
MFIs from serving the poorest people (Bogan, 2009). Meanwhile, MFIs are unwilling to 
charge interest rates for funds they received cheaply through grants or subsidized loans 
and are worried about undermining their social goals by charging higher rates 
(Schreiner, 1996; Khandker, 1998). 
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 Interest and administration costs are needed to obtain deposits and commercial loans 
as well as the imputed costs on equity due to inflation. 
63
 The capitalisation rate represents the net real profit. 
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Natarajan (2004) focuses on the adverse selection problem in order to examine the 
interest rate for individual and joint liability lending.
64
 This study concludes that the 
interest rate for group lending is lower than for individual lending due to the 
relationship between the level of interest rate and the value of collateral (level of 
guarantee). This finding is definitely consistent with the recent findings of Attanasio et 
al. (2011). Obviously, MFIs use social collateral to overcome the problems of adverse 
selection to improve repayment rates and pass on the burden and costs associated with 
monitoring loans to the poor. Joint responsibility can be considered as a form of ex-post 
pledgeable income that is used as collateral rather than traditional assets. As a result 
MFIs seem to expect that group members will select their potential members carefully 
to reduce their expected costs.  
Recently, Gonzalez (2010b) analysed the microcredit interest rate premium
65
 
based on the review of the methodology proposed by Yunus (2007). This paper focuses 
on how MFIs can fulfil their social missions while charging the poor the market interest 
rate. The interest rates charged by MFIs are higher than those of non-MFIs (such as 
banks) since MFIs have higher operating costs in the delivery of small loans, including 
administrative and personnel expenses (Gonzalez, 2010b).  
Despite the fact that numerous poor people are able to generate returns from their 
investments, obviously not all are able to use borrowed money in such a productive way 
and therefore, cannot afford loans at commercial rates. In order to also reach the 
poorest, many MFIs tend to mix their sources of funds, especially investment funds with 
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 See page 7, Natarajan (2004). 
65
 Interest rate premium is defined as the difference between the interest rate of loans 
and the cost of funds at the market rate paid by the MFI (Yunus, 2007). 
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low costs from donors, in order to make their interest rates lower (Campion et al., 
2010). Clearly, an interest rate at the market rate is possible and microfinance can be a 
profitable industry with the increasing participation of the private sector (Morduch and 
Haley, 2002; Tulchin, 2004; Campion et al., 2010). 
2.4.5. Empowering Women 
One important factor many experts on poverty reduction discuss when defining 
poverty is empowerment. This generally refers to the expansion of the individual’s 
ability to make strategic life choices (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). The poor are not 
empowered since there are few jobs, hence they tend to accept to do any job or start 
small businesses to survive. Therefore, this state of existence can be linked to poverty. 
When people are disempowered, they are often in poverty (Maes and Foose, 2006). 
Therefore, empowerment is the expansion of the assets and capabilities of poor people 
to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable institutions that 
affect their lives. Poor people need a range of assets and capabilities to increase their 
well-being and security, as well as their self-confidence. The empowerment of women, 
called gender empowerment, has become a significant topic of discussion with regards 
to development and economics. 
 “Empowering women” means giving them more rights and opportunities because 
of their important roles in families, villages or communities (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). 
Better education helps most women gain better control in daily life and improve their 
living standards. Women take part in family planning and help to reduce the rapid 
growth of the population in poor countries. Therefore, this helps to increase economic 
development based on their contributions to the survival of the family. Therefore, 
55 
 
empowering women is one of the important objectives for microfinance (Swain and 
Wallentin, 2007).
66
 
Microfinance has generally targeted poor women by providing chances to access 
financial services (Yunus, 1999; Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). Many studies have proved 
how access to financial services has improved the status of women within the family 
and the community. Women have become more assertive and confident. In regions 
where women's mobility is strictly regulated, women have become more visible and are 
better able to negotiate the public sphere. Women own assets and play a stronger role in 
making decisions. In some social programs, there are declining levels of violence 
against women. The basic theory is that microfinance empowers women by providing 
loans and giving chances to earn an independent income and contribute financially to 
their households and communities (Sujatha, 2011).  
Lending to women in developing countries has some benefits since they play 
important roles in poor households. Women are responsible for managing the home, 
maintaining the property, raising the children, and they are also especially responsible 
for daily consumptions and maintaining the savings accounts
67
 of the family, while men 
are typically the ones who work to earn money (Yunus, 1999; Ngo and Nguyen, 2007).  
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  Most microfinance programs target women since they play an important role in the 
survival of the family and are more reliable thereby contributing to financial viability 
(De Aghion and Morduch, 2005, pp.179-195). The impact of microfinance is a long 
term process and may take a long time before it is significantly reflected in observable 
measures. Only a few studies have successfully investigated the impact in a rigorous 
manner (Pitt et al., 2006). 
67
 In Bangladesh, as in many developing countries, husbands generally want to control 
the money and make the final decisions concerning the use of money for the 
investments of the household (Yunus, 1999).  
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Some practitioners argue that an intentional focus on women’s empowerment as a 
central principle of microfinance may lead them to additional activities which could 
affect the efficiency of providing financial services to the poor in a sustainable way 
(Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). There are three main reasons for not intentionally focusing 
on women. First, microfinance is provided to the right member of the poor family since 
microfinance is not suitable for all people (Morduch and Haley, 2002; Adjei and Arun, 
2009). Second, lending to women has meanings not only for women but also for 
families or households. If a woman wants to take out a loan, MFIs will always insist 
that she needs to discuss it with her husband. Women always spend the income they 
earn to benefit their families and to lead to better lives (Yunus, 1999). Third, MFIs tend 
to provide microfinance to members of families who take part in ongoing economic 
activities or have effective business plans, instead of intentionally focusing on gender. 
2.4.6. Scale of Operation 
In commercial microfinance, scale of operation refers to the scale of financial 
products and services provided to the poor by MFIs. Financial products and services are 
likely to be adapted to meet the demands of the poor which ensures that the right 
financial products and services are provided to the right people. Therefore, MFIs may 
earn profits from their business at the market interest rate or at a reasonable rate from 
which MFIs can cover their operating costs and also remain viable (VisionFund, 2011). 
Without enough invested capital, low return on equity and a low repayment rate, any 
businesses commonly cannot compete in this world of profit. The return on equity 
(ROE) tends to encourage investors to reinvest in microfinance, so it may operate 
longer and meet the continual demand of new and existing clients. This section aims to 
provide a comprehensive review of the impact of scale of operations in microfinance 
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from the borrowers’ (the poor) and the lenders’ (MFIs) points of view in order to shed 
light on the link between funding, scale and financial performance.  
2.4.6.1. From the Poor’s Point of View 
It is widely accepted that the poor have varied financial needs that can be 
categorised into three main purposes: spending on the basic needs of the family, 
conducting small businesses, and dealing with emergencies as previously mentioned. 
The poor basically tend to borrow money to meet their financial needs as they have 
insufficient funds from very low daily income. Therefore, loan sizes depend on what 
they are going to do with the borrowed money (i.e. the scale depends on the purposes of 
the loans).
68
 It is suggested that MFIs should provide sufficient loan sizes to appropriate 
borrowers who have innovative minds and the knowledge to create good business ideas. 
There are possible moral hazards, in that the poor may want larger loan sizes than they 
really need or are able to manage.
69
 Larger loans or over-lending can easily lead to the 
over-indebtedness of some borrowers, who do not use the borrowed money wisely in 
small businesses and struggle to pay back loans to the lenders. Smaller loans, on the 
other hand, are likely to make the poor borrow from multiple sources if their financial 
needs are not understood and met, which can also lead to over-indebtedness. MFIs, 
therefore, need in-depth understanding of the financial needs of the poor to provide 
suitable products to meet their needs. 
In addition, the poor tend to borrow from a variety of formal and informal sources 
for different purposes (i.e. multiple borrowing). It is a great challenge to track the 
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  See Yunus (1999), WWB (2003), Ngo and Nguyen (2007), VSBP (2009), Arora and 
Meenu (2010) and Opportunity Fund (2011). 
69
  See WWB (2003), Haas (2006), Arora and Meenu (2010) and Silva (2012). 
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borrowing from several sources. This therefore tends to lead the poor into considerable 
debt and becomes dangerous if they are unable to pay off their loans. Even if MFIs have 
suitable products to meet their financial needs, this still cannot stop them from 
borrowing elsewhere. Clearly, financial education and the consequences of over-
indebtedness have to be explained and reinforced periodically.  
Overlending and multiple borrowing are the most important early signs of over-
indebtedness, in which the poor are unable to pay off their loans (Hass, 2006; CGAP, 
2012). This is likely to be caused by the free market and stiff competition between MFIs 
and other financial providers. According to CGAP (2012) and Duquet (2006), credit 
bureaus are suggested as a useful mechanism to track the borrowers from other 
institutions, which share credit data with the bureaus. However, credit bureaus provide 
only a partial answer because it is difficult to gauge the level of indebtedness and to 
judge whether the poor are over indebted. This seems to suggest that MFIs should 
restrict the number of loans the poor can take out to prevent over- indebtedness. 
Over-indebtedness basically refers to the inability ‘to repay all debts fully and on 
time’ (Haas, 2006, p.3). According to this definition, the poor are considered as being 
over-indebted if they have insufficient income to cover all their expenses in the given 
period mentioned in lending contracts (Maurer and Pytkowska, 2010; Wisniwski, 2010; 
Silva 2012). It has been argued that this definition is just the static one-period and 
misses a dynamic perspective. The dynamic multi-period definition, on the other hand, 
states that over-indebtedness only occurs if the net cash flows of the poor are 
chronically negative (i.e. they are in over-indebtedness in several periods) (Kappel et 
al., 2010). 
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According to Rhyne (2001), the first known microfinance crisis, which occurred 
in Bolivia in 1999, was caused by consumer lending
70
 and multiple borrowing. Reille 
(2009) and Burki (2009) also conclude that consumer lending and relaxing credit 
policies together with the rapid growth of MFIs contributed to the crisis in Morocco and 
the Punjab (Pakistan). The case of Zambia shows that the relaxing of the standards of 
loan officers’ responsibilities are the main reasons (Dixon et al., 2007).  
Based on a cross-country analysis and the crises
71
 in microfinance, Chen et al. 
(2010) and Guarneri and Spaggiari (2009) have recently concluded that over-
indebtedness is typically caused by many factors, such as: the existence of multiple 
borrowing; the growth targets of MFIs; overstretched MFI systems and controls; an 
erosion of MFI lending discipline; weak policies and practices of assessing customer 
repayment capacities, and the absence of effective credit information systems. In 
addition, the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, politically motivated movements and 
non-repayment movements are aggravating factors, but not the root cause of crises, such 
as in Nicaragua, Pakistan, Morocco and Bosnia and Herzagovina (Chen et al., 2010). 
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  Microfinance has suffered several hardships over the years and recently faced some 
large hurdles as a result of severe crises, which have shaken the microfinance sector: (1) 
the 2010 Pakistan floods, (2) the Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis in 2010, (3) the 
Kolar microfinance crisis in 2009, (4) the Bosnia and Herzagovina microfinance crisis 
in 2009 (5) the Nicaraguan microfinance crisis in 2008 and (6) the liquidity crisis in 
Nigeria in 2005. 
71
  Consumer lending simply refers to loans provided to salaried workers for their 
consumption. Providing consumer loans to the poor is too risky since they basically 
have no cash return to repay them. Over spending and easy credit are singled out as the 
main causes of consumer over-indebtedness in many countries. 
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Clearly, the root causes of the recent microfinance crises are multiple borrowing and the 
poor quality of loans provided to the poor by the rapid growth of MFIs. 
The recent microfinance crisis in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh was 
caused by a concentrated market which was manifested through competition between 
MFIs and the existence of multiple borrowing. In the hunger to meet their rapid growth 
targets, loans were provided to the poor who were indebted to other financial 
organisations. While many MFIs have suffered losses and still continue to face 
uncertainty, the real people who will be impacted are the borrowers. There is a real 
danger that borrowers, especially in Andhra Pradesh may face a hard time in accessing 
credit for years to come. The case of Andhra Pradesh also shows that the crisis 
threatened microfinance not only there, but also nationwide. 
The poor enter into unaffordable credit when they do not use borrowed money 
wisely. Therefore, they always struggle to pay back loans and interest to the lenders. 
Over-indebtedness is very dangerous, not only for the poor but also for MFIs, and may 
cause many social problems. There are typically several possible solutions for over-
indebtedness. According to Arun and Murinde (2010), there are two main perspectives 
on this issue based on the funding of microfinance. The poor tend to take out larger 
loans or borrow from several sources for their financial needs and finally end up being 
over-indebted and unable to pay off the borrowed money. On the other hand, the poor 
will continue to be financed to solve this problem and be able to repay their debts. This 
seems to suggest that MFIs should take a risk and give the poor more chance to solve 
their financial problems. It has been argued that the competition between MFIs and 
other financial providers in the market makes MFIs accept the higher risk by providing 
more credit to the poor. Therefore, credit risk in microfinance is considered as the 
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biggest risk faced by MFIs globally (CSFI, 2009 and 2011). According to CSFI (2009), 
this is rising across the board, from the micro-borrower through to the MFI and even 
among MFI lenders. The chain is increasingly being broken at different points. 
2.4.6.2. From the MFIs’ Point of View 
The poor can be reached by commercial banks in direct or indirect way through 
downscaling and upscaling (see Appendix 2.6). The word “downscale” means to cut 
back in size or scope. In microfinance, downscaling refers to the scale of finance 
products and services provided “directly” to the poor by commercial banks. It implies 
reducing the volume of their business to market niches: the poor and MFIs.
72
 
Downscaling primarily expresses the involvement of local commercial banks in 
commercialization based on the assumption that microfinance is a development tool 
which is effective in fighting poverty but cannot address the poorest of the poor and be 
utilised in cases of extreme poverty. Therefore, it is possible to establish the intersection 
between the customers of MFIs and local commercial banks. Downscaling is a way of 
commercialising the microfinance of local commercial banks, together with the 
commercial investment of MFIs and transformation of NGOs. 
 Commercialize microfinance: banks or other formal financial institutions 
expand their financial services to the poor traditionally served by MFIs and 
moneylenders (Delfiner and Peron, 2007). 
 Commercial investments: this refers to the investment of the private sector 
in microfinance directly or indirectly through other financial intermediaries 
based on the positive returns of MFIs (CGAP, 2004). 
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 See Chowdri (2004), Fernando (2004) and Delfiner and Peron (2007) 
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 Transformation (Upgrading): this refers to the transformation process of 
NGOs into formal financial providers. NGOs or socially motivated MFIs are 
required to change their organisational and legal structures in order to 
become self-sufficient and profit driven (Campion and White, 2001; 
Fernando, 2004). 
The terms “upscale” or “scale-up” mean to increase or upgrade from small to 
higher levels or volumes. In finance, this issue relates to scaling up from small to 
medium size finance services provided to the poor (Terberger, 2003; Fernando, 2004; 
Martin, 2008; Lehner, 2009). There is usually a wide gap between the small and 
medium, and they are really two different aspects; therefore, different financial products 
and services can be used for them. “Upscaling” involves the addressing of different 
groups of clients who obviously have different kinds of demand for financial services; 
the staff who are acquainted with dealing with small-sized loans, and those who deal 
with large-sized loans differ in skills (Terberger, 2003). Upscaling is used to talk about 
the bottom-up approach, in which local commercial banks finance the poor indirectly by 
providing financial services in higher volumes to MFIs (Martin, 2008). After dealing 
with higher scale loans, MFIs distribute loans to individuals or groups due to the lack of 
reliable information, collateral and difficulty of inputs in contracts (Lehner, 2009). 
The issue which is under debate is whether it is better to upscale or to downscale 
to encourage the private sector to take part in and improve the speed of poverty 
reduction. Microfinance is provided to the poor by formal financial institutions directly 
through group and individual lending or indirectly through intermediate organisations 
(Lehner, 2009). Among intermediate organisations, MFIs are considered as the best 
candidate for putting microfinance into practice by dealing with banks to avoid the lack 
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of reliable information and lack of collateral (Martin, 2008). Therefore, upscaling and 
downscaling are used together as a package solution to improve microfinance based on 
the particular conditions of each country and each institution. 
First, in most developing countries, MFIs are only set up to cover that particular 
segment. Their staffs are trained to deal with the poor, who have a low educational 
background and do not have any financial information or records (Fernando, 2004). 
However, their products are really designed for poverty reduction. Second, the 
organisational and financial structures of MFIs are difficult to adjust in order to expand 
their operations (Martin, 2008). Small financial institutions also need a range of 
financial products like larger ones, whereas MFIs normally offer one or a few limited 
products and services to the poor. These products are quite often produced by the larger 
financial institutions. Nevertheless, the problem with them is that they feel small 
business lending is risky, and entails high costs to operate. So both aspects are possible. 
Upscaling and downscaling are two ways in the commercial progress of 
microfinance. The main problem is that the poor should take out smaller size loans from 
small MFIs or larger ones from larger financial providers. This should depend on each 
individual country’s own experience and the state of institutional development in that 
country. 
2.4.7. Private versus Public Funds 
The core reasons for the success of microfinance in poverty reduction, boosting 
economic development and developing MFIs are two-fold: (i) requiring that the money 
be paid back creates a system of empowerment and self-reliance that has a sustainable 
and contagious impact, and which direct aid has failed to produce time after time and 
(ii) it brings loan recipients into the formal financial sector (MCI, 2004a and 2004b). 
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These same two reasons are also at the core of why commercial microfinance – 
profit-driven loans from private sources – can be more successful at achieving social 
objectives than money from the public, taxpayer sources (Lehner, 2009; Westley, 2006; 
Arianto, 2004). To draw a relationship with the macroeconomic level of global finance, 
it has long been argued that the use of public funds from the likes of the World Bank 
and IMF to bail out ailing governments in the developing world is counterproductive, 
because by acting as a lender of last resort, the multinational institutions are creating an 
atmosphere that encourages moratoriums on debt payments and sometimes outright 
default on loan principal and interest (MCI, 2004a and 2004b).   
Figure 2.4 Uses of Microfinance Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Tulchin (2004) and MCI (2004a and 2004b) 
MFIs that are supported by public monies have less of an incentive to be vigilant 
about paying back the loans, as they know that in the end the lender of last resort – be it 
the World Bank or local aid institutions – will absorb any non-performing loans. 
Microfinance  
Commercial Microfinance  
Influence Long-Term Change 
Goods vs. Profit Index 
Socially Responsible Investors Funds  
Charity / Direct Aids 
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Consequently, those publicly funded lenders also have a tendency to be less vigilant 
about selecting profitable MFIs and monitoring their progress. Often, the attitude is if 
one MFI does not work out, they can always move on to another.   
Commercially funded microfinance has built-in efficiencies along the value chain. 
Because investors expect to be paid back, commercial microfinance funds pay close 
scrutiny to the MFIs they select to receive the loans from, and monitor them more 
closely. And that profit-driven attitude is translated to the MFIs when they select clients 
for loans and monitor loan repayment schedules. Finally, the loan recipients themselves 
are empowered with a sense of responsibility and obligation to repay the loans. Add to 
that the added responsibilities that peer-lending groups imply, and the incentives for 
loan repayment can be quite strong. As a result, making efficient use of that capital 
becomes paramount. That has a direct result on raising the financial and social level of 
the loan recipients, those around them, and the community at large.   
Furthermore, there are indications that the best-run, most profitable MFIs are 
more efficient at introducing additional financial products into the community – from 
mortgages and home-equity loans to savings and checking accounts, insurance and even 
credit cards. All of this brings the poor who were once below the poverty line into the 
formal financial sector, and can go a long way toward poverty reduction and economic 
development. 
2.4.8. Roles of Regulation and Supervision of MFIs in Microfinance 
The legal framework and governing principles of financial intermediation in a 
country define the roles of its regulatory authorities who set out the rules for the entry 
and the exit of financial institutions, determine and limit their businesses and products, 
and specify criteria and standards for sound and sustainable operations (Chavez and 
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Gonzalez-Vega, 1992; Gallardo, 2001; Seelig and Novoa, 2009). Regulation
73
 may 
include forms of auxiliary regulation and self-regulation by the governing boards of 
financial institutions, their networks and associations, or apex organisations. Prudential 
supervision encompasses all measures by which regulators enforce compliance by 
licensed financial institutions with a given legal and regulatory framework (Davis, 
2009). The financial authority assumes full responsibility for the soundness of the 
regulated or licensed financial institutions (Gallardo, 2001). 
Widespread experiences and research have shown the importance of the 
regulation and supervision of MFIs in microfinance. These studies suggest that MFIs 
should be prudentially regulated and supervised to protect their depositors and to 
prevent risks to the financial system
74
. This also protects investors and helps MFIs 
attract more investment funds from the private sector or international organisations 
(Davis, 2009). An argument can be made that credit-only MFIs
75
 do not need to be 
subject to prudential regulation and supervision and small community-based MFIs
76
 
should not be prohibited from deposit taking since they are too small or too remote to be 
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 Regulation usually refers to non-prudential regulation but may include prudential 
supervision in its broad general meaning. 
74
 See Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega (1992), Vogel et al. (1999), Christen and Rosenberg, 
(2000), Gallardo (2001), Rhyne (2002), Omino (2005), Seibel (2005), Ledgerwood and 
White, (2006), Ngo and Nguyen (2007), Haq et al. (2008), Davis (2009), Arun and Murinde 
(2010) and WSBI (2011). 
75
 The term “credit-only MFIs” refers to MFIs which do not take voluntary deposits. 
76
 “Community-based MFIs” refer to the many forms and shapes of small MFIs built in 
informal ways, such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), 
accumulating savings and credit associations or in a legally registered form such as the 
Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs). 
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regulated effectively. However, Christen and Rosenberg (2000) believe strongly that the 
future of microfinance lies in a licensed setting that will permit massive, sustainable 
delivery of good quality financial services to the poor. Clearly, MFIs are likely to need 
to meet certain minimum regulatory conditions based on the characteristics of the 
financial institutions and conditions of each country. MFIs need a licensed environment 
to achieve their potential. Therefore, an appropriate legal framework to promote viable 
and sustainable systems of microfinance in a country must be developed (Omino, 2005).  
Lack of a clear regulatory framework, on the other hand, will expose MFIs to 
uncertainties and risks in terms of costs, unhealthy competition, operational challenges, 
limited funding sources, sustainability and other challenges. According to Gallardo 
(2001), it tends to boil down to the need for an efficient policy and regulatory 
environment within the borders of a country that seals the financial system from both 
internal and external macroeconomic turbulence. The existing legal frameworks in 
many countries have been unable to support the sustainable growth and commercial 
integration of microfinance programs into the formal financial system (Ngo and 
Nguyen, 2007; Christen and Rosenberg, 2000). Therefore, the roles of regulation and 
supervision are addressed to make governments realize the advantages and benefits of a 
tiered financial system which facilitates the establishment of smaller, specialised MFIs 
and creates a good environment for them to develop and strengthen themselves in.   
2.4.9. Synergies between Microfinance and other Non-Financial Programs 
As previously mentioned, microfinance can have a great potential positive impact 
on a wide range of poverty reduction targets, particularly in income, health care, and 
education (Wright, 2000; Morduch and Haley, 2002; Gonzalez, 2010a). It is clear from 
the evidence that poverty is a serious social problem that permeates every dimension of 
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culture and society (Bartle, 2008). Morduch and Haley (2002) conclude that there are 
strong potential synergies between microfinance and the provision of basic social 
services for the poor since the benefits derived from these programs are interconnected. 
In addition, the impact of each program on poverty reduction tends to increase if they 
are delivered together. Most researchers find that it is difficult to isolate the impact of a 
specific development tool as each contributes to the others. The marginal cost of 
providing social services for the poor tends to be substantially reduced when the 
infrastructure for microfinance is already in place. However, it is suggested that these 
social services are relevant to the financial needs of the poor (UNICEF, 1997; MkNelly 
and Dunford 1999; Marcus et al., 1999; Gonzalez, 2010a). 
There are a variety of ways to integrate microfinance into non-financial programs 
in poverty reduction. According to Dunford and Rueda (2005), these can be: bound, 
parallel and unified. MFIs can traditionally create a bound program by conducting 
strategic alliances with other organisations to integrate microfinance into other non-
financial services. This strategy can normally maintain different specialities of financial 
and non-financial services, but MFIs tend to have less control and follow-up in the non-
financial area.  On the other hand, a parallel or unified combination of microfinance and 
non-financial services may be provided by MFIs themselves with different or the same 
specialised personnel. Since the specialised personnel are highly committed, the results 
are likely to be better. However, the operational costs and the coordination of personnel 
from different sectors are great challenges. In order to conduct these programs, MFIs 
need to hire, train and supervise personnel to provide both services. The impact of non-
financial services provided by MFIs, therefore, seems to be smaller due to the limit in 
capacity to provide these services. Clearly, it is necessary to identify the various 
processes involved in the provision of both financial and non-financial services. 
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Training and education obviously plays important roles in successfully providing these 
integrated services to the poor
77
. 
It is proposed that training might be valuable to the poor and also to MFIs. It tends 
to improve not only the knowledge and skills of the personnel, but also the attitudes and 
behaviour of the clients, which in turn strengthens institutional actions. Basic 
knowledge of and skills in financial and also non-financial topics can help the poor to 
better address adverse conditions in the environment. Due to the limited capacity for 
providing non-financial services, MFIs are likely to focus on financial education, such 
as promoting financial services to potential clients, training clients who have just 
entered the program, and training group leaders to achieve better management of the 
group itself (Cohen and Sebstad, 2003; Sebstad et al., 2006; Khumawala, 2009).   
As mentioned previously, using borrowed money as an extra source to invest into 
small business can be very dangerous, especially if the poor have little knowledge of 
investments. It can lead the poor to over-indebtedness. Therefore, the main purpose of 
financial education is to teach the poor basic concepts of money and how to manage it 
wisely. It enables them to become more informed financial decision makers, develop 
awareness of personal financial issues and choices, and learn basic skills related to 
earning, spending, budgeting, saving, borrowing, and investing money. It helps people 
set financial goals and optimise their financial options (Cohen and Sebtads, 2003; 
Sebstad et al., 2006). Clearly, financial education plays an important role in achieving 
success in investment businesses and microfinance programs. 
Financial education programs run through NGOs, as well as MFIs are timely and 
can be a win-win situation for the poor and MFIs. They help the poor build assets and 
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 See Gonzalez-Vega et al. (2002), Maldanado (2005) and Khumawala (2009) 
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creates wealth to provide the basis for economic security. Common ways in which poor 
people are likely to build assets are through savings, and investments in land, 
businesses, and housing. They also build assets by investing in their children’s 
education, health, and the maintenance of reciprocal social relationships that provide 
support in times of need. According to the findings of Cohen and Sebstad (2003) and 
Sebstad et al. (2006), good money management is critical to the process of 
accumulating all kinds of assets and preserving them. Obviously, access to appropriate 
financial products and services, along with the financial skills to manage these resources 
well, are keys to the process of asset accumulation. 
2.5. Conclusions 
Microfinance has proven to be an appropriate, effective, and powerful tool for the 
poor and for poverty reduction in order to reach the Millennium goals. The 
comprehensive review of microfinance has raised some important issues in the existing 
literature. First, microfinance clearly cannot immediately turn the poor into the non-
poor. The point is that microfinance is basically a long-term process which tends to 
support the poor financially so that they can combine their skills, knowledge, 
experience and financial capital to break away from poverty and change their lives. 
Second, donor funding tends to become insufficient to meet the continual demand for 
well designed financial products from new and existing clients. Therefore, access to 
commercial funds is likely to encourage MFIs to move out of heavily subsidised 
operations and enter into commercialisation in order to achieve efficiency and 
sustainability. Third, several studies have focused on investigating the impact of 
microfinance or the trade-off between social mission and financial sustainability, 
instead of the possibility of remaining viable in providing financial services to the poor 
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in the long run. Fourth, the funding of microfinance plays important roles in economic 
viability and sustainability of MFIs. Fifth, lending methodologies, savings, 
empowerment of women and the impact of microfinance are likely to depend on the 
legal status, profit status and regulated status of MFIs. Sixth, these studies have shed 
light on the link between funding and microfinance performance as one of the important 
gaps in the existing literature (i.e. how MFIs choose financial structure to improve their 
performance). Therefore, in the following chapters this study attempts to fill these gaps 
in the literature by investigating the funding of microfinance and testing the effects of 
financial structure on the different aspects of MFI performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MICROFINANCE FUNDING 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Donor funds in microfinance tend to become insufficient to meet the continual 
demand from new and existing clients, as previously mentioned. Therefore, access to 
commercial funds is likely to encourage MFIs to move out of heavily subsidised 
operations and into commercialisation in order to achieve efficiency and sustainability. 
The positive returns of several MFIs around the world have continued to attract new 
investment funds. Microfinance continues to evolve, with consistent emphasis on 
efficiency and growth in outreach. It is relying increasingly on commercial financing to 
fund this potential growth, whether through debt or equity investments
78
. In addition, 
the comprehensive review of microfinance in Chapter 2 has shed light on the link 
between the funding and performance of MFIs as one of the important gaps in the 
existing literature (i.e. how funders determine financing decision based on the key 
performance indicators of MFIs).
79
 Therefore, this chapter investigates some important 
issues in microfinance funding to shed new light on previously unstudied topics, 
especially the impact of financial leverage on the performance of MFIs. The most 
influential economic theories and empirical evidence, presented here, attempt to provide 
quality statements for the empirical analysis presented in the following chapters. 
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 See Hsu (2007) and Hermes et al. (2011). 
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 See Thapa (2007), Bogan (2009) and Imai et al. (2011). 
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3.2. Microfinance Funding 
Like other businesses, the financial structures of MFIs nclude two major parts: 
total liabilities and total equity (see Figure 3.1). Total liabilities, sometimes called total 
debts, typically include voluntary deposits, compulsory savings, debts and other 
liabilities
80
. Total equity, on the other hand, generally refers to the total money the 
owners have invested. Before deciding to start a new business or to expand a current 
one, one of the first questions is how to raise money or funds to finance the operation 
based on the business plans. Fundamentally, there are two main separate categories of 
financing instruments that an MFI can choose: liabilities financing and equity financing 
(Mullineux and Murinde, 2001). There has been discussion on which is the best option: 
debt or equity financing?
81
 Choosing between liabilities and equity financing regularly 
creates a dilemma, since the answer always depends on the particular situation
82
 of each 
MFI. Each instrument has its own pros and cons; therefore, a mix of liabilities and 
equity financing is constantly the optimal strategy, with favourable financial leverage
83
 
to maximise the benefits for shareholders based on their advantages. 
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 See Wisniwski (1999), Hsu (2007), MIX Market (2009), Sapundzhieva (2011) and 
Hermes et al. (2011). 
81
 See Marsh (1982), Cornell and Shapiro (1988), Gombola and Marciukaityte (2007), 
EVCA (2007), Delloite (2010), Hanke et al. (2010) and Peavler (2012). 
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 The particular situations refer to the type, size, profitability, objectives, financial 
capital, potential investors, credit standing, business plans and tax situations of each 
firm at a specific period of time. 
83
 Debt to equity ratio is calculated by dividing total debts by total equity. It is seen as 
being below 3:1 for most industries (ideally, 2:1 or 1:1, depending on each industry). 
The lower values of this ratio are favourable. This means that the business relies less on 
external lenders than others, thus it has lower risk. 
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Figure 3.1 Financial Structures of an MFI   
 
Sources: Adapted from Hsu (2007), MIX Market (2009), Sapundzhieva (2011) and 
Hermes et al. (2011). 
3.2.1. Equity Financing 
Equity financing refers to the act of raising money to finance business activities 
by issuing stocks (common or preferred stocks) to the current owners or potential 
investors. This form of financing enables firms to receive more investment funds from 
the current owners and potential investors with or without borrowings for their startups 
or when they need to raise additional equity
84
 to offset existing debts.   
                                                 
84
 In finance, equity is the term used to describe the funds (money) of the owners. It 
refers to the amount of money the owner has invested in a firm. 
Total Liabilities and Equity 
Liabilities 
Voluntary Deposits 
Compulsory Savings 
Borrowings 
Other liabilities 
Equity 
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At the early stages of a new business, owners need to invest their own money to 
finance the start-up operations. As the business is a separate entity from its owners, 
these investments create a liability
85
 in the shape of capital. In accounting and finance, 
owners’ equity is the residual interest or claim of owners in assets after all other 
liabilities are paid (Delloite, 2010). If total debts exceed total assets, negative equity 
exists. This means that creditors would not be able to get enough money back from their 
debts, and nothing is left over to reimburse owners’ equity. Thus, owners’ equity is also 
known as risk or liable capital. 
It is widely accepted that firms with high profitability and poor credit ratings often 
rely on equity financing to fund their new or small businesses. It is also ideal for start-
ups and newly launched firms, since they do not have a solid track record of success and 
face uncertainty in the early stages of development. There are three main methods of 
raising equity: retained profits,
86
 rights issues
87
 and new issues of shares to the public.
88
 
These methods have the following main advantages: 
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 In financial accounting, a liability is defined as an obligation of the business arising 
from corporate financing (IASB, IFRS framework, F.49b). Liabilities include equity 
from owners’ funds or debts from borrowed money. Therefore, the basic accounting 
equation Total Assets = Total Liabilities demonstrates how assets are financed and 
shows the relationship between assets and liabilities. In detail, it becomes Total Assets = 
Total Liabilities (Debts) + Total Owners’ Equity. The term “total liabilities” refers to 
total debts to distinguish between different sources of funds. 
86
 The retained profits or capital gains refer to the profits that result from the 
investments that are retained to increase capital rather than paid out to the shareholders 
as dividends. 
87
 The rights issues refer to new shares issued to current shareholders. 
88
 The new issues of shares to the public refer to new shares issued to new investors. 
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 The investment funds from owners do not necessarily have to be repaid 
since investors expect a share of the profits (called dividends). If the 
business does not make any profit or fails, the firm will not have to make 
any repayment. In the case of bankruptcy, the money does not have to be 
paid back from the personal funds of the owners. 
 There is valuable assistance from the different investors. They have 
advantages for a firm, especially in the early days of business. 
 Owners can use the equity to pay all the start-up costs of the business 
without the burden of debt.     
However, equity financing has some disadvantages. First, the current owners must 
show the potential investors that they are willing to invest more money and share risks 
in the current business by using their own money. Second, investors always require a 
very well-detailed and convincing business plan as they do not receive guaranteed 
returns. In addition, the current owners have to give up a share of ownership rights and 
profits to the new investors. This is basically a big sacrifice of independence for any 
business owner. Finally, any dividend payments to shareholders, if applicable, will not 
be tax-deductible. 
Clearly, equity investments play an important role in providing finance for MFIs 
around the world. According to Chasnow and Johnson (2010), there are two typical 
types of investors: social investors and commercial investors. First, social investors, 
called microfinance focused funders, are individuals or institutions that invest with 
social objectives as a high priority. Second, commercial investors, called private-equity 
funders, are profit-driven investors from the private sector who are likely to tend to 
focus more on financial returns (dividends) from their investments. 
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3.2.2. Liabilities Financing 
Liabilities financing, also called debt financing, refers to the borrowed money 
which a firm must pay back to lenders with interest after a specific agreed period of 
time. Firms tend to rely on debt financing to fund their businesses if they are well-
established and have steady sales, solid collateral and profitable growth. Due to lack of 
sufficient funds (equity), firms always use borrowed money as an extra source of 
finance to expand their businesses. Debt may be a good option, but it can be very 
dangerous if firms do not have in-depth knowledge of the pros and cons of the financial 
instrument. The main advantages of debt financing are: 
 Owners can maintain maximum control over their business without sharing 
control and profit with lenders. 
 The firm has no other obligations apart from the repayment of the loans (the 
principal and interest) to the lenders.         
 Interest on debts is tax-deductible to corporate income tax. This means that 
it shields a part of the income from taxes and lowers tax liability every year.         
However, there are also a number of disadvantages of debt financing. Firms have 
to show lenders how they are going to repay the loans, and secure loans against their 
assets as collateral. In addition, they may have large loan repayments for startup' costs. 
Thus, whenever they use debt financing they run the risk of bankruptcy. The higher the 
level of debt financing, the higher the risk. Clearly, debt financing can bring some 
benefits to shareholders, but over-reliance on this financing instrument creates a 
negative impact on their credit ratings and makes it difficult to raise funds in the future. 
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3.2.2.1. Deposits 
Deposits refer to the sum of savings deposited in financial institutions. They are 
categorised according to the type of client (individual vs. institution) and different 
products. In microfinance, there is an additional category which includes disclosures of 
voluntary deposits vs. compulsory deposits
89
 (MIX Market, 2011). These terms are 
often mixed and inappropriately used. Therefore, the correct use of these terms plays an 
important role in achieving the objectives of MFIs. Voluntary deposits are characterised 
by convenience and return: the ability to deposit and withdraw at will and earn interest 
at the market-driven rates (Branch and Klaehn, 2002).  
Compulsory savings refer to a sum of money which borrowers have to save at 
regular intervals with MFIs as a condition for receiving a loan. They are considered as 
collateral and used to cover missed payments (CGAP, 1997 and 2011a). These savings 
typically provide clients with little or no choice of saving products, but teach them how 
to make micro savings. These savings are collected indirectly through groups (group 
lending) or directly from individuals (individual lending), only one time when the poor 
receive loans, or many times on a regular basis. The borrower can withdraw 
immediately upon repayment of the loan. In contrast to saving up, compulsory saving is 
a kind of saving down, by taking an advance loan from lenders and repaying through 
the series of savings (Rutherford, 2000). It suggests that the poor are usually not 
permitted to have compulsory saving, unless they borrow. They also provide a source of 
lending and investment funds for MFIs. However, they do not, in fact, provide a 
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 To distinguish voluntary vs. compulsory deposits, the term “deposits” is sometimes 
used to refer to voluntary deposits, while the term “compulsory savings” is used to refer 
to compulsory deposits in microfinance. 
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sufficient volume of funding for the lending activities of MFIs (Branch and Klaehn, 
2002; Wisniwski, 1999). 
In contrast, voluntary deposits refer to the savings deposited voluntarily by public 
clients.
90
 There are different types of deposits with various features related to interest 
rate and withdrawal ability, such as current account deposits, savings deposits, time 
deposits, monthly income schemes or fixed deposits. Most deposits are basically 
voluntary savings and are withdrawable anytime, apart from time deposits
91
 (Seibel, 
1999; Giehler, 1999). Voluntary deposits refer to the saving up of small amounts of 
money to accumulate assets, with the plan to use them in the future
92
 (Rutherford, 
2000).  
Voluntary deposits assume that the economically active poor already save in a 
variety of forms, and that they do not need to be taught to save, as previously 
mentioned. If MFIs aim to collect savings from the public, they need to learn to provide 
a choice of saving products appropriate for clients’ demand, particularly for the poor. 
This is consistent with the fact that two of the biggest obstacles to serving low-income 
depositors are the distance and the products. Deposits are always the primary source of 
funds of financial institutions and can be divided into three main types: current account 
deposits, savings deposits, and time deposits (Giehler, 1999). 
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 See CGAP (1997), Adams (2002), Gonzalez and Meyer (2009) and MIX Market 
(2011). 
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 Time deposits, known as term deposits, are not withdrawable unless the stated time is 
met, since depositors expect higher interest based on the longer term. 
92
 See “saving up” and “saving down” in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2.3. 
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 Current account deposits are normally non-interest bearing funds. They are 
payable on demand and are the main instruments for the financial 
transactions of depositors. There are high costs incurred in servicing clients 
with these accounts and high competition between MFIs and other financial 
institutions, who offer particular services to attract more clients. 
 Savings deposits can be added to and withdrawn at any time by depositors. 
Transactions and interest payments are recorded in passbooks. They 
traditionally provide an important source of funds for financial institutions 
that are specialised in mobilising and stimulating savings. 
 Time deposits are not withdrawable during a certain term.93 Depositors are 
paid at a higher interest rate than other kinds of deposits. The longer term 
provides a better yield because financial institutions have the ability to 
invest in higher gain financial products. Therefore, they are stable funds and 
may be negotiable on the secondary market. 
Deposits are a relatively stable and low-cost source of funds. They help MFIs to 
achieve independence from donors and investors, which is particularly important in 
periods of liquidity constraints (Morduch and Haley, 2002). Deposits are more than half 
of the total assets reported by financial institutions that have deposit mobilisations 
(Gozalez and Meyer, 2009) because depositors enjoy certain benefits, such as access to 
loans (Wright, 1999; Elser et al., 1999).   
Deposits traditionally represent an important source of funding, but they were 
neglected by most MFIs until a few years ago, since they provided an insufficient 
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 For a withdrawal before the term, a minimum period of notification may be required 
or a penalty is paid (such as a lower interest rate being charged). 
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volume of funding.
94
 There are some particular reasons why MFIs have historically not 
emphasised deposits. First, the poor were thought not to have enough money to make 
the saving voluntary
95
 (Adams, 2002). Second, most of the institutions involved in 
microfinance were NGOs or small financial institutions, which were not legally licensed 
to collect savings from the public. Due to their own lack of capacity, such as limited 
services and branches, the public prefer to deposit their savings in local commercial 
banks rather than MFIs. Therefore, deposits become too costly if compared to 
concessionary funds from governments and donors, or even commercial loans with 
interest at the market rates.
96
  
There are some arguments over whether or not the deposit mobilising MFIs
97
 are 
really serving small depositors (micro-savings). Based on the combined database of 
MIX Market – MicroBanking Bulletin for 2007 (MBB, 2008), Gonzalez and Meyer 
(2009) state that most deposit mobilising MFIs were reaching small depositors, perhaps 
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 See Wisniwski (1999), Maisch et al. (2006), Ngo and Nguyen (2007), Gonzalez and 
Meyer (2009) and Sapundzhieva (2011). 
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  Poor households spend all of their income on daily food or invest any remaining 
income in running small businesses. Therefore they tend to have no money left to make 
proper savings. However, there has been increasing recognition that they do save in 
non-financial forms due to lack of access to good facilities for formal savings 
(Hirschland, 2005). 
96
  There are many important issues to consider in order to attract deposits, such as 
transaction costs, advertisement costs, workloads for employees, the volatility of funds, 
liquidity management and reserve requirements. Otherwise, nobody will be keen to 
make deposit savings with MFIs. In addition, MFIs also have to provide various 
services to their depositors (Giehler, 1999; Adams, 2002). 
97
  Deposit mobilising MFIs refer to MFIs that mobilise voluntary deposits, excluding 
MFIs that only mobilise compulsory or institutional deposits. 
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even smaller than their borrowers. This result suggests MFIs have been able to design 
and mobilise voluntary deposits to meet the special needs of the people who are poor or 
even poorer than their borrowers. Therefore, not all MFIs have succeeded at micro 
deposit mobilisation. Gonzalez and Meyer (2009) also account for 68 million borrowers 
and 62 million savers in 2007 with MFIs around the world. Their assets represented 
US$ 51 billion, their gross loan portfolio US$ 37 billion and their voluntary deposits 
US$ 22 billion. The voluntary deposits included both savings accounts and time 
deposits by individuals, while institutional accounts and compulsory deposits were 
excluded. From 2005 to 2007, the number of deposit mobilising MFIs in 2007 was 
110% greater than in 2005 (318 versus 298), and they represented on average 39% of all 
MFIs. The total amount of assets in USD increased by 190%, of gross loan portfolio by 
200%, and of voluntary deposits 170% during the period 2005 to 2007. The number of 
borrowers increased by 150%, and the number of voluntary savers increased by 110%. 
Weighted by the assets of deposit mobilising MFIs only, this ratio decreased slightly 
from 63% in 2005 to 58% in 2007. This result is consistent with the fact that assets 
increased more than deposits in the same period. Deposits are an important source of 
funds, but they were not yet considered as the primary source of MFIs for lending. 
The poor regularly face many of life’s worse challenges98 at the same time; 
therefore, they live in instability, insecurity and often despair for work and income 
(Dijk, 2010; Levin, 2009; Boonyabancha, 2001). However, they have the same needs 
and objectives as non-poor people. They should avoid “living from hand to mouth" by 
being careful with their low income and need to plan more and manage their finances 
better than non-poor people (Karlan, 2010). This obviously means that the poor need to 
                                                 
98
  The poor regularly face the sickness of a child, too many children and large families, 
problems with giving birth, accidents, criminality and violence. 
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save and swap small savings from income flows for the lump sums needed for a variety 
of purposes (Rutherford, 2000). 
Two primary arguments can be made for savings. It is widely accepted that the 
poor have very little income and spend most of it on daily food. From this perspective, 
most poor people are likely to be too poor to make proper savings, even if they have a 
very small amount of money. On the other hand, the relevant studies conclude that the 
poor do have surplus money, and all do indeed save in different ways, tending to put 
aside money for different purposes
99
 (Rutherford, 2000; Karlan, 2010; Robinson, 2004 
and 2010). However, not all of them have money for savings in some certain situations, 
especially the poorest. The income of the poor is not only small but also probably 
irregular and unreliable. Most of it is quickly spent on essentials. If taking out a loan is 
typically considered as the best way to access future income (saving down), 
withdrawing savings is the best way to access past income (saving up). This is always 
the paradox that faces many of the poor and poorest people (Rutherford, 2000). 
3.2.2.2. Borrowings and other Liabilities 
Borrowings
100
 are loans or money borrowed from other financial institutions in 
the short- or long-term (especially from local commercial banks or international 
financial organisations) (MIX Market, 2009). International investors can invest money 
                                                 
99
 The poor participate in informal saving groups which mobilise member contributions 
for specific purposes such as weddings or funerals, set aside money for school fees or 
buy and collect bricks to prepare to build houses.  
100
 The term “borrowing” is the total amount of money owed at a particular point in 
time. It is frequently used to describe the process by which debt is taken out, and is also 
the amount that is used to express the total amount outstanding. 
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in MFIs directly or indirectly through microfinance investment vehicles
101
 (MIVs), 
known as intermediaries between global investors and local MFIs. Even though debts 
are the commercial funds generally priced at the market rate and may be expensive for 
new or small MFIs, they are currently the most popular funding source for lending when 
MFIs have limited ability to obtain savings from the public (Sapundzhieva, 2011).         
Other liabilities are investment funds from other external sources (such as soft 
loans
102
 or grants from local or international donors). They also are mixed with other 
funding sources (such as commercial debts) to make the interest rate lower than the 
market rate (MIX Market, 2009). 
To sum up, MFIs have three main sources to fund their potential growth: equity, 
deposits and debts. Each fund has different costs which contribute to the lending interest 
rate. Besides reducing operating expenses by becoming cost-effective, MFIs try to 
obtain low-cost funds such as soft loans or public deposits to combine with other 
commercial funds to reduce costs. Clearly, commercial debts are necessary to fund the 
continued expansion of microfinance to meet the increasing demand for well-designed 
financial services for the poor, as previously mentioned. 
3.3. The Link between Funding and Performance 
Economic profit (or loss) refers to the difference between total revenues and all 
expenses. Responding to profit incentives, firms tend to try to increase total revenues 
                                                 
101
 Microfinance Investment Vehicles act as financial intermediaries that mobilise funds 
from international investors to local MFIs and play an important role as the main 
channel for commercial microfinance in developing countries.  
102
  Soft loans or concessionary loans are a special kind of debt borrowed from socially 
responsible investors at a low interest rate. 
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and decrease total expenses (including costs of capital). In the case of a financial 
institution, financial expenses (costs of funding) usually represent a large part of total 
costs, but this part is more difficult to control by the financial institution, while the 
revenues depend mostly on the interest on loans provided to borrowers (De Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005). Therefore, financial structure in terms of funding has become one of 
the important issues for MFIs in gaining efficiency and sustainability. The effects of 
funding sources can be positive or negative due to their positive contributions to total 
financial revenue (i.e. the predicted effects are indeterminate and depend on the specific 
circumstances of each MFI). However, the increase in financial expenses is always 
expected to be lower than the increase in financial revenues. 
This section will discuss the most influential economic theories on the link 
between financial structure and performance to provide quality statements for the 
empirical analysis presented in the following chapters. Therefore, the section is divided 
into three sub-sections. The first sub-section presents the theories of capital structure 
concerning financing behaviours and the impact of financial structure on performance. 
Subsequently, the second and the third sub-sections present other theories concerning 
the contributions of firm size and financial crisis to the effect of financial leverage. 
3.3.1. Theories of Capital Structure 
In corporate finance, there is a large body of literature that examines the financing 
behaviours and the impact of financial structure on the performance of firms. However, 
most current studies in the field of financial structure are dominated by two main 
theories: trade-off theory and pecking order theory (Swinnen et al., 2005). They have 
both been developed from Modigliani and Miller's theorem, which is considered as one 
of the most important cornerstones of finance (Pagano, 2005). These theories provide a 
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main framework for the effects of financial structure on the performance of firms in 
general, and financial institutions in particular. Over the years, three major theories of 
capital structure have emerged which diverge from the assumption of perfect capital 
markets under which the “irrelevance principle”103 works. Therefore, the capital 
structure of a firm is considered as the result of the transactions with various suppliers 
of finance. 
In a perfectly competitive market, Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963)
 
state 
that the value of a firm is independent of financial structure. Leveraged and un-
leveraged firms
104
 have the same cost of funds, since debt and equity are assumed to 
have the same interest rate. This theory has several assumptions, including that there is 
no transaction cost, no information asymmetry, no taxes and the same interest rate. 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), debts have a tax benefit shield, which leads 
firms to maximise their value by using as much debt as possible if there are no 
bankruptcy and agency costs. However, imperfections exist in the real world, including 
bankruptcy costs,
105
 agency costs
106
 and gains from leverage-induced tax shields.
107
 
Thus, financial structure is completely relevant to the value of a firm. It suggests that an 
                                                 
103
 Modigliani and Miller’s theorem is also often called the capital structure irrelevant 
principle. The term “capital” refers to investment funds (debt or equity financing). 
Capital structure is the combination of sources of funds (including two main source 
proportions: debts and equity). 
104
 An unleveraged firm refers to a firm financed only by equity. A leveraged firm refers 
to a firm financed by a mix of equity and debts.   
105
 See Baxter (1967), Stiglitz (1972), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Kim (1978) 
Haugen and Senbet (1988) and Leland (1998). 
106
 See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Haugen and Senbet (1988) and Leland (1998). 
107
 See De Angelo and Masulis (1980) and Lewellen et al. (2005 and 2006). 
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optimal financial structure may exist and tends to reflect both the tax advantages of 
debt, fewer default costs and the agency costs of managerial discretion (Lehan, 1998).
108
 
There are a number of theoretical and empirical studies
109
 that largely support the notion 
that bankruptcy and agency costs are the partial determinants of leverage and optimal 
financial structure. These studies have generally examined the financing behaviours of 
firms if Modigliani and Miller’s hypotheses do not hold.  
Trade-off theory refers to the trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt and 
equity financing after accounting for market imperfections such as taxes, bankruptcy 
costs and agency costs. According to the assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (1963 
and 1958), there are no bankruptcy and agency costs. However, the presence of agency 
and bankruptcy costs of debt in the real world make its tax benefit exaggerated. This 
means that there are some threshold levels of debt, under which the values of firms are 
maximised. The threshold level is generally called the optimal level of financial 
structure, in which debt is expected to provide maximum tax benefits (Myers, 1984). 
When firms are profitable, they prefer debts to equity because interest paid to lenders is 
a deductible item to net income before paying corporate income tax (IFS, 2011). 
However, one of the disadvantages of debt is the cost of potential financial distress, 
especially when the firm relies on too much of it. They target their capital structures
110
 
                                                 
108
 Debts have corporate income tax advantages since the interest payments reduce 
taxable income, while dividends and share repurchases do not (Lewellen et al., 2006). 
109
 See Bradley et al., (1984), Long and Malitz (1985) and Titman and Wessells (1988). 
110
 Firms target their capital structures; i.e. if the actual leverage ratio deviates from the 
optimal one, the firm will adapt its financing behaviour in a way that brings the leverage 
ratio back to the optimal level targeted. This is an important prediction of the static 
trade-off theory. 
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and tend to use more debt to implement highly efficient output strategies when the past 
positive return is a good proxy for future return (Jensen, 1986). Firms with low profit 
prefer internal funds, since external ones may be more expensive and non-debt tax 
shields may be bigger than the advantage of tax benefits (De Angelo and Masulis, 
1980). Developed from these predictions, dynamic trade-off theory points out the role 
of time, expectations and adjustment costs. The correct financing decision typically 
depends on the financing margin that the firm anticipates in the next period (i.e. some 
firms expect to pay out funds, while others expect to raise funds in the next period). 
This suggests that the optimal financial choice today tends to depend on what is 
expected to be optimal in the next period. These theories explain the difference in the 
debt to equity ratio between industries but they do not explain differences within the 
same industry.       
Pecking order theory, on the other hand, argues that firms follow a financing 
hierarchy to minimise the problem of information asymmetry between the manager-
insiders and the shareholders-outsiders (Myers, 1977 and 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984). This refers to the impact of asymmetric information
111
 on the choice of funding 
instruments to maximise the value of firms (Myers, 1984). According to this theory, 
firms prefer to use internal funds (retained earnings) to external funds (debts and 
equity), since the information asymmetry leads to a mis-pricing of their values on the 
market and causes a loss of wealth for existing shareholders (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
                                                 
111
 It is assumed that managers and existing shareholders have better information about 
the value of firms than external or potential investors. This is called the adverse 
selection problem. In the real world, asymmetric information is mentioned in most 
studies on financial intermediation between borrowers and lenders (Leland and Pyle, 
1977; Diamond, 1984; Rajan, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1998; Dinc, 2000). 
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Majluf, 1984; Froot et al., 1989). It has been argued that equity financing has a 
disadvantage: it makes potential investors believe that the firm is over-valued, and they 
tend to place a lower value on the newly issued shares (Myers, 1984). This problem 
leads firms to use debt financing, which helps them mitigate the inefficiencies in 
making investment decisions caused by the information asymmetry (Myers, 2001). This 
theory seems to suggest that there is likely to be lower mis-evaluation or adverse 
selection by using debt compared to equity since firms can limit losses for shareholders 
through debt contracts. Clearly, firms have hierarchical preferences over sources of 
funds, which are given to internally generated funds first, followed by debts and then 
equity as a last resort.
112
 
It is widely accepted that taking on debt may increase the probability of financial 
distress, and it can lead to bankruptcy. According to Myers (1984), the risks of financial 
distress affect the leverage ratio
113
 of a firm. Therefore, Ross (1985) builds the cash 
flow beta theory by using beta as a standard measurement for controlling financial risks 
and establishes that there is an inverse relationship between financial leverage and cash 
flow beta. Based on this result, George and Hwang (2009) also conclude that the 
expected returns from low leverage firms are higher than those from high leverage ones. 
In addition, there are some adjustment costs to raise the leverage ratio and debts can 
easily be reimbursed with excess cash provided by internal sources. According to 
dynamic theoretical models, the adjustment costs tend to make firms display pecking 
                                                 
112
 This finding is consistent with numerous studies, such as Kester (1986), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Friend and Lang (1988), Harris and Ravi (1993), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Michaelas et al. (1999), Booth et al. (2001) and George and Hwang (2009). 
113
 The term “leverage ratio” refers to the financial leverage of a firm and is calculated 
by dividing total debts by total equity or total debts by total assets. 
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order behaviour in the short term, although they aim to increase their leverage ratios 
(Leland, 1998, Fischer et al., 1989). 
According to Myers (1977), the growth opportunities are considered as a call 
option.
114
 High growth firms may have more funding and investment options for their 
future developments. The interests (costs of capital) are paid to the lenders instead of 
shareholders. In this case, firms tend to prefer to issue new equity to existing 
shareholders and avoid using debt. The value of growth opportunities will disappear 
when the firms go bankrupt. Firms with higher growth opportunities usually have larger 
potential bankruptcy costs; therefore, they face fewer debts (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Myers, 1977, Froot et al., 1989). 
3.3.2. Theories of Scale of Operation 
Arrow (1969) states that the differences between large and small firms arise from 
the theory of market failure
115
 as the contracts cannot be enforced without costs, and 
lenders are risk-averse. The costs and risks of contracts rise with firm size and there is a 
trade-off between them (Roberts, 1977). There are some important measurable 
differences in capital intensity between large and small firms such as: assets, sales, 
equity, employees, sales and ROA (Roberts, 1977). Large firms pay lower interest rates 
                                                 
114
 A call option is a financial contract in which the buyer has the right but no obligation 
to buy an agreed quantity of currency (or goods) from the seller at a certain of time and 
at a certain of price. 
115
 Market failure is a general term describing the situation in which supply does not 
meet demand; therefore, there is a non equilibrium and an inefficient allocation of 
resources in a free market. It was first posited by Bator (1959) and developed from the 
approaches of Mill (1859) and Sidgwick (1885). See Arrow (1969), Khemani and 
Shapiro (1993), OECD (2006), Medema (2007), King (2007) and Morey (2010). 
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for long-term debts, while small firms pay higher interest rates for short-term debts. 
Rudolph (2010) provides evidence concerning the roles of state-owned financial 
institutions (larger firms) in supporting other financial institutions (smaller firms) in 
certain conditions, especially in the case of financial crisis. 
Smith (1776) concludes that the sizes of firms are limited by the size of the 
market. Coordination costs play a major role in limiting the size of the firm before the 
size of the market becomes binding (Becker and Murphy, 1992). In addition, human 
capital has a positive correlation with the size of a firm (Rosen, 1982; Kremer, 1993). 
Institutions can affect a firm’s size by regulatory and financial development. If the 
external fund plays an important role in growth, size should be positively correlated to 
financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 1998a). 
Economies of scale refer to the advantages of costs (unit cost reductions) and 
other benefits in business expansion (Bized, 2006). According to this theory, there are 
some reductions in the unit cost when the size or the volume of output increases.
116
 This 
relates to the theory of Suranovic (2010) concerning the relationship between returns 
and size. Many benefits arise from efficiencies resulting from scale in competitive 
markets (Hodgson, 2010). Customers have the ability to choose the best providers, with 
the best products and services, at the lowest costs. In finance, Benston (1965) provides 
evidence regarding the relationship between the inputs and outputs of banks. Sources of 
inefficiency and the presence of the trade-off between efficiency and outreach in 
microfinance have been investigated by many studies.
117
 Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
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  See Arthur and Sheffrin (2003), Riley (2006) and Suranovic (2010). 
117
 See Humphrey (1987), Yuengert (1993), Nghiem et al. (2006), Cull et al., (2007) and 
Hermes et al. (2011). 
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establish robust benchmarks to identify optimal sizes by understanding the relationships 
between inputs and outputs. Financial institutions are divided into groups based on their 
total assets to investigate the impact of size on operating costs. Recently, Cull et al. 
(2007) and Campion et al. (2010) have provided evidence concerning the relationship 
between interest rates and microfinance performance. Some MFIs gain efficiency from 
economies of scale because microcredit is rather labour intensive: salaries are the largest 
part of most operating expenses and fixed costs are relatively low compared with 
variable costs (Hamilton et al., 2008; Rosenberg, 2009). 
Diseconomies of scale, on the other hand, refer to the disadvantages of large 
scale. These lead to increases in the unit cost due to firms being too large or expanding 
too quickly.
118
 If diseconomies of scale did not exist, there should be no limit to the 
growth and the size of a firm (Canback et al., 2006). According to Stigler (1974), if size 
were a great advantage, small firms would disappear. Similar to the findings of Coase 
(1937), Williamson (1967) identifies that there is a limit of firm size due to bounded 
rationality. Economies of scale cannot be applied by all firms since they only have 
meaning for some particular ones (Riordan and Williamson, 1985). 
3.3.3. Theories of Economic Integration 
Economic integration basically refers to the combination of several national 
economies into a larger territorial unit by the reduction or elimination of economic 
borders
119
 between countries (Viner, 1950; Balassa, 1967; Brou and Ruta, 2011). This 
tends to help to reduce costs for both consumers and producers, as well as to increase 
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  See Arthur and Sheffrin (2003), Riley (2006) and Bized (2006). 
119
  Economic borders refer to any obstacle which limits the mobility of goods, services 
and other factors of production between countries. 
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trade between the countries taking part in the agreement. Financial integration, a part of 
the broader process of economic integration, refers to an individual country’s link to 
international capital markets. It is suggested in order to help developing countries to 
improve growth rates and reduce macroeconomic volatility. However, the risk of 
financial contagion
120
 presents a major threat to otherwise healthy financial systems. 
Therefore, the integration of microfinance into the mainstream financial system can 
provide a convenient pathway for the negative impacts of a crisis (Prasad et al., 2003). 
Some firms are “too big to fail”; since they play important roles in an economy, 
and their failure would be disastrous (Sorkin, 2009). According to this theory, 
governments or central banks must step in when they get into trouble. This concept was 
integral to the recent global financial crisis. According to Krugman (2009 and 2010), 
the world economy is considered as the economy of many nations. This suggests that 
the failure of larger firms has more negative effects on the economy than of smaller 
ones and of course, they have some efficient protection from bad economic situations or 
negative effects from market changes. It also means that larger firms are generally less 
affected than smaller ones.   
3.4. A Review of the Empirical Evidence of Financial Structure and Performance 
This section investigates the financing behaviours and the impact of financial 
structure of firms in general, and MFIs in particular (i.e. how firms or MFIs choose a 
financial structure to improve their performance). 
                                                 
120
  Financial contagion refers to a scenario in which shocks, which initially affect only 
a few financial institutions or a particular region of an economy, spread to the rest of 
financial sector and other countries whose economies were previously healthy, in a 
manner similar to the transmission of a disease. It may happen at both the international 
and the domestic level. 
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3.4.1. The Effects of Financial Structure on Performance 
Many studies have been conducted by using different methods and data from 
developed and developing countries to define the effects of financial structure on the 
performance of firms. They investigate the link between the choice of leverage ratios, 
profitability, firm size, and other factors (such as non-debt tax shields, firm growth and 
collateral values of assets). The results of most studies provide useful evidence 
supporting the consistent negative correlation between profitability and the leverage 
ratio of firms in developed and developing countries.
121
 They suggest that firms tend to 
hold fewer debts, especially fewer short-term debts, but they tend to use more long-term 
debts and equity in countries with better legal protection for shareholders and investors 
(Fan et al., 2008). In general, these empirical studies do not shed any light on the 
adjustment process in which firms must trade off between benefits and costs to achieve 
an optimal ratio (i.e. the dynamic nature of the financial structure of firms). 
On the other hand, several studies have addressed the adjustment process in the 
leverage ratio or the dynamic nature of the financial structure of firms based on the 
benefits from the advances in econometrics.
122
 They discover that firms in developed 
and developing countries have a target leverage ratio, adjust very fast to their optimal 
                                                 
121
  For more details on this issue, see Titman and Wessels (1988) on US. companies; 
Rajan and Zingles (1995) on firms in G-7 countries; Bevan and Danbolt (2000 and 
2002) on UK non-financial firms; Chen (2004), and Huang and Song (2005) on the 
Chinese market and Antoniou et al. (2008) on capital market-based systems (USA and 
UK) and bank based financial systems (France, Germany and Japan). 
122
  See Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Kremp et al. (1999), 
De Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Ozkan (2001). 
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ratio, and rely heavily on external funds and new share issues to finance their growth.
123
 
The main reason is that the relative costs of equity fell significantly during the 1980s 
due to the large increase in stock prices. Therefore, equity issues became more attractive 
than debt issues during this decade (Singh, 1995). Some findings refer to large firms 
and are unlikely to be valid for smaller ones. However, Hovakiman et al. (2001) and 
Leary and Roberts (2005) conclude that highly profitable firms will be more likely to 
issue debt rather than equity because they are less subject to high bankruptcy risk and 
consequently they can borrow at more attractive interest rates. Clearly, these findings 
are consistent with the suggestion of the trade-off theory. Leverage is found to be 
negatively related to profitability due to the presence of transaction costs, which prevent 
firms from adjusting their ratios towards to the optimal ones. The adjustment process 
depends on whether the firm is below or above its optimal ratio and other factors, such 
as firm size (scale of operation) and interest rates. 
Based on the suggestion of the pecking order theory, Taggart (1985) examines 
how US firms build their financial structures and concludes that leverage is negatively 
related to profitability.
124
 The comparative costs of available financing sources tend to 
make firms use internally generated funds as a first choice before raising funds. The 
amount of debt needed will be determined as the residual between the desired 
                                                 
123
  See Singh (1995) on listed firms in ten less developed countries during the period 
1980-1990 (India, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Turkey and Zimbabwe); Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Huang and Ritter (2007) on 
firms in developed countries and Hovakiman et al. (2001) on US firms. 
124
 This finding is consistent with the findings of Baskin (1989), Allen (1993), Adedji 
(1998) and Tong and Green (2005). 
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investment and the supply of retained earnings (Baskin, 1989; Allen, 1993). The main 
reason is the presence of asymmetric information (Adedji, 1998) 
According to the view of Myers and Majluf (1984), firms tend to issue equity 
when its cost is relatively low.
125
 The results show that higher cash flow firms tend to 
use low levels of debt, while a higher investment level will increase the need for debt 
(Benito, 2003). On the other hand, profitable large firms prefer debt to equity and 
increase debt according to their financing requirements (Mayer and Sussman, 2003). 
However, when both small and large firms suffer losses and if debt would take them to 
dangerous levels of leverage, issuing equity would be their financing choice. Therefore, 
new equity issues are generally associated with loss-making small firms. This also 
suggests that the pecking order theory is more applicable to large firms than small ones, 
since their sample of large firms provides more support for pecking order than that of 
small firms. There have been numerous studies focusing on testing the suggestions of 
pecking order theory by using different models for different countries. The results are 
consistent and follow pecking order theory. 
Concerning the effects of financial structure on performance in the financial 
sector, King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) provide empirical 
evidence regarding the strong positive relationship between the financial system and 
economic growth. It is also suggested that firms tend to rely on external funds for their 
expansion, and that they grow faster in countries with good financial systems. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1998a), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). 
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 This finding is consistent with the findings of several studies, such as Frank and 
Goyal (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Huang and Ritter (2007). 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) were the first to consider the impact of 
financial structure on bank performance for a large number of developed and 
developing countries in the period from 1990 to 1997. They investigate the effects of 
financial structure on profitability and bank interest margins. The empirical results show 
that greater bank development is related to lower profitability and interest margins. This 
means that lower profitability and lower interest margins should be reflections of 
increased efficiency due to a high level of competition between banks. The study 
concludes that financial development has an important impact on bank performance.    
Following the work of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, some research has been 
conducted on the determinants of financial structure or profitability in different 
countries.
126
 These findings are consistent with pecking order theory. 
Hutchison and Cox (2006) test the causal relationship between bank capital and 
profitability by using bank data from the US in two different time periods: the less 
regulated period from 1983 to 1989 and the more highly regulated period from 1996 to 
2002. Financial leverage is found to be positively related to the return on equity (ROE) 
or the return on assets (ROA). The findings of this study tend to support the suggestion 
of trade-off theory. 
Girardone et al. (2006) investigate the cost X-efficiency levels in European banks 
deriving from differences in ownership, bank type and financial structure for the period 
1998 to 2003. The results of this study are mixed with regard to the financial structure 
hypothesis. This seems to suggest that bank efficiency should not be statistically 
different in bank-based economies versus market-based economies. The hypothesis 
seems to hold for the sub-sample. The study concludes that bank type characteristics 
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 See Athanasoglou et al. (2006), Ruiz-Porras (2009) and Flamini et al. (2009). 
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have an important role in explaining the differences in cost efficiency across financial 
systems, an issue that should be of fundamental importance to policy-makers who are 
interested in corporate governance principles at the international level. 
Aburime (2008) examines the impact of ownership structure on bank profitability 
in Nigeria in the period 1989 to 2004 and finds that ownership structure had no 
significant impact on bank profitability. This finding is not consistent with other 
comparative studies.
127
 The findings of La Porta et al. (2002) and Micco et al. (2004) 
suggest that state-owned banks operating in developing countries tend to have lower 
profitability than privately owned ones due to a lower net interest margin, higher 
overhead costs, and higher non-performing loans. This seems to suggest that ownership 
concentration may improve performance by decreasing monitoring costs. However, it 
may work in the opposite direction (Leech and Leahy, 1991) since there is a possibility 
that large shareholders may use their control rights to achieve private benefits (Zeitun 
and Tian, 2007). 
In microfinance, Germaine and Natividad (2010) test the effects of asymmetric 
information on lending and the reductions in information asymmetries based on the 
assumption of Myers and Majluf (1984).
128
 They found that MFIs with highly efficient 
performance can easily access investment funds, and the increase in the number of MFIs 
made them provide better quality loans to the poor. A positive relationship between 
evaluations and financing suggests that evaluations lead MFIs to provide more loans to 
the poor. Their empirical results provide clear evidence of the impact of financing and 
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investment on lending. The nature of MFIs varies greatly, as many of them maintain a 
non-profit status and rely on donations and subsidies. Lafourcade et al. (2005) attempt 
to extend microfinance services to the poor, who are underserved by MFIs and 
classified as outreach. The findings also show that African MFIs fund only 25% of the 
total assets with equity. MFIs finance their activities with funds from various sources, 
both debts and equity. 
Bogan (2009) examines the link between the financial structure and sustainability 
of MFIs by testing the life cycle theory of financing on the larger MFIs with total assets 
above US$1 million. The results show that the life cycle stage variables are significantly 
related to both operational self-sufficiency and financial sustainability. The age of the 
MFI is found to be related to operational self-sufficiency. Grants are found to be 
negatively related to sustainability but positively related to costing per borrower. This 
result is also consistent with the findings of Matu (2008). The feasibility of investment 
funds is considered to be a key driver for channelling alternative sources of funding to 
MFIs. The growing competition to access funding sources leads to a financial gap in the 
supply of microfinance service. Therefore, increasing funds for MFIs during the 
financial crisis should be on a short term basis (Littlefield and Kneiding, 2009). 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) examines the impact of financial structure on the 
performance of MFIs. This study shows that most MFIs employ high leverage and 
finance their operations with long-term rather than short-term debt. Highly leveraged 
MFIs also perform better by reaching out to more clients, and enjoy scale economies; 
therefore, they are better able to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection, 
enhancing their ability to deal with risk. 
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3.4.2. The Effects of Scale of Operation on Performance 
Several studies investigate the link between scale of operation (firm size), 
financial structure and the performance of firms. According to Titman and Wessels 
(1988), short-term debt ratio is negatively related to the size of the firm. The results 
show that smaller firms, particularly in the US market, rely more on short- than long-
term debt due to high transaction costs. Following Titman and Wessels, numerous 
studies have examined the effects of scale of operation on leverage and performance. 
They conclude that firms rely heavily on external funds and new share issues to finance 
their growth.
129
 However, these findings refer only to large firms and are unlikely to be 
valid for smaller ones based on the data of the top hundred largest listed firms in ten 
less-developed countries during the period 1980 to 1990, as previously mentioned 
(Singh, 1995). On the contrary, Rajan and Zingles (1995) find that there is no evidence 
to support the effect of firm size on the leverage ratio, based on a comparative study of 
firms in G7 countries. 
Mayer (1990) concludes that small and medium size firms are considerably more 
reliant on external finance than large ones, and the majority of external financing comes 
from bank loans in all countries. Bank loans are found to be the primary source for 
firms in developed countries. This finding is consistent with those of Beattie et al. 
(2006). On the other hand, Chen (2004) and Huang and Song (2005) conclude that 
leverage ratio increases with firm size. Antoniou et al. (2008) also reaches the same 
results by conducting a comparative study of capital market-based systems (USA and 
UK) and bank based financial systems (France, Germany and Japan).         
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According to Flamini et al. (2009), size is found to be positively related to the 
return. These findings are consistent with pecking order theory. They suggest that, if 
bank profits are reinvested, this leads to safer banks and promotes financial stability. 
Larger banks seem to create more efficiency than smaller ones (i.e. this finding is 
consistent with the economies of scale theory). However, the negative coefficient of size 
indicates that banks tend to be inefficient when they become too large (i.e. this finding 
is consistent with the diseconomies of scale theory).   
Concerning the economies of scale in financial institutions, some studies have 
established robust benchmarks to identify optimal firm size by understanding the 
relationships between the inputs and outputs of banks.
130
 Their sizes are categorised by 
total assets to establish the impact of different size on operating costs (Zacharias, 2008). 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) outline the idea of X-inefficiency and emphasise the scale 
and scope of efficiencies. Sources of inefficiency and the presence of the trade-off 
between efficiency and outreach in microfinance around the world have been 
investigated by many studies.
131
 Cull et al. (2007) and Campion et al. (2010) provide 
evidence concerning the relationship between interest rate and microfinance 
performance.  
3.4.3. The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Performance 
Tregenna (2009) examines the effects of concentration, market power, bank size 
and efficiency on profitability by using US bank data in the pre-crisis period of 1994 to 
2005. The results show that efficiency does not strongly affect profitability, and the 
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economies of scale associated with higher operational efficiency are simply manifested 
in higher concentration. Tregenna (2009) argues that high profits before the crisis in the 
US banking sector were derived from concentration and not from efficient performance. 
This suggests that the rising profits were at the expense of an efficient economy as a 
whole. In addition, high profits in the banking sector cannot prevent banks from 
bankruptcy in the event of financial crisis if such profits are derived from market share 
or market concentration, rather than through efficient performance. The crisis caused 
both banks and regulators to focus on cost reduction and efficiency improvement. In 
particular, a much stronger regulation of the banking sector in developing banking 
systems is needed in order to balance returns and risks. 
Llanto and Badiola (2009) conduct theoretical analysis to investigate the effects of 
the global financial crisis on rural areas and microfinance in East Asia. They conclude 
that the crisis has caused a liquidity shortage and credit crunch worldwide that will have 
a more adverse impact on MFIs that have limited ability to mobilise deposits. However, 
MFIs showed good performance in the run-up to the onslaught of the global financial 
crisis in the region. Performance was, however, worsened by the global financial crisis, 
with many poor households facing loan repayment difficulties, which could trigger a 
deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios. This suggests that MFIs will face severe 
challenges to their viability and sustainability if they cannot effectively manage loan 
portfolios. The global financial crisis has led MFIs to become more efficient and to 
diversify funding sources, tapping local savings, and having better information on 
clients and local economies. 
Littlefield and Kneiding (2009) state that MFIs performed better financially than 
mainstream banks during the currency crises in East Asia and the banking crises in 
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Latin America in the 1990s. However, MFIs are being impacted in very different ways 
(such as the structure of an institution’s liabilities, its financial state, and the economic 
health of its clients) since microfinance now has many more links to domestic and 
international financial markets due to financial integration. 
Bella (2011) analyses the performance of a large sample of top MFIs against 
domestic economic conditions and international capital markets. This study presents an 
empirical analysis of the factors behind MFI lending rates and interest rate spreads to 
assist in making informed policy decisions. The results show that the performance of 
MFIs is correlated to domestic economic conditions and to changes in international 
capital markets. Efficient MFIs tend to charge lower interest rates. High MFI growth 
has resulted in an increase in scale and client base and adoption of better management 
practices and information systems. The study suggests that regulations promote 
competition and innovation in lending technologies have the chance to lower lending 
interest rates. 
According to CGAP (2011b), borrowers, especially the poor, are affected at 
different levels by the credit crunch since they tend to spend more income on food and 
find it more difficult to repay their loans (60% of respondents). Therefore, most MFIs 
(56%) reduced portfolio growth. Small and medium MFIs have a problem with 
liquidity. MFIs always have links to domestic and international financial markets, and 
thus the financial crisis has infected MFIs at different levels (Littlefield and Kneiding, 
2009). WWB (2002 and 2003) also provide some evidence concerning the financial 
integration of MFIs based on different size (i.e. the differences between larger and small 
scale of operation). This finding shows that larger MFIs have deeper financial 
integration into a financial market than smaller ones. 
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These studies have clearly suggested that MFIs are far from homogeneous; 
therefore, they respond in different ways to the changing economic conditions, such as 
the global financial crisis. This means that the performance of MFIs varies with the 
heterogeneous firm characteristics (in terms of legal status, profit status and regulated 
status or firm size) and country characteristics (regulation and supervision, inflation and 
GNI per capita). Therefore, the lessons learned from one type of MFI cannot be 
generalised to other MFIs with different characteristics. 
3.5. Determinants of Microfinance Performance 
In the previous section, we presented the most influential theories and some 
empirical evidence on the relationship between financial structure and the performance 
of a firm. In general, the existing empirical studies have focused separately on the 
determinants of financial structure. A natural extension of this line of inquiry was to 
investigate the effects of financial leverage on performance, in the particular case of 
microfinance. However, a large number of studies conducted over the last two decades 
are fairly limited; by focusing only on the link between financial structure, sustainability 
(financial performance) and outreach (social performance), they miss other relevant 
aspects of MFI performance: efficiency and portfolio quality. The following section is 
divided into three sections. The first section presents the main aspects of microfinance 
performance from the funders’ point of view. The second section presents the 
determinants of microfinance performance and their background, with definitions for 
the empirical model presented in the third section. 
3.5.1. Microfinance Performance 
The performance of MFIs is typically measured in four main critical areas: 
outreach, financial sustainability (profitability), efficiency, and portfolio quality. These 
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core indicators are categorised into two groups: financial and social performance. 
Sustainability, efficiency and portfolio quality are indicators of financial performance. 
On the other hand, outreach captures the social performance of MFIs. These indicators 
do not capture all the relevant aspects of performance for internal management but they 
ideally represent the minimum performance areas for the basic investigations of external 
investors (Rosenberg, 2009).  
3.5.1.1. Outreach 
Outreach refers to reaching out to the poor and is measured by the number of poor 
being served at a given point in time (Rosenberg, 2009). The two most usual aspects of 
outreach in the literature are its depth and breadth.
132
 Depth of outreach refers to the 
poverty level of the clients served, while breadth of outreach refers to the scale of 
operations of an MFI. Expanding outreach is an ultimate goal of almost all MFIs, but rapid 
expansion sometimes proves to be unsustainable, especially during an MFI’s early years, 
when designing its products and building systems. It has very seldom been useful for 
funders to pressurise MFIs for rapid expansion, as in the case of Andhra Pradesh, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. The most common indicators recommended to measure 
outreach are average loan balance per borrower (ALB) and number of active borrowers 
(NAB), representing the social performance and the depth and breadth of outreach 
(Lafourcade et al., 2005; Rosenberg, 2009, Littlefield and Kneiding, 2009). 
There is disagreement on the benefits of the depth and breadth of outreach. The 
non-profit MFIs would rather reach out to the poorest; therefore, depth of outreach is 
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more important for achieving their social objective, whereas the proponents of 
sustainable microfinance are more interested in opening access to a wide range of 
unserved or underserved clients (Rhyne, 1998). According to Navajas et al. (2000, 
p.336), ‘Breadth matters since the poor are many but the aid dollars are few.’ According 
to the breadth logic, MFIs should have large-scale outreach in order to make a 
difference to the world’s poverty levels. Some argue that shallow depth can be 
compensated for the breadth of outreach or that it is even more important than depth 
(e.g. Navajas et al., 2000; Robinson, 2001). The objective functions might thus differ in 
the weight MFIs assign to different aspects of outreach. The common approach has 
been to study outreach by investigating the impact of microfinance and how to achieve 
this outreach.  
3.5.1.2. Efficiency 
There are many indicators recommended to measure whether an MFI is cost 
effective, such as cost per loan, cost per client, or operating expense ratio. These ratios 
focus on nonfinancial operating expenses and do not include interest paid on the 
liabilities or loan loss provision expenses. They tend to allow a quick comparison 
between the portfolio yield and its personnel and administrative expenses - how much it 
earns on loans versus how much it spends to make and monitor them. These indicators 
show how much it costs the retail financial service provider to serve each client. Since it 
does not penalise MFIs for making smaller loans, cost per client is a better efficiency 
ratio for comparing institutions. If one wishes to benchmark an MFI’s cost per client 
against similar MFIs in other countries, the ratio should be expressed as a percentage of 
per capita GNI, which is used as a rough proxy for local labour costs. 
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According to Rosenberg (2009), measured in terms of costs as a percentage of 
amounts on loan, very small loans are more expensive to make than large ones. Only a 
few extremely efficient MFIs have an operating expense ratio below 10%; commercial 
banks making larger loans usually have ratios well below 5%. The median ratio of MFIs 
reporting to MIX Market for 2006 was about 19%.  
When a microfinance market starts to mature and MFIs have to compete for 
clients, price competition on interest rates will usually push MFIs to become more 
efficient. But many MFIs do not yet face much real competition. External monitoring of 
efficiency is especially important in those cases. Young or fast-growing MFIs will look 
less efficient by either of these measures, because those MFIs are paying for staff, 
infrastructure and overheads and are not yet producing at full capacity. 
Many funding agencies have a hard time determining the effectiveness of their 
support for retail microfinance. If an agency wants to keep track of whether its projects 
are producing sustainable results, it needs to collect these basic indicators regularly and 
make them available in an agency-wide database. When designing projects and 
choosing MFIs to participate, staffs need to check whether the MFIs have systems that 
can produce this minimum core information reliably. Where such systems are lacking, 
the project usually needs to include the support necessary to build them. Without 
attention to reporting systems at the earliest possible stage, it is unrealistic to expect 
meaningful information to be produced later. 
3.5.1.3. Sustainability 
Sustainability generally refers to the ability of a program or a firm to continuously 
carry out activities and services in pursuit of its statutory objectives. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, MFIs can maintain and expand their financial services in the long 
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run, unless they cannot cover all of their costs and generate net income. Therefore, 
sustainability basically refers to profitability or commercial microfinance.
133
 According 
to this approach, since MFIs are viewing their activities more and more as profitable 
businesses, it is important to constantly look for possible cost reductions to operate 
profitably and to be economically viable (Hermes et al., 2011). 
The most common measure of profitability in commercial institutions is return on 
assets (ROA), which reflects an organisation’s ability to deploy its assets profitably, and 
return on equity (ROE), which measures the returns produced on the owners’ 
investments (Lafourcade et al., 2005). ROE calculations should use starting equity 
unless there has been a substantial infusion of new equity from an outside source during 
the reporting period. These are appropriate indicators for institutions that do not receive 
subsidies. But donors and social investors typically deal with institutions that receive 
substantial subsidies, most often in the form of grants or loans at below-market interest 
rates. In such cases, the critical question is whether the institution will be able to 
maintain itself and grow when subsidies are no longer available. To determine this, 
financial reporting must be “adjusted” to reflect the impact of the present subsidies, 
such as subsidised cost of funds, in-kind subsidy and inflation. Self-sufficiency 
(including operational self-sufficiency and financial self-sufficiency) is a subsidy-
adjusted indicator often used by donor-funded NGOs. It measures the extent to which 
an MFI’s revenue - mainly interest received - covers the adjusted costs. If it is below 
100%, then the MFI has not yet achieved breakeven.  
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Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) measures operating revenue as a percentage of 
operating and financial expenses, including loan loss provision expense. It generally 
includes all the cash costs of running a MFI, depreciation and the loan loss reserve. 
Therefore, it becomes one of the major goals for MFIs to achieve in order to maintain 
viability and further grow their operations. OSS is calculated as follows: 
OSS = 
                      
                                                                     
  (3.1)
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OSS = 
                
                        
  (3.2)
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On the other hand, financial self-sufficiency (FSS) is the ability to cover all costs 
on an adjusted basis
136
 and indicates the ability to operate without ongoing subsidy
137
 or 
losses. This ratio is calculated as in equation 3.3 below. According to Dichter and 
Harper (2007), out of the approximately 10,000 MFIs worldwide, it is estimated that 
only 3 to 5% have achieved full financial sustainability. Therefore, OSS is preferred by 
several studies when investigating the effects of financial structure on the financial 
performance of MFIs. 
FSS = 
                        
                           
  (3.3)
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funds rasied on the commercial market, plus inflation adjustment. 
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 Ongoing subsidy typically includes soft loans and grants. 
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 Source: UNCDF (2009). 
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3.5.1.4. Portfolio Quality 
This is the most revealing of the performance areas. An MFI must have the ability 
to collect loans for its success: if delinquency is not kept to very low levels, it can 
quickly spin out of control (Rosenberg, 2009). Furthermore, loan collection has proved 
to be a strong proxy for general management competence. Long experience with 
evaluating microfinance has shown that very few successful projects have bad 
repayment, and very few unsuccessful projects have good repayment. More than any 
other indicator, this one deserves special care to ensure meaningful and reliable 
reporting. Therefore, this aspect of performance tends to be indirectly investigated by 
examining efficiency. 
Unfortunately, the reporting of loan collection is complicated. MFIs have used a 
range of ratios that measure very different things and terminology and calculation 
methods are not always consistent. Ratios can obscure rather than clarify performance if 
they are not calculated according to international standards. Therefore, whenever any 
measure of loan repayment, delinquency, default, or loss is reported, the numerator and 
denominator of the ratio should be explained very precisely. 
MFIs’ self-reported collection performance often understates the extent of 
problems, usually because of information system weaknesses rather than the intent to 
deceive. Collection reporting should be regarded as reliable only if it is verified by a 
competent independent party. The common indicator is portfolio at risk (PAR) beyond a 
specified number of days.
139
 When any full or partial payment is past due, the whole 
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 The number of days used for this measurement varies. In microfinance, 30 days is a 
common breakpoint. If the repayment schedule is other than monthly, then one 
repayment period could be used as an alternative. 
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outstanding balance of the loan is at higher than normal risk of non-repayment. PAR 
should not be confused with arrears or past due payments, which measure the value of 
the past due amount rather than the full loan amount that remains outstanding. The PAR 
ratio should also include the outstanding value of all renegotiated loans, including 
rescheduled and refinanced ones, because they have higher than normal risk, especially 
if any payment is missed after renegotiation. 
3.5.2. Determinants of Microfinance Performance 
A substantial number of studies have been carried out on the determinants of the 
performance of firms in general, and MFIs in particular, as mentioned in the previous 
sections of this chapter. The results have suggested that MFIs are far from 
homogeneous based on scale of operation, legal status, profit status and regulated 
status.
140
 Therefore, they respond in different ways to the changing economic conditions 
of their countries and regions (including global financial crisis). This means that the 
performance of MFIs varies with the heterogeneous firm, country and regional 
characteristics. Therefore, this increases the need to address the importance of firm-
specific factors (internal) and macroeconomic factors (external) in investigating the 
relationship between funding and microfinance performance. 
These empirical studies generally employ models which involve the regression of 
the observed indicators of microfinance performance variables (MPV) against a number 
of explanatory variables. The microfinance performance variables include social and 
financial performance indicators representing the minimum relevant aspects of MFI 
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performance (sustainability, efficiency, portfolio quality, and outreach), as previously 
mentioned. They also suggest that the explanatory variables are typically categorised 
into two groups: macroeconomic variables (MEV) and firm-specific variables (FSV). 
However, the indicators used to represent macroeconomics and firm-specific are 
different and depend on the approach of each study. 
3.5.2.1. Macroeconomic Variables (MEV) 
The previous empirical studies suggest that macroeconomic variables are based 
primarily upon an economic tradition, emphasising the importance of external market 
factors in determining a firm’s success.141 These typically include inflation, GDP or 
GNP growth, GDP per capita or GNI per capital, population, the unemployment rate 
and interest rate differentials.
142
 The common approach has been to study the impact of 
macroeconomic factors by investigating the impact of GDP growth and inflation on 
performance. Therefore, in this study, we use GNI per capita and inflation as two 
proxies for the external market factors that affect microfinance performance and how to 
achieve the outreach. 
The inflation indicator refers to a rise in the general level of prices of goods and 
services in an economy over a period of time. When the general price level rises, each 
unit of currency buys fewer goods and services. Most economists favour a low and 
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steady rate of inflation.
143
 In order to be worth the same amount, the income or savings 
and investments are expected to increase by at least the rate of inflation each year to 
avoid losing value in real terms. It is common sense that the rate of interest (after tax) 
earned from savings is greater than the rate of inflation, in order for money to actually 
be growing. If the interest rate on savings is lower than the inflation rate (as it was in the 
case study of Vietnam in 2011), the poor find it difficult, or even impossible, to beat 
inflation. Therefore, the inflation rate becomes one of the most common indicators in 
investigating the effects of macroeconomic factors on performance. Inflation is 
measured at time t-1 annual % change of the GDP deflator at market prices for each 
country where the MFI is located for each year. 
GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income divided by 
the midyear population. It measures the wealth earned by nations through economic 
activities. There are two good reasons why this study uses GNI per capita instead of the 
annual growth rate of GDP or GDP per capita.
144
 First, GDP is used to establish the 
strength of a country’s local economy, while GNP is used to observe how the nationals 
of a country are doing economically. Due to some practical difficulties in the 
measurement of international flows of income, GDP per capita is the most widely used 
indicator of income or welfare, even though it is theoretically inferior to GNI per capita. 
Second, data on GNI per capita are available for use on MIX Market. 
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As previously mentioned, the performance of MFIs also varies between regions 
and countries characteristics. This suggests that we should investigate the impact of 
regulation and supervision on microfinance performance (Gallardo, 2001). However, 
the regulation and supervision involve the regulatory status, which is also considered as 
one of the firm-specific factors of MFIs. 
3.5.2.2. Firm-Specific Variables (FSV) 
Firm-specific variables of MFIs typically include financial structure in terms of 
financial leverage, scale of operation, profitability, deposits, legal status,
145
 lending 
methodologies, empowerment of women, and profit status. However, this study focuses 
on legal status, profit status and regulated status as the main proxies for MFI 
characteristics, for a number of reasons. First, regulated status refers to the ability of 
MFIs to access commercial capital, mobilise savings, improve customer service and 
expand outreach, as well as the ability to attract savers and provide the right financial 
products and services, in particular savings to the poor (Gallardo, 2001; Cull, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch 2009). Second, profit status refers to the reason why 
MFIs exist. For profit MFIs are generally founded to provide microfinance to generate 
income and to distribute profits between owners, employees, shareholders and the 
business itself while non-profits ones focus heavily on their social mission. Third, legal 
status refers to the dominant legal forms for the operation (i.e. organisational and 
operating structure). This allows room for innovation. Therefore, they provide a general 
overview of MFI characteristics, including the ability, mission, and organisational and 
operating structure, that are directly related to performance and capital structure. 
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The comprehensive review in this study suggests that using the lending 
methodologies depends on the profit status and/or legal status, as well as the 
developmental stages of MFIs, and leads them to better performance. In addition, 
intentional focus on lending methodologies and empowerment of women as the main 
proxies may become hard for funders to determine financing decisions since there is 
always a trade-off between financial and social performance. As explained in the 
previous chapter, these factors tend to lead MFIs to additional activities that could affect 
the efficiency of providing financial services to the poor in a sustainable way (Cheston 
and Kuhn, 2002). Clearly, using the right lending methodologies and providing 
financial products to the right person result in better performance, although each case 
depends on the specific circumstances of each MFI. Therefore, commercial funders 
avoid intentionally focusing on the lending methodologies and lending to women in 
order to give MFIs more room for innovation.  
Moreover, several empirical studies have focused on the suggestions of lending 
methodologies and/or gender in interpreting the results of the effects of financial 
structure on performance. The results show that many commercial MFIs are switching 
tactics and beginning to favour lending to individuals as the practice of aggressively 
lending to women is often more harmful than beneficial. The majority of women with 
access to microcredit are not nearly involved enough in the handling of loans to achieve 
any sort of empowerment. On the contrary, many women suffer from an increase in 
violence following their loans due to ensuing power struggles in the home. In most 
cases, women are the favoured clients of MFIs because they are more docile rather than 
because they invest more responsibly and efficiently. Therefore, an obvious extension of 
this study is to introduce possible explanations that might be relevant in the context of 
other firm characteristics, such as legal status, profit status and regulatory status. 
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3.5.3. Estimation Methodology 
Based on the determinants of microfinance performance, this section presents the 
methodology and empirical model used to investigate the relationship between MFIs 
characteristics (including capital structure and scale of operation) and performance. 
3.5.3.1. Research Questions 
Five main research questions are formulated for investigation in the following 
chapters. First, how does financial leverage affect the different aspects of microfinance 
performance (including efficiency, sustainability and outreach)? Second, is there any 
trade-off between the financial and social performance of MFIs? Third, is there any 
trade-off between depth and breadth of outreach? Fourth, how does scale of operation 
together affect microfinance performance (social and financial performance)? Fifth, 
how did the recent global financial crisis of 2007/2008 affect microfinance 
performance? 
3.5.3.2. Data 
The data were collected from MIX Market which have been reported from MFIs 
around the world from 1997 to the end of 2010 for a cross-country analysis. The 
number of available data series varies considerably from year to year. There are many 
different reasons for this, most of which involve the legal framework in the local 
country that determines and limits their businesses and products, and specifies criteria 
and standards for the sound and sustainable operations of MFIs (Chavez and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1992; Gallardo, 2001; Seelig and Novoa, 2009). In order to increase the number 
of the poor with access to microfinance and reduce donor dependence, many MFIs have 
been driven toward greater integration with the formal financial sector and a large 
number of NGOs have considered converting into private owned, regulated entities. 
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There are a large number of MFIs which enter and exit the market. Therefore, a panel 
data was conducted over the whole period. However, the data was self-reported from 
MFIs to MIX Market. Due to the lack of accounting standards designed for MFIs, 
international comparison between different countries becomes difficult (Haq et al., 
2008). In addition, there are a great number of MFIs who do not submit updated data, 
which may also create a selection bias. Any conclusions from the proceeding analysis 
will therefore be somewhat limited. However, this has been considered as the nature of 
MFI analysis: limited data is likely to be followed by limited conclusions. 
3.5.3.3. Design of the Models 
This study tests the impact of capital structure in terms of financial leverage and 
scale of operation on microfinance performance by investigating the relationship 
between the observed performance indicators and a set of explanatory variables. The 
performance of MFIs is further broken down into social performance and financial 
performance while the explanatory variables are categorised into macroeconomic and 
firm-specific variables. 
To examine whether the performance of MFIs varies widely based on the 
differences in characteristics, the following regression model is estimated to carry out a 
cross-country analysis. 
           ∑   
  
           ∑   
  
                                   (3.4) 
where MPVitc is the observed performance of MFIi at year t; FSVitc is the firm-
specific variables; MEVitc is the macroeconomic variables; α is constant; β is a 
regression coefficient, while ε is the disturbance term. 
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3.5.3.4. Methodology 
Different methods are utilised in this study to find answers to the research 
questions that were stated in Chapter 1. The first technique is the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS)
146
. First, the OLS estimator is consistent when the regressors are exogenous and 
there is no perfect multicollinearity and is optimal in the class of linear unbiased 
estimators when the errors are homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. Under these 
conditions, the OLS method provides unbiased estimators when the errors are assumed 
to have finite variances. Under the additional assumption that the errors be normally 
distributed, OLS is the maximum likelihood estimator. Therefore, OLS is one of the 
strongest and most used estimators for unknown parameters based on the Gauss-Markov 
theorem. Second, the weaker the correlations between the instruments and the 
explanators are, the less efficient instrument variables are compared to OLS. Third, 
much of the diagnostic information for multicollinearity can be obtained by calculating an 
OLS regression model using the same dependent and independent variables (Menard, 
2002). Therefore, this may be preferred to other instrumental variables methods (GLS,
147
 
TSLS
148
 and GMM
149
) in some cases. 
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 See Sala-I-Martin (1997), Wooldridge (2002), Gujarati (2003), Baltagi (2008), 
Brooks (2008), Greene (2011) and Dougherty (2011).  
147
 GLS - Generalized Least Square. 
148
 TSLS - Two-Stages Least Square. 
149
 Two types of the GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) are frequently used. The 
first method is first-difference GMM, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which 
uses first-differenced equations with suitable lagged levels as instruments. The second 
method is system GMM, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), which augments the former by additional equations in levels with lagged 
first-differences as instruments. 
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The second technique is GMM which is the preferred method over OLS, GLS and 
TSLS since it helps to solve several econometric problems that may arise from 
estimating the equation above. First, the panel dataset with particular regard to this 
study (a cross-country analysis) has a short time dimension and a larger country 
dimension. The Arellano – Bond estimator was designed for small-T panels in order to 
remove any autocorrelation between the explanatory variables. Second, there is a 
possibility of reverse causation which makes variables correlate with the error term in 
the equation. Therefore, some explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous. To 
cope with that problem (fixed effects), the GMM uses first-differences to transform the 
regressors in order to remove the fixed country-specific effect since it does not vary 
with time. Third, the presence of the lagged dependent variable gives rise to 
autocorrelation. Therefore, the lagged levels of the endogenous regressors (i.e. the first-
differenced lagged dependent variable) is added to the explanatory variables and also 
instrumented with its past levels. This makes the endogenous regressors pre-determined 
and, therefore, not correlated with the error term.  
The GMM is also preferred to fixed effect model (FEM), as well as random 
effects model (REM)
150
 since in small-T panels a shock to the country’s fixed effect, 
which shows in the error term, will not decline over time. In addition, the correlation of 
the lagged dependent variable with the error term will be significant (Roodman, 2006). 
Therefore, the fixed effect model does not allow for controlling of the unobserved 
heterogeneity which describes individual specific effects that are not captured by 
observed variables (this means that there is no evidence of individual effects in the 
data). Since REM is considered as a special case of FEM and also does not allow one to 
                                                 
150
 The Hausman test is conducted to test the significant differences in the coefficiency 
(i.e. whether FEM or REM is appropriate) (Dougherty, 2011). 
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capture the unobserved effects by the error term, consisting of an individual specific one 
and an overall component which is the combined time series and cross-section error.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Over the past few years, equity investments from social investors with social 
objectives as a high priority have played an important role in providing financing for 
several MFIs around the world. These funds have tended to become insufficient to meet 
the continual demand from the poor. Therefore, MFIs are likely to move out of heavily 
subsidised operations and access commercial funds to improve their performance. 
Responding to profit incentives, MFIs have tried to increase revenues and decrease total 
expenses (including costs of capital). The financing behaviours and their effects become 
an important issue. On the other hand, there has been a very little research on the effects 
of financial structure on the performance of MFIs. The existing empirical research has 
analysed the determinants of financial structure and the trade-off between profitability 
and outreach. These studies miss out other relevant aspects of MFI performance, such as 
efficiency and portfolio quality. Therefore, they do not shed new light on the 
relationship between funding and performance for funders to investigate and make 
important financing decisions. This study has raised the important role of firm-specific 
factors in terms of scale of operation and other characteristics (such as charter type, 
profit status and regulated status), as well as the macroeconomic factors in terms of GNI 
per capita and inflation, in presenting the effects of financial structure on the social and 
financial performance of MFIs. This chapter has discussed the most influential 
economic theories and empirical evidence to provide the theoretical sign of the proxy 
variables for the empirical analysis presented in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LINKAGE BETWEEN FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
AND MICROFINANCE PERFORMANCE 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we presented the most influential theories and empirical 
evidence related to the relationship between financial structure and the performance of 
MFIs. The theories and evidence have raised some significant shortfalls of the literature. 
First, the empirical studies have basically focused on the determinants of financial 
structure to explain how an MFI can finance business activities by using debt and equity 
to maximise the benefits for shareholders based on their advantages.
151
 A natural 
extension of this line of inquiry is to investigate the effects of financial structure on the 
main aspects of performance of MFIs from the external funders’ points of view. 
However, previous studies have tended to be fairly limited, focusing only on the links 
between financial structure, profitability and outreach, and thereby missing other 
important aspects of performance: sustainability, efficiency and portfolio quality. 
Second, MFIs are far from homogeneous; their performance therefore responds in 
different ways to changes in return to firm-specific internal factors (such as scale of 
operation, legal status, profit status and regulatory status), as well as macroeconomic 
factors (such as inflation, GNI per capita and global financial crises). Clearly, this 
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 See Mullineux and Murinde (2001). 
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argument increases the need to address the issue of the heterogeneity of MFIs by 
investigating the relationship between microfinance funding and the different aspects of 
performance.
152
 From this point of view, the results of the investigation will help 
internal and external funders determine financing decisions or take corrective actions 
when needed based on the key performance indicators of MFIs. 
Third, the existing empirical research focuses on savings, lending methodologies 
and gender in interpreting the results of the effects of financial structure on the 
performance of MFIs. It concludes that using the right lending methodologies, as well 
as intentionally focusing on lending to women, totally depends on the profit status 
and/or legal status, as well as the developmental stages of MFIs and leads them to better 
performance. However, the research suggests that using the lending methodologies 
and/or lending to women as the main proxies for funding tends to lead MFIs to 
additional activities that could affect the efficiency of providing financial services to the 
poor in a sustainable way (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). It also may become hard for 
funders to determine financing decisions since there is always a trade-off between 
financial and social performance. Therefore, commercial funders would not 
intentionally focus on the lending methodologies, nor lending to women, as the main 
proxies for financing in order to give MFIs more room for innovation.  
An obvious extension of this study is to introduce the possible explanations that 
might be relevant in the context of other firm characteristics, such as scale of operation, 
legal status, profit status and regulatory status for a number of reasons, as discussed in 
the previous chapter (see page 115). Therefore, in this chapter, we conduct an empirical 
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 See Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), Bogan et al. (2007), Bogan (2009) and Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua (2010). 
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investigation to examine the relationship between financial structure in terms of 
financial leverage and microfinance performance (including social and financial 
performance). The indicators investigated here represent the minimum relevant aspects 
of MFI performance (sustainability, efficiency, and outreach). The chapter is divided 
into two main sections. The linkages between financial structure, outreach and 
sustainability are examined in the first section, while the linkage between financial 
structure and efficiency is examined in the second.  
4.2. The Linkage between Financial Structure, Sustainability and Outreach 
4.2.1. Research Objective 
The performance of MFIs is commonly measured by two common indicators, 
sustainability and outreach, and in two main critical areas, financial and social 
performance,
153
 as mentioned in the previous chapter. It has been argued that there is a 
potential trade-off between reaching a high number of the poor to achieve the social 
mission and attaining profitability to achieve financial sustainability. Purely socially 
motivated MFIs have to consider the possibility that the problem of insufficient funds 
for microfinance can be replaced by being sustainable and economically viable in the 
long run.
154
 Numerous studies suggest that MFIs can maintain profitable operations and 
remain viable without any subsidies (sustainability), while serving a high number of the 
poor to achieve their social goals (outreach). This means that MFIs can trade off 
outreach (depending totally on subsidies for their social mission) for sustainability (i.e. 
attempt to maintain themselves and grow when subsidies are insufficient or no longer 
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 See Rosenberg (2009). 
154
 See Christen and Drake (2001), Zeller and Myer (2002), Srinivasan and Sriram 
(2006) and Hammill et al. (2008). 
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available for the financial mission). Therefore, MFIs tend to access commercial funds 
(including savings) and move towards operational sustainability, complemented by 
financial and social efficiency, based on funding sources. This suggests that funding 
sources are an important fundamental component to achieve the mix of the double 
bottom line (i.e. the balance between social and financial performance). 
In order to answer the main research questions (RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3) presented in 
the previous chapters, empirical tests are conducted to investigate the link between 
financial leverage, and the social and financial performance of MFIs across countries. 
They aim to shed light on how funding affects the social and financial aspects of 
microfinance performance to help funders determine and make investment decisions, as 
well as to improve the performance of MFIs and achieve the double bottom line. It is, 
therefore, hypothesised that positive relationships exist between financial leverage, 
sustainability and outreach. This hypothesis can be broken into four basic sub- 
hypotheses (SH) in order to test the central hypothesis and provide empirical evidence 
for this section. 
SH4.1: Financial leverage can help MFIs to achieve sustainability (H0). 
SH4.2: Financial leverage can help MFIs to expand their outreach (H0). 
SH4.3: There may be thresholds or reversals in the causal relations between 
financial leverage and microfinance performance (H0) 
SH4.4: Sustainability can promote the outreach of MFIs (H0). 
SH4.5: The breadth of outreach can promote the depth of outreach (H0). 
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4.2.2. Models 
4.2.2.1. Dependent and Independent Variables 
In order to accomplish the above objectives, a cross-country analysis is carried out 
to investigate how sustainability and outreach are influenced by financial structure in 
terms of financial leverage and how they vary depending on the characteristics of MFIs. 
There is a large body of literature on factors influencing microfinance performance, as 
mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3. These studies conclude that operational self-sufficiency 
(OSS), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) are the most common 
indicators used to assess sustainability, while gross loan portfolio (GLP), number of 
active borrowers (NAB), and average loan balance per borrower (ALB) are the most 
common indicators used to assess outreach (Lafourcade et al., 2005; Rosenberg, 2009). 
However, this study primarily focuses on investigating the impact of financial leverage 
on outreach and sustainability, as well as profitability (ROA and ROE).
155
 Therefore, 
debt to equity ratio (DTE) is used as one of the independent variables. The dependence 
variables include OSS, ROA, ROE, ALB and NAB, representing sustainability, 
profitability, and the depth and breadth of outreach, respectively.
156
 More specifically, 
the financial performance and outreach indicators are regressed on a set of explanatory 
                                                 
155
 First, it is common sense that firms who have achieved break-even are profitable. 
This means that an MFI may be profitable, but it has not yet achieved sustainability –
break-even without the subsidised cost of funds. Second, ROA and ROE may become 
inappropriate indicators for any firms that receive substantial subsidies (Rosenberg, 
2009). Therefore, OSS is preferred in microfinance over ROA and ROE. 
156
 See Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Christen et al. (1995), 
Navajas et al. (2000), Ozkan (2001), Zeller and Meyer (2002), Cull et al. (2007), Bogan 
(2009), Agarwal and Sinha (2010), Ahlin et al. (2010) and Imai et al. (2011). 
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variables used to proxy for factors affecting performance. There are several other firm-
specific factors (such as scale of operation,
157
 percentage of lending to women 
(Pwomen), legal status, profit status and regulated status) and macroeconomic factors 
(such as inflation and GNI per capita) that may influence the performance of MFIs and 
are also considered in this study. Outreach is measured in terms of the natural logarithm 
of ALB and NAB (lnALB and lnNAB). According to the suggestion of Professor 
Malcolm Harper, we add percentage of lending to women indicator into the regressions 
since it is considered as one of the main factors that affects the financing decisions of 
external funders and it relates to the “doing good” of MFIs. 
4.2.2.2. Models 
Based on the general regression models presented in chapter 3, the relationships 
between financial leverage, sustainability and outreach have been analysed by the 
following regression models (RM) in order to answer RQ4A and RQ4B: 
                                ∑   
  
            ∑   
  
                        (RM 4.1) 
where MFPit is the microfinance performance indicators of MFIi at time t located 
in country c, (including OSS, ROA, ROE, lnNAB and lnALB); DTEit  is the financial 
leverage of MFIi at time t; FSVitc represents other firm-specific variables, including 
lnGLP, Pwomen and dummy variables referring to legal status, profit status and 
regulated status; MEVitc represents macroeconomics factors, including inflation, GNI 
per capita and a dummy variable referring the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 
(before and after the crisis); α is constant; β is a variable coefficient and             
                                                 
157
 The effects of scale of operations on performance and the contributions of different 
scales of operation to the relationship between financial structure and microfinance 
performance will be investigated in the next chapter. 
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      is an error term that includes    (the unobserved complete set of the MFI-specific 
effect),    (the unobserved time effect) and      (the idiosyncratic error). 
There are possible interactions between financial leverage (DTE) and other firm-
specific variables (FSV) that could come into play. Therefore, we created an interaction 
by multiplying DTE by dummy variables in terms of legal status (bank, credit union, 
NFBI, NGO and rural bank), as well as profit status (profit and non-profit) and 
regulated status (regulated and unregulated) in order to test and explain the relationship 
between financial leverage and microfinance performance. In addition, we also created 
squared variables to investigate whether there is an optimal financial leverage that help 
MFIs to achieve sustainability and expand their outreach. This means that the effect of 
financial leverage on performance changes from positive to negative, or from negative 
to positive at some levels of financial leverage. Maybe, as financial leverage increases, 
performance increases or decreases down to some threshold. But if it goes beyond the 
critical point (the inflection point), the relationship reverses. 
To avoid an unbalanced two-way error component model, we add the country-
specific dummy into the regression model and test country and time hypotheses 
separately as well as jointly by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The results show that 
country and time specific dummy variables are insignificant for a cross-country 
analysis. Therefore we should neither include year-specific nor country-specific 
dummies in the model. In addition, we perform the Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions in the GMM dynamic model estimation to confirm the validity of the 
instruments, as well as also testing whether the Arellano-Bond orthogonality conditions 
are fulfilled. In all regressions, the lags of dependent variables are statistically 
significant in order to justify our use of the system GMM. 
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4.2.3. Predicted Effects of Independent Variables 
The predicted effects of the proxy variables are constructed depending on the 
theoretical model and empirical evidence of the variables. These predicted effects 
provide convincing statements for the empirical analysis below. 
Table 4.1 Predicted Effects of the Independent Variables 
Variable Indicator Notation Predicted Effects Source of Data 
Dependent Variable 
Outreach Number of Active 
Borrowers 
NAB  MIX Market 
Sustainability Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
OSS  MIX Market 
Profitability Return on Assets 
Return on Equity 
ROA 
ROE 
 MIX Market 
Independent Variable 
Firm-Specific Variables (FSV)   
Financial Leverage Debt to Equity DTE Negative MIX Market 
Scale of Operation Gross Loan Portfolio GLP Positive MIX Market 
Gender Share of Lending to 
Women 
Pwomen Negative MIX Market 
Legal Status Dummy (DLS) Bank 
NGO 
Credit Union 
NBFI 
Rural Bank 
Indeterminate MIX Market 
Profit Status Dummy (DP) Profit and 
Nonprofit 
Indeterminate MIX Market 
Regulated Status Dummy (DR) Regulated and 
Unregulated 
Indeterminate MIX Market 
Macroeconomic Variables (MEV) 
Inflation Inflation INF Negative Datastream 
GNI per capita GNI per capita GNI Indeterminate Datastream 
Financial Crisis Dummy Beforecrisis 
and Aftercrisis 
Positive 
Negative 
Datastream 
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4.2.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used for the 
regression. The mean value of OSS for the period 1996 to 2010 was 1.18 (118%), while 
the minimum value was -0.29 (-29%) and maximum 19.38 (1,938%). This means that 
some MFIs can cover their costs by operating revenue. However, the mean value is very 
small and the minimum value is negative. An MFI reaches sustainability if OSS is at 
least 1 (100%). This result shows that there are a number of MFIs, who do not earn 
enough profit to cover their total costs. In this case, equity will be reduced by losses 
(negative equity), unless they receive grants or concessional loans from external 
sources. Comparing this result to the “key stages in microfinance” (Charitonenko and 
Campion, 2003) shows that MFIs are at the midway stage of achieving sustainability 
and are not fully commercial. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of all variables 
Variable Mean Max Min Std. Dev Obs. 
OSS 1.1847 19.38 -0.29 0.6871 4,570 
ALB 1,166.77 99,889.5 0 2,799.52 4,657 
NAB 59,619.96 6,397,635 0 338,013.5 4,684 
DTE 4.4125 2940.2 -2,478.24 82.7328 4,671 
CPB 292.85 179,116 0 3,813.71 3,653 
Pwomen 0.6254 2.12 0 0.2670 3,938 
Inflation 8.1367 431.7 -13.23 16.7145 1,462 
GNI 547.8553 999.99 80 244.976 1,692 
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Table 4.2 shows that the value of DTE was 4.4125 times on average. There is a 
big gap between the minimum value (-1,221.26 times) and the maximum value (2,940.2 
times). DTE gives a measure of how much of the company’s worth is funded through 
debt and how much through equity. A ratio of greater than 1 means that the MFI has 
less equity than total liabilities; a ratio of greater than 0 but less than 1 means that the 
MFI has more equity than total liabilities. These rules apply, only so long as the MFI 
has positive equity. A negative DTE would indicate that many MFIs have negative 
equity, when total liabilities exceed total assets. This suggests that MFIs depend heavily 
on borrowings and subsidised funds for lending. It leads to MFIs having negative equity 
since they do not earn enough revenue to cover total costs. This index provides the level 
of dependence on external funds for their expansion.  
Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix between the dependent and independent variables 
 
 OSS ROA ROE DTE lnGLP Pwomen Inflation lnGNI 
OSS 1.0000        
ROA -0.0293 1.0000       
ROE -0.0308 0.0836* 1.0000      
DTE -0.0112 -0.0026 -0.0168 1.0000     
lnGLP 0.0431* 0.0237 0.0194 -0.0004 1.0000    
Pwomen -0.0272 -0.0190 -0.0148 0.0085 -0.1745* 1.0000   
Inflation -0.0180 -0.0296 -0.0090 -0.0241 -0.0747 -0.0465 1.0000  
lnGNI 0.0112 0.1156* 0.0426 0.0096 0.1830* 0.0389 -0.1356* 1.0000 
Note: * is statistically significant at a level of 5% or lower. 
Table 4.3 is a correlation matrix for all the variables in the regression model. The 
figures are Pearson correlation coefficients ranging from -1 to 1. Closer to 1 means a 
strong correlation and a negative value indicates an inverse relationship (i.e. one goes 
up while other goes down). The table shows the bi-variate relationships for the period 
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1996 to 2010 between dependent and independent variables. The results are consistent 
with the argument that MFIs may not have the revenue greater than the cost of debts for 
a number of reasons, such as costs of being regulated. Therefore, stockholder equity is 
reduced by losses and has a negative value. This also suggests that MFIs rely heavily on 
grants or concessional loans from external sources. An interesting observation is the 
positive and significant relationship between gross loan portfolio and sustainability. 
This may be an indication that expanding their outreach helps MFIs achieve 
sustainability and vice versa. In addition, the negative relationships between share of 
lending to women, sustainability and profitability are also consistent with the results of 
the comprehensive review in this study. Intentionally focusing on lending to women 
leads MFIs to additional activities which could have a negative impact on the efficiency 
of microfinance in a sustainable way. This means focusing on lending to women can 
make MFIs less efficient and therefore less profitable. 
4.2.5. Estimation Results of Sustainability 
The main aim of this section was to determine whether sustainability and 
profitability depend on microfinance funding. The descriptive statistic in the previous 
section led us to test further the relationship between sustainability, profitability and 
capital structure in terms of financial leverage, while the control for other MFI specific 
characteristics and macroeconomics factors are not within the control of MFI 
management and external funders. We perform a regression analysis in four different 
specifications by adding the squared term of financial leverage and the interaction term 
of financial leverage and MFI-specific characteristics. This includes the specification 
without the squared and interaction terms (MS4.1), with the interaction term of financial 
leverage and MFI specific characteristics (MS4.2), with the squared term of financial 
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leverage (MS4.3) and with the squared and interaction term of financial leverage and 
MFI specific characteristics (MS4.4). 
Table 4.4 shows the results from our basic specifications using operational self-
sufficiency (OSS, log) as the sustainability. The result is overwhelming evidence to 
support our hypotheses (SH4.1 and SH4.3) from the review of the literature. It suggests 
that sources of funding play an important role in helping MFIs around the world achieve 
sustainability. The results indicate that financial leverage was negatively related to 
sustainability (see table 4.4), as well as profitability (see table 4.5). This suggests that 
any funding source has its costs (called costs of funding) which include interest paid to 
investors for debts, dividends paid to owners for equity and interest paid to depositors 
for savings. In microfinance, debts (including borrowings and savings) are normally 
from commercial sources at the market interest rate or from socially responsible 
investors at a low rate (known as “soft” loans). Therefore, debts tend to increase 
financial expenses and have negative effects on net income (Gozalez and Meyer, 2009). 
This may point to the fact that MFIs do not earn enough revenue to cover total costs 
when using commercial funds to provide subsidised loans to the poor. The current trend 
away from subsidies towards a commercial approach adds to the costs and directly 
narrows the gross margin on loans. Therefore, savings become an even more attractive 
refinancing alternative in a mixed overall calculation and perspective. In the long run, to 
fulfil the goal of fighting against worldwide poverty, it becomes clear that MFIs need to 
operate on a sustainable and efficient basis. This suggests that larger loans, as well as 
higher interest rates, would result in more income for MFIs and make them more 
profitable due to cost and some scale effects. However, it might create disadvantages for 
the poor who are dependent on the loans and who might have difficulties in paying back 
larger amounts. 
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Table 4.4 Impact of financial leverage on sustainability  
 
Variables (MS4.1) (MS4.2) (MS4.3) (MS4.4) 
Lag 1 lnOSS 0.5946*** 0.5477*** 0.5582***  
DTE -0.0379***  -0.0278* -0.0226 
DTE
2
   -0.0164 -0.0804*** 
lnGLP 0.0356*** 0.0515*** 0.0311** -0.0468 
Pwomen -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0503 -0.2385** 
Regulated  -0.0074  -0.0106 -0.3928 
Profit 0.1199  0.1116 0.5616 
Micro Bank -0.0963*  -0.0216* 0.0499 
Credit Union 0.0387  0.1083 0.4219 
NGO 0.0072  0.0439 0.4967 
NBFI -0.1081**  -0.0379* 0.0027** 
Inflation 0.0009 0.0015 0.0018 -0.0079 
lnGNI -0.0566* -0.0498 -0.0178 0.1652*** 
Beforecrisis 0.0973*** 0.1012*** 0.1141*** -0.0278** 
DTEregulated  -0.0071*  -0.0259 
DTE
2
regulated    0.0002 
DTEprofit  0.0102*  0.5415** 
DTE
2
profit    -0.0963** 
DTEbank  -0.0156**  -0.5076** 
DTE
2
bank    0.0965** 
DTEcreditunion  0.0054  0.0002 
DTE
2
creditunion    -0.0242 
DTEnbfi  -0.0009**  0.0964** 
DTE
2
nbfi    -0.4942** 
DTEngo  0.0001*  0.0148* 
DTE
2
ngo    -0.0002 
Observations 425 420 425 544 
AR (1)
a
 -2.62*** -2.02*** -2.42***  
R
2
 = 0.8257 AR (2)
b
 0.51 1.12 0.49 
Wald Test 367.70*** 346.75*** 317.84*** 
Sargan Test
c
 247.60 
 (p-value=0.601) 
281.39 
(p-value=0.495) 
219.46 
(p-value=0.713) 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
 c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in GMM dynamic estimation. 
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However, the real effects of funding on performance can in theory be positive or 
negative due to their contributions to financial revenue (i.e. MFIs may take on more 
debt to increase profitability by creating greater revenue than costs). The insignificant 
result on the squared term of financial leverage in the third model specification (MS4.3) 
is consistent with this approach. It suggests that the differences in characteristics of 
MFIs contribute to the impact of financial structure on performance in various ways. 
Therefore, we investigate the interaction effects between financial leverage and other 
MFI specific factors in terms of profit status, legal status and regulatory status. The 
results indicate that there exists some thresholds and if financial leverage goes beyond 
the threshold, the relationship between financial leverage and microfinance performance 
reverses (MS4.4). The results show us that the coefficient for the normal term of 
financial leverage is positive (or negative) and the coefficient for the squared term is 
negative (or positive). This tell us that, as financial leverage increases (decreases, the 
level of sustainability increases (or decreases) at first (the first term), but then turns 
negative (or positive) beyond the threshold (by using the squared term). In addition, we 
can also determine the threshold value by using the coefficient of the linear term divided 
by -2 times the value of the coefficient of the squared term. 
As previously mentioned, OLS regression is not an appropriate statistical technique 
as it has various problems. However, much of the diagnostic information for 
multicollinearity (e.g. VIFs
158
) can be obtained by calculating an OLS regression model 
using the same dependent and independent variables we use in our logistic regression model 
(Menard, 2002). According to Menard (2002, p.76),  “because the concern is with the 
relationship among the independent variables, the functional form of the model for the 
                                                 
158
 VIFs – the variance inflation factor. 
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dependent variable is irrelevant to the estimation of collinearity.” This means we could run 
an OLS regression and ignore most of the results but still use the information that pertained 
to multicollinearity (see MS4.4 in table 4.4).  
We find that the results of the percentage of lending to women coefficient for all 
the model specifications are negative and insignificant. This is consistent with the 
findings of the literature and the comprehensive review of this study and may point to 
the fact that focusing on lending to women makes MFIs less efficient and therefore less 
profitable (Hermes et al., 2011). Many arguments against focusing on lending to women 
has been considered as “doing good” of MFIs. In order to give MFIs more room for 
innovation, external funders tend to focus on the main indicators of microfinance 
performance instead of the lending to women indicator to determine financing 
decisions. It is therefore excluded from the following regression model for investigating 
the impact of funding and microfinance performance. 
The results indicate that gross loan portfolio was positively related to 
sustainability, as well as profitability. This result suggests that an increase in 
outstanding loans (scale of operation) tends to help MFIs achieve higher self-
sufficiency. Consistent with Hermes and Lensink (2007) and Cull et al. (2012), MFIs 
could improve their sustainability by increasing outstanding loans. However, according 
to the diseconomies of scale, large scale lead to an increase in the unit cost and there is 
also a limit of scale due to bounded rationality. This means we need to carry out a more 
comprehensive model in the following chapter to investigate the impact of scale of 
operation on microfinance performance in order to find the convincing answers for 
research question 4 (RQ4). 
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Table 4.5 Impact of financial structure on sustainability and profitability 
 
Variables lnOSS lnROA lnROE 
Lag 1 
(ln.OSS/ROA/ROE) 
0.5613***  
(0.0198) 
0.6957*** 
(0.0547) 
0.0408* 
(0.0298) 
lnGLP 0.0534***  
(0.0133) 
0.0069** 
(0.0028) 
0.1057 
(0.1312) 
DTEprofit 0.0127 **  
(0.0060) 
0.0037* 
(0.0031) 
0.0434 
(0.0344) 
DTEregulated -0.0097*  
(0.0057) 
-0.0036* 
(0.0034) 
-0.0804*** 
(0.0286) 
DTEbank -0.0153** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0017* 
(0.0012) 
-0.0319 
(0.0794) 
DTEcreditunion 0.0077*  
(0.0056) 
0.0031 
(0.0031) 
0.0794 
(0.0856) 
DTEnbfi 0.0006***  
(0.0002) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0062*** 
(0.0008) 
DTEngo 0.0001**  
(0.001) 
3.78e-06 
(5.52e-06) 
0.0018*** 
(0.0002) 
Inflation -0.0005 
(0.0040) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0024 
(0.0031) 
lnGNI -0.0504  
(0.0494) 
-0.0059 
(0.0105) 
-0.1102 
(0.2991) 
Beforecrisis 0.0964** 
(0.0376) 
0.0275** 
(0.0112) 
0.3797 
(0.7591) 
Observations 452 334 334 
AR (1)
a
 -2.01*** -2.40** -2.34** 
AR (2)
b
 1.12 0.75 0.78 
Wald Test 1,422.84*** 656.72*** 439.41*** 
Sargan Test
c
 283.52 
P-value = 0.497 
315.74 
P-value = 0.718 
317.88 
P-value = 0.688 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in GMM dynamic estimation. 
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We also find that financial leverage in the case of profitable MFIs is positively 
related to sustainability and is significant at a level of 5% (see table 4.5). Consistent 
with Campion and White (2001), Fernando (2004) and Bogan (2009) and with the 
economies of scale theory, profitable MFIs take on considerably more debt and are 
therefore have more revenue and achieve higher sustainability than non-profit MFIs. 
Therefore, debts have recently become one of the main funding sources for profitable 
MFIs, together with savings and other low cost funds. This result is important, as it 
would also encourage the transformation process of MFIs from simply achieving their 
social mission to becoming profitable businesses in order to be self-sufficient and 
remain viable. However, the smaller MFIs take on more debt and tend to be exposed to 
considerably more risk than their larger counterparts. Many signs point to the fact that 
profit status has significantly interacted with large scale of operation. This also suggests 
that scale of operation interacts with financial structure and has an impact on 
performance. 
Financial leverage in the case of regulated MFIs was negatively related to 
sustainability (-0.0097) and was significant at a level of 10% (see table 4.5). This result 
indicates that regulated status, as well as taking on more debt, also has some 
disadvantages that MFIs should be aware of. These include a cost increase from 
licensing fees, savings mobilisation, capital requirements and control of interest rates. 
Therefore, using more debts tends to result in the lower revenue. Consistent with 
Christen and Rosenberg (2000), Ngo and Nguyen (2007) and David (2009), MFIs have 
to equip themselves with knowledge on the how and why of being a regulated 
institution. Therefore, it is argued that only MFIs which achieve a significant scale and 
degree of sustainability should be regulated, as mentioned in the previous chapters. In 
addition, the microfinance industry already has to endure high operating expenses in 
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relationship to loan size, savings mobilisation and additional costs from regulation and 
supervision, which increase the difficulty of maintaining operations. Therefore, creating 
a good environment for MFIs to develop and strengthen themselves plays an important 
role in promoting viable and sustainable systems of microfinance (Omino, 2005).   
The financial leverage of microfinance banks was negatively related to 
sustainability and profitability (-0.0154, -0.0018 and -0.0337) and was significant at a 
level of 5%. Consistent with Myers (1984) and Bogan (2009), microfinance banks are 
regulated and profitable MFIs which tend to rely more on debts than subsidized funds 
for their lending. Therefore, they may not have a revenue greater than the costs of debts 
and other high expenses associated with being regulated, as previously mentioned in the 
case of regulated MFIs. Compared to profitable MFIs, microfinance banks need to 
broaden their services or increase their scale of operation for economies of scale, reduce 
the costs of savings mobilisation and obtain more savings to achieve an overall lower 
cost of funds (Cull et al., 2011). 
Another interesting finding in this study is that financial leverage was positively 
related to the sustainability of profitable MFIs, but was negatively related to the 
sustainability of regulated MFIs and microfinance banks. This suggests that the cost of 
compliance may be very costly on top of the costs of savings mobilisation and causes 
more damage than it remedies. Therefore, MFIs should transform their organisational 
and legal structures to those of regulated and profitable MFIs only because of the 
practicality of expanding their scale of operations and the usefulness in effectively 
generating added resources, as well as the compulsory regulations for microfinance of 
each country. Low-cost funds are always preferable in microfinance. 
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Financial leverage at Credit Unions, NBFIs and NGOs were positively related to 
sustainability and significant at the level of 10%, 1% and 5% respectively. This 
indicates that some Credit Unions, NBFIs and NGOs have achieved higher 
sustainability and profitability by increasing and mixing debts with other funding 
sources. However, note that the coefficient for the first term is positive and that the 
coefficient for the squared term of financial leverage is negative (see MS4 in table 4). 
This suggests that in contrast to microfinance banks, other MFIs can initially increase 
sustainability and profitability by increasing financial leverage, but these then turn 
negative beyond the thresholds previously discussed. Consistent with the findings of 
MIX Market (2006 and 2009), these MFIs have created higher revenue by using more 
commercial debts (perhaps including savings) in order to mix debts with subsidised 
funds and/or by using more subsidised funds to obtain a lower capial cost. We also find 
that there is a positive relationship between gross loan portfolio and sustainability. This 
suggests that several MFIs take on more debt in their financial structure to expand their 
scale of operation in order to have a positive impact on sustainability. This means that 
higher sustainability may also help MFIs to expand their outreach. Therefore, an 
optimal mix of financing sources has indirect positive effects on the growth in outreach 
and the level of sustainability in various ways. The impact of financial leverage on 
outreach is investigated in the following section to order to test sub-hypothesis (SH4.2). 
The results indicate that gross loan portfolio was positively related to 
sustainability, as well as profitability. This suggests that an increase in outstanding 
loans (scale of operation) tends to help MFIs achieve higher self-sufficiency. Consistent 
with Hermes and Lensink (2007) and Cull et al. (2012), MFIs could improve their 
sustainability by increasing outstanding loans. However, according to the diseconomies 
of scale, large scale leads to an increase in unit cost and there is also a limit of scale. 
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This led us to carry out a more comprehensive model specification in the following 
chapter to test further the link between scale of operation and performance. 
The effects of macroeconomic variables (inflation and GNI per capita) are 
negative and insignificant. This result may point to the fact that high inflation may 
increase the costs of capital and other MFI expenses, while borrowers have trouble with 
the repayment of loans since prices have increased but not wages. On the other hand, 
when poor households have a higher income (GNI per capita) and have been lifted out 
of poverty, they tend to move from MFIs to local commercial banks because of the 
advantages they offer. The results also provide strong evidence that the positive 
coefficient on the “before crisis” dummy shows that the global financial crisis may pose 
an obstacle to the performance of MFIs. It is common sense that the global financial 
crisis, as well as high inflation, tends to have the same negative impact on microfinance 
performance, increases the cost of living and affects the income of the population. 
4.2.6. Estimation Results of Outreach 
Outreach is considered as one of the main aspects of microfinance performance 
that captures the social mission of MFIs. In order to test sub-hypothesis (SH4.5), the 
main aim of this section is to determine whether the social performance (“doing good”) 
of MFIs in terms of depth and breadth of outreach also depends on funding (SH4.2), as 
well as whether there is any trade-off between the depth and breadth of outreach. We 
focus on performing a regression analysis in two different specifications by adding the 
squared term of all variables (MS4.5 and MS4.7) and the interaction term of financial 
leverage and other MFI-specific characteristics (MS4.6 and MS4.8).   
Table 4.6 shows the results from our basic specifications using average loan 
balance (ALB, log) and number of active borrowers (NAB, log) as the depth and 
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breadth of outreach to investigate the effects of financial structure on outreach. The 
results support our null hypotheses (SH4.2 and SH4.5) and suggest that funding plays 
an important role in expanding the outreach of MFIs and that breadth can indirectly 
promote the depth of outreach based on improving profitability and sustainability. 
The effects of funding on outreach can be positive or negative due to the 
interaction between financial structure and the differences in the characteristics of MFIs. 
This tells us that some MFIs may take on more debt to increase profitability. Therefore, 
financial leverage has a positive impact on outreach. Others do not earn enough revenue 
to cover total costs when using commercial funds to provide subsidised loans to the 
poor. However, the relationship between funding and outreach can reverse and change 
the sign from positive to negative, or vice versa, if financial leverage goes beyond the 
threshold, as explained earlier. 
An interesting finding in the results is that financial leverage has the opposite 
effect on breadth (loan size) and depth (number of borrower) based on the 
characteristics of MFIs. This means that once financial leverage passes the inflection 
point, increases (or decreases) in financial leverage result in increases (or decreases) in 
breadth but decreases (or increases) in depth. The percentage change in number of 
borrowers is equal to the percentage change in loan size. This provides us with evidence 
of a trade-off between the depth and breadth of outreach beyond the threshold of 
financial leverage. Due to funding constraints, some MFIs may choose to focus on their 
social mission by providing loans to a large number of borrowers, while others may 
focus on loan size. Sometimes it is useful to think of the use of funds to the poor as in 
slices of a pie. If so, the goal of the MFI manager will be to choose the financial 
leverage that makes the pie as big as possible in order to increase the threshold level.  
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Table 4.6 Impact of financial structure on the depth and breadth of outreach 
 
Variables lnALB lnNAB 
MS4.5 MS4.6 MS4.7 MS4.8 
Lag 1 (lnALB/lnNAB)  0.8987*** (0.0286)  0.8668*** (0.0427) 
lnGLP 0.8229*** 0.0362* (0.0187) -0.1170 0.0652** (0.0345) 
lnGLP2 -0.0249***  0.0249***  
DTE -0.0695 -0.0047 (0.0159) 0.0695 0.0006 (0.0267) 
DTE2 -0.0418*  0.0418*  
DTEprofit -0.1526* -0.0056* (0.0077) 0.1526* 0.0156* (0.0113) 
DTE2profit 0.0018  -0.0018  
DTEregulated -0.0187 0.0111* (0.0070) 0.0187 -0.0175* (0.0181) 
DTE2regulated 0.0023*  -0.0023*  
DTEbank 0.5415*** 0.0014 (0.0099) -0.5415*** -0.0150* (0.0110) 
DTE2bank -0.0168***  0.0168***  
DTEcreditunion 0.1186*** -0.0132* (0.0073) -0.1186*** 0.0128 (0.0117) 
DTE2creditunion -0.0037**  0.0037**  
DTEnbfi 0.1671** -0.0013*** (0.0003) -0.1671** 0.0005 (0.0006) 
DTE2nbfi -0.0043*  0.0043*  
DTEngo -0.0279* -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0279* 0.0001 (0.0001) 
DTE2ngo 0.0002***  -0.0002***  
Inflation 0.0094 -0.0027*** (0.0006) -0.0094* -0.0012* (0.0008) 
Inflation2 -0.00001*  0.00001  
lnGNI -5.3804*** 0.0690* (0.0452) 5.3804*** -0.1771** (0.0766) 
lnGNI2 0.5167***  -0.5167***  
Beforecrisis 0.0072 0.1269** (0.0594) -0.0072 0.0402 (0.0834) 
Observations  462  462 
AR (1)a  -2.62***  -2.45** 
AR (2)b  -0.14  -.032 
Wald Test  3,365.42***  2.732.85*** 
Sargan Testc  259.80 (P-value = 0.367)  263.56 (P-value = 0.378) 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in GMM dynamic estimation 
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An implication of this is the possibility that there is a possible trade-off between 
the depth and the breadth of outreach. Consistent with Goldberg (2005) and Cull et al. 
(2007), a large number of borrowers can lead to small loan size due to funding 
constraints. Therefore, to guarantee a large-scale outreach on a long-term basis, MFIs 
may need a big increase in funds, as suggested by Hermes et al. (2011). This finding 
contributes additional evidence that an increase in funds implies an increase in scale of 
operation, which may also increase the depth of outreach. 
The results show that gross loan portfolio (GLP, log) was positively related to the 
depth and breadth of outreach (0.0362 and 0.0652) and significant at the levels of 5% 
and 10%, respectively (see table 4.6). This means that there is a positive relationship 
between scale of operation and outreach. Therefore, MFIs may need to upscale their 
operations in order to expand their outreach to the poor. Consistent with Terberger 
(2003), Fernando (2004), Martin (2008) and Lehner (2009), MFIs can increase loan size 
and/or number of borrowers depending on their characteristics to avoid overlending and 
multiple borrowing by fulfilling the increasing demand for larger loans. Increasing 
outstanding loans helps MFIs improve their sustainability and also creates the causal 
effect of sustainability. The possible trade-off between the depth and breadth of 
outreach due to funding constraints is consistent with the findings of Navajas et al. 
(2000), Robinson (2001) and Cull et al. (2012). However, it raises the issue of a shift in 
the composition of new clients or a reorientation from poorer to wealthier clients among 
the existing clients of MFIs. There is an interesting issue here, which is that successful 
MFIs tend to shift their mission and practices with the changes in their clients, who will 
be less poor and need larger loans over time. This means that MFIs are able to reach 
larger numbers of the poor and have the ability to offer bigger loans to meet the 
increasing demand of the poor after the expansion in their scale of operation. Therefore, 
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the result is not “trade-off,” as the term is generally understood, between loan size and 
number of borrowers. This is a trade-off between the wealthier and poorer clients 
among existing clients.  
The results in the case of profitable MFIs follow the theoretical prediction of the 
impact of financial leverage on outreach. Financial leverage was positively related to 
the number of active borrowers (0.0156, significant at the level of 5%) but was 
negatively related to average loan balance (-0.0056, significant at the level of 5%) (see 
table 4.6). This result indicates that using more debts allows profitable MFIs to reach a 
larger number of borrowers and may allow them to offer smaller loans to the poor. 
Consistent with Yunus (1998), Arora and Meenu (2010) and Opportunity Fund (2011), 
the cost efficiency of profitable MFIs enables them to offer small loans, which are 
associated with high transaction costs. This may point to the fact that profitable MFIs 
tend to pay more attention to the purposes of loans and to provide sufficient loans sizes 
to the appropriate borrowers (Cull et al., 2007). 
We also find that financial leverage has a significant effect at the level of 5% on 
the number of active borrowers (0.0111) and loan size (-0.0175) (see table 4.) in the 
case of regulated MFIs. This result indicates that regulated MFIs may provide larger 
loans to the poor in order to maximise the benefits of fixed costs (such as licensing fees, 
capital requirements and control of interest rates) and to minimise the transaction costs 
of providing small loans. Complementary services are sometimes offered by MFIs, but 
supplying them increases operating costs, thereby jeopardising financial sustainability if 
the additional costs are not covered by the borrowers; however this almost never 
happens. It has been found in many studies that regulated MFIs are less efficient than 
profitable MFIs. Consistent with Lafourcade et al. (2005), regulated MFIs tend to be 
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much bigger than unregulated ones since they have mobilisation of savings and can 
reach more depositors. This result is also consistent with the effects of financial 
leverage on the sustainability of regulated MFIs, as mentioned in the previous section. 
With microfinance banks, financial leverage was negatively related to both the 
breadth and the depth of outreach. This result indicates that commercial debts may be 
more expensive than equity and other funding sources in microfinance. Therefore, debts 
are not desirable for expanding outreach at first, as they are negative or decrease during 
the first term, but then become positive beyond the threshold. In addition, microfinance 
banks are regulated, therefore they have the cost efficiency of profitable MFIs but also 
the disadvantages of being regulated. These pros and cons lead microfinance banks to 
offer loans to appropriate borrowers based on their purposes. Consistent with the effects 
of financial leverage on sustainability, microfinance banks may have high costs of 
savings mobilisation and need to broaden their services for economies of scale and 
secure more deposits for an overall lower cost of funds. 
The effect of financial leverage was positively related to the breadth of outreach 
but was negatively related to the depth of outreach at Credit Unions, NBFIs and NGOs. 
Contrary to the results of regulated MFIs, these MFIs may choose to focus on the 
number of active borrowers instead of concentrating on loan size due to their social 
mission, commitment to sponsors and funding constraints. Consistent with De Sousa-
Shields and Frankiewiecz (2004), the subsidised funds and social mission lead MFIs to 
focus on providing small loans to a large number of borrowers. Clearly, the results tell 
us that unsubsidised MFIs with commercial funds focus on sustainability and providing 
microfinance to the poor over the long term. Therefore, they have a higher probability 
of reaching more people based on this commercial basis.  
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As anticipated, we also find the effects of macroeconomic variables on outreach. 
Inflation was negatively related to the depth (-0.0027) and breadth of outreach (-0.0012) 
and significant at the levels of 1% and 10%, respectively. This result shows that high 
inflation tends to make MFIs reduce their outreach. Consistent with the effects of 
inflation on sustainability, this tends to increase the cost of capital and other expenses of 
MFIs and means borrowers have trouble in the repayment of loans. GNI per capita (log) 
was negatively related to the number of active borrowers (the breadth of outreach) but 
was positively related to average loan balance (the depth of outreach). Consistent with 
the effects of GNI per capita on sustainability, poor households tend to have different 
financial needs and to require larger loans when they become less poor. This may point 
to the fact that wealthier clients tend to move to commercial banks to benefit from their 
advantages after being lifted out poverty. In addition, the positive coefficient of the 
dummy before crisis on outreach is consistent with its effects on sustainability. This 
indicates that the global financial crisis may have caused an obstacle to microfinance 
performance. 
Another new and interesting finding in this section is that the inflation ratio was 
negative and significantly related to outreach. This sheds light on the inflection point of 
the inflation ratio, where the relationship between inflation and outreach reverses (see 
MS1 of table 4.6). The results point to the fact that as inflation increases, loan size also 
increases, while the number of borrowers decreases at first, but it starts to decrease or 
increase beyond the threshold. In contrast to the inflation ratio, GNI per capita was 
positively related to loan size, while it was negatively related to number of borrowers. 
However, there is also a threshold of GNI per capita that makes the relationships 
between GNI per capita, loan size and number of borrowers become negative or 
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positive. The results provide further information about the response to the impact of 
macroeconomic factors on performance. 
4.2.7. The Trade-Off between Sustainability and Outreach 
The significant impact of financial leverage on operational self-sufficiency and 
gross loan portfolio from the previous section indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between sustainability and outreach in some MFIs. The results suggest that 
MFIs may take on more debts to achieve a positive impact on sustainability and to have 
the ability to expand their outreach. This increases the need to carry out an additional 
empirical to investigation to shed new light on the trade-off between sustainability and 
outreach in order to seek convincing answers to RQ3. It is hypothesised that 
sustainability can promote the outreach of MFIs (SH4.4). In this section, we focus on 
performing a regression analysis RM4.2 based on RM4.1 in two different specifications 
by the squared term of all variables (MS4.9) and the interaction term of financial 
leverage and MFI-specific characteristics (MS4.10). We also use operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) as the sustainability, average loan balance (ALB, log) and number of 
active borrowers (NAB, log) as the depth and the breadth of outreach. 
                                      ∑   
  
            ∑   
  
                   (RM 4.2) 
Table 4.7 shows that loan size and number of borrowers were positively related to 
sustainability and were significant at a level of 1% (0.0530 and 0.0510). This may point 
to the fact that MFIs can expand their outreach to achieve sustainability based on the 
advantages of the economies of scale. MFIs need to convert from credit-only NGOs into 
regulated MFIs in order to provide other financial services to their clients. Consistent 
with the previous findings, this conversion allows MFIs take on more debts, especially 
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savings, as well as to offer a greater basket of products and services. However, it is a 
lengthy process and requires a great deal of resources; costs are high and a large amount 
of resources are required to change the organisational structure.  In addition, there is 
also a risk of broken brand promise if brand expectations are not reached across 
subsidiaries. Due to the causal relationship between sustainability and outreach, the 
sustainable MFIs tend to serve the large majority of borrowers since on average 
sustainable MFIs are much larger than unsustainable ones. This suggests that we should 
weigh the results by number of borrowers or gross loan portfolio. It would make no 
sense to give each of the hundreds of tiny MFIs the same weight as one large one. 
Furthermore, most of the investors who identify themselves as socially responsible will 
not apply a negative screen or accept a lower return and higher risks than any other 
commercial investors. Clearly, government MFIs tend to be unsustainable and will 
continue to be so. However, the proposition that microfinance can be a perfectly viable 
business in most settings has been demonstrated very compellingly by now. 
We also find that the coefficient for the first term is positive (or negative) and the 
coefficient for the squared term is negative (or positive). This tells us that there is a 
threshold that makes the relationship between variables reverse (if it goes beyond that 
point). Clearly, the results also provide strong evidence that there is an optimal mix of 
efficiency in terms of sustainability and outreach. Furthermore, the results tend to vary 
with the heterogeneity of MFI characteristics. This also provides us with evidence of a 
trade-off between sustainability and outreach beyond the threshold. However, the 
positive and significant relationship between loan portfolio size and outreach found in 
the previous section (see table 4.6) suggests that MFI managers need to focus on 
increasing the level of thresholds to achieve a higher level of operational self-
sufficiency and a wider outreach.  
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Table 4.7. Trade-off between sustainability and outreach 
Variables lnOSS 
MS4.9 MS4.10 
Lag 1 lnOSS  0.5524*** (0.0181) 
lnALB -1.4748*** 0.0530*** (0.0185) 
lnALB2 0.1174***  
lnNAB 0.0069 0.0510*** (0.0169) 
lnNAB
2
 -0.0069  
DTE -0.0817  
DTE
2
 -0.0561**  
DTEprofit 0.0067 0.0112 (0.0073) 
DTE
2
profit -0.0008  
DTEregulated -0.0126 -0.0094 (0.0069) 
DTE
2
regulated 0.0005  
DTEbank -0.0474 -0.0119* (0.0067) 
DTE
2
bank 0.0016  
DTEcreditunion 0.0094 0.0072* (0.0073) 
DTE
2
creditunion -0.0041  
DTEnbfi 0.0159 0.0009** (0.0004) 
DTE
2
nbfi -0.0004  
DTEngo 0.0069 0.0001* (0.0001) 
DTE
2
ngo -5.49e-06  
Inflation -0.0063 -0.0006 (0.0005) 
Inflation
2
 0.0001  
lnGNI -1.1185 -0.0646 (0.0522) 
lnGNI
2
 0.0675  
Beforecrisis 0.0951 0.0997*** (0.0357) 
Observations  452 
AR (1)
a
  -2.37** 
AR (2)
b
  1.06 
Wald Test  1,073.22*** 
Sargan Test
c
  282.67 (P-value = 0.563) 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in GMM dynamic estimation. 
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One of the best ways to shift the threshold is by raising the effective interest rates 
to meet the demands of higher profitability, by which MFIs have the ability to earn 
sufficient income to cover the full costs of operation. In addition, MFIs may also need 
to create an environment to attract the poor by providing vocational training, 
counselling, mentoring and market analysis through partnerships with training 
institutions. This will provide a platform for the poor to enter self-employment in 
groups through close collaboration with MFIs. In the long run, MFIs will be able to 
ensure an increase in their clientele, closely monitor them, ensure sustainability and 
ultimately achieve their social missions. 
4.3. The Linkage between Financial Structure and Efficiency 
4.3.1. Introduction 
This section attempts to answer the same research questions (RQ1, RQ1 and RQ1) 
as in the previous section but uses efficiency as different aspect of microfinance 
performance. There are two main reasons why we carry out this investigation. First, 
there have been several studies which have measured the effects of financial structure 
on microfinance performance by focusing on profitability and outreach, thereby missing 
efficiency as another important aspect of performance. This investigation makes 
contributions to the existing knowledge and provides more useful information for 
funders to determine financing decisions based on the key performance indicators. 
Second, external funders tend to collect information about portfolio quality indirectly by 
investigating efficiency, since there are very few successful MFIs who suffer from bad 
repayments (i.e. MFIs with good repayments tend to become efficient) (Rosenberg, 
2009). Therefore, this section tests two hypotheses.  
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(SH4.6) Financial leverage can make MFIs more efficient (H0). 
(SH4.7) Expanding outreach makes MFIs more efficient (H0). 
4.3.2. Models 
To accomplish the above objectives, we perform the regression model RM4.3 
below derived from RM4.1 by using the natural logarithm of cost per borrower (CPB) 
as the dependent variable to assess sustainability, while financial leverage and outreach 
are two of the explanatory variables. 
                                                ∑   
  
          ∑   
  
                (RM 4.3) 
Similar to the previous section, we also perform an analysis with four different 
specifications by using gross loan portfolio (GLP, log), as well as number of borrowers 
(NAB, log) and loan size (ALB, log) to represent outreach and by using the squared 
term of all variables. The predicted effects of the explanatory variables are as follows. 
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Table 4.8 Predicted effects of the independent variables 
Variable Indicator Notation Predicted Effects Source 
Dependent Variable 
Efficiency Cost Per Borrower CPB  MIX Market 
Independent Variable 
Firm-Specific Variables (FSV)   
Financial Leverage Debt to Equity DTE Negative MIX Market 
Outreach Gross Loan Portfolio 
Number of Borrowers 
Average Loan Balance 
GLP 
NAB 
ALB 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
MIX Market 
Gender Share of Lending to 
Women 
Pwomen Negative MIX Market 
Legal Status Dummy (DLS) Bank 
NGO 
Credit Union 
NBFI 
Rural Bank 
Indeterminate MIX Market 
Profit Status Dummy (DP) Profit and 
Nonprofit 
Indeterminate MIX Market 
Regulated Status Dummy (DR) Regulated and 
Unregulated 
Indeterminate MIX Market 
Macroeconomic Variables (MEV) 
Inflation Inflation INF Negative Datastream 
GNI per capita GNI per capita GNI Indeterminate Datastream 
Financial Crisis Dummy Beforecrisis or 
Aftercrisis 
Positive 
Negative 
Datastream 
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Table 4.2 in the previous section (page 131) shows that the mean value of the 
efficiency ratio for the period 1996 to 2010 was 292.85, while the minimum value was 0 
and the maximum 179,116. 
Table 4.9 Correlation matrix between lnCPB and independent variables 
 
 lnCPB lnGLP lnNAB lnALB DTE Pwomen Inflation lnGNI 
lnCPB 1.0000        
lnGLP 0.2117* 1.0000       
lnNAB -0.3246* 0.7879* 1.0000      
lnALB 0.7987* 0.0463* -0.2425* 1.0000     
DTE -0.0099 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0026 1.0000    
Pwomen -0.4878* -0.1745* 0.2101* -0.5827* 0.0085 1.0000   
Inflation 0.0314 -0.0747* -0.0727* -0.0183 -0.0241 -0.0465 1.0000  
lnGNI 0.1398* 0.1380* 0.0505* 0.2201* 0.0095 0.0389 -0.1356* 1.0000 
Note: * is statistically significant at the level of 5% or lower. 
Table 4.9 is a correlation matrix between cost per borrower and other variables in 
the regression model (RM4.3). The results are consistent with the argument that the 
high costs of MFIs are often misunderstood, especially in comparison with other credit 
institutions. For total costs covered by interest rates and fees paid by borrowers, 
operating costs represent around 60% on average, financial expenses 30% and profits 
10%. Therefore, from the point of view of efficiency it makes sense to focus on 
operating expenses since financial expenses are more difficult for MFIs to control. This 
suggests that MFIs should improve efficiency while balancing social responsibility to 
staff and clients in term of appropriate salaries and incentives and the provision of high 
quality services at a low cost. Loan size is one of the most important determinants of the 
average cost of microcredit.  The average cost per dollar lent tends to be lower for larger 
loans, while the average cost per borrower is higher. This relationship is the main 
reason why smaller loans require higher interest rates than larger ones. 
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Table 4.10. The Impact of Financial Structure on Efficiency 
Variables lnCBP 
MS4.11 MS4.12 MS4.13 MS4.14 
Lag 1 lnCBP 0.8453*** (0.0369)  0.7076*** (0.0525)  
lnGLP 0.0004 (0.0259) 0.5283**   
lnGLP
2
  -0.0204**   
lnALB   0.2591*** (0.0415) 1.0651*** 
lnALB
2
    -0.0276* 
lnNAB   -0.0336** (0.0157) 0.0271 
lnNAB
2
    -0.0071* 
DTE -0.0080 -0.0845* -0.0115 (0.0229) -0.0781* 
DTE
2
  0.0046  0.0102 
Pwomen -0.3538 -1.8184*** -0.0315 (0.0674) -0.0652 
Pwomen
2
  -0.4426***  -0.0168 
DTEprofit -0.0069 (0.0197) -0.5194* -0.0019 (0.0137) -0.0514 
DTE
2
profit  0.0885  0.0041* 
DTEregulated 0.0091* (0.0149) -0.0764* 0.0042 (0.0130) -0.1057*** 
DTE
2
regulated  0.0069***  0.0067*** 
DTEbank -0.0036 (0.0096) 0.9622*** -0.0073 (0.0068) 0.2976*** 
DTE
2
bank  -0.1120*  -0.0096*** 
DTEcreditunion -0.0021 (0.0154) 0.1652*** -0.0005 (0.0129) 0.0899*** 
DTE
2
creditunion  -0.0082***  -0.0062*** 
DTEnbfi -0.0013*** (0.0004) 0.5254* -0.0013** (0.0006) 0.1332** 
DTE
2
nbfi  -0.0949*  -0.0023 
DTEngo -.00001* (0.0001) -0.0251* -0.0001*(0.0001) -0.0078 
DTE
2
ngo  0.0001**  0.0001* 
Inflation -0.0022* (0.0051) -0.0002 -0.0005* (0.0039) -0.0074* 
Inflation
2
  0.0002  0.0001 
lnGNI 0.2276*** (0.0553) -0.5995 0.0637 (0.0619) -1.3510 
lnGNI
2
  0.0936  0.1055 
Beforecrisis -0.0011 (0.0607) -0.3023** -0.0613* (0.0494) -0.2579*** 
Observations 306 425 306 425 
AR (1)
a
 -2.05**  -2.20**  
AR (2)
b
 -0.96  -0.92  
Wald Test 3,354.13  3,883.26  
Sargan Test
c
 303.65 
P-value = 0.253 
 301.64 
P-value = 0.239 
 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in GMM dynamic estimation. 
155 
 
4.3.3. Estimation Results 
Table 4.10 shows the results from our basic specifications using the cost per 
borrower indicator (CPB, log) as efficiency to investigate the impact of financial 
structure in terms of financial leverage on efficiency. In the regressions MS4.11 and 
MS4.13, the lags of dependent variables are statistically significant, which justifies the 
use of the system GMM estimator for the dynamic panel data models. 
The results show that gross loan portfolio (log) was positively related to efficiency 
(0.0004), but was insignificant (see MS4.10, table 4.10). This insignificant result may 
point to the fact that MFIs may face economies or diseconomies of scale in business 
expansion, perhaps because they have expanded too quickly in this case, which leads to 
an increase in the unit cost of nonfinancial operating expenses, such as personnel and 
administrative expenses. This is consistent with the findings of Arthur and Sheffrin 
(2003), Riley (2006) and Rosenberg (2009). In addition, according to Williamson 
(1967), there is a limit to scale of operation. The results in MS4.11 provide evidence 
that there exists an inflection point that makes the relationship between outreach and 
efficiency reverse if it goes beyond it. 
The results follow the predictions from the literature for the relationship between 
lending to women and microfinance performance in terms of efficiency. This may alert 
MFIs to the fact that focusing on lending to women in microfinance may make them 
less efficient. In fact, MFIs tend to charge higher interest rates to women borrowers on 
small loan sizes (i.e. the cost per borrower tends to increase when providing small loans 
to women). In addition, for microfinance to be appropriate, women, like other clients of 
MFIs, must have the capacity to repay their loans under the terms under which they 
have been provided. Otherwise, they may not be able to benefit from microfinance and 
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risk being pushed into debt problems. Another new and interesting finding in this 
section is that the coefficients for the first term and the squared term of the lending to 
women indicator are negative. It is logically possible, of course, for both coefficients to 
be positive, or to be negative. In these cases there is still an inflection, but the curve 
does not reverse direction; rather, it accelerates or decelerates. Such relationships are 
rarely hypothesised or discovered in social science data. 
Another interesting finding in microfinance is that the depth of outreach (loan 
size, lnALB) was positively related to efficiency and significant at the level of 1%, but 
the breadth of outreach (number of borrower, lnNAB) was negatively related to 
efficiency and was significant at the level of 5% (see table 4.10). Consistent with 
Attanasio et al. (2011), MFIs may achieve a better efficiency ratio by offering to larger 
groups of borrowers. However, they have started to move from group to individual 
lending due to the potential downside of joint-liability lending.
159
 The results suggest 
that cost per borrower tends to increase with loan size. Over time, loan size tends to 
creep up, partly because as borrowers become successful and wealthier they want larger 
loans. As loan size grows, MFIs perhaps need to be especially careful about selecting 
and monitoring borrowers and also require higher labour inputs. Consistent with Cull et 
al. (2007), Hermes et al. (2011) and the diseconomies of scale theory, the average cost 
per dollar lent is lower for larger loans, while the average cost per borrower is higher 
due to an increase in refinancing costs and non-financial operating expenses. Therefore, 
a negative relationship is found between average loan balance (depth of outreach) and 
efficiency, as mentioned in Hermes et al. (2011) and several other studies. 
                                                 
159
 Group lending often involves time-consuming weekly repayment meetings and 
exerts strong social pressure, making it potentially onerous for borrowers (Attanasio et 
al., 2011). 
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One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that offering 
loans to a larger number of borrowers (expanding the breadth of outreach) tends to help 
MFIs reduce the cost per borrower. Consistent with Hamilton et al. (2008), Rosenberg 
(2009), the economies of scale theory and the results from the previous chapter, MFIs 
gain higher efficiency by expanding the breadth of outreach.  A new and interesting 
finding is that the conclusion of this study seems to be inconsistent with the conclusions 
of Hermes et al. (2011), but the reality is that the conclusions of the two studies are 
totally consistent. In fact, Hermes et al. (2011) evaluated a trade-off between the 
outreach and efficiency of MFIs between 2000 and 2010 by using average loan balance 
as a proxy for outreach, and cost per borrower as a proxy for efficiency and concluded 
that there was a significant negative correlation, as had been found in many previous 
studies. A negative correlation found in Hermes et al. (2011) was between efficiency 
and depth of outreach. Therefore, this has contributed additional evidence to the existing 
literature which states that there is a significant positive correlation between efficiency 
and the breadth of outreach. 
The insignificant result from financial leverage in the case of profitable MFIs may 
point to the fact that they are cost efficient (i.e. MFIs may take on more debt, mobilise 
savings and other transaction costs to reduce costs per borrower). Consistent with 
Rosenberg (2009), operating costs in profitable MFIs account for roughly half of 
interest yields, and therefore represent the biggest cost block. This also suggests that 
MFIs have spent an increasing proportion of operating expenses on non-credit activities 
(such as savings, insurance and money transfers), therefore efficiency improvements 
may be systematic and improvement in credit would be greater than non-credit 
activities. 
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However, the effect of financial leverage on efficiency was positive for regulated 
MFIs. This result indicates that these MFIs are less efficient (i.e. employing more debt 
may increase costs per borrower). Consistent with Masood and Ahmad (2010), 
regulated MFIs also incurred more expenses and disadvantages than unregulated ones. 
This addresses the importance of creating a good environment for MFIs to develop and 
strengthen themselves in promoting viable and sustainable systems of microfinance 
(Omino, 2005). 
Based on the legal status, all financial leverage was negatively related to 
efficiency in the case of banks, credit unions, NBFIs and NGOs. This result suggests 
that taking on more debt (including savings) tends to make these MFIs cost efficient. 
Consistent with the findings from profitable MFIs, this encourages MFIs to achieve 
self-sufficiency and promotes commercial microfinance. However, the relationship 
reverses if it goes beyond the threshold. In addition, debt financing always faces the 
risks of being inability to pay back loans (financial distress). This may therefore lead to 
the foreclosure and even liquidation of the MFI. Even though the cost of debt is lower 
than the cost of equity due to tax advantages, it raises forth financial risks that increase 
the cost of equity. 
Consistent with the findings of the previous section, the relationship between 
financial leverage and microfinance performance in terms of efficiency in this section is 
in line with expectations. First, the effects can be positive or negative due to the 
contributions of commercial debts and savings towards financial revenue, based on the 
differences in MFI characteristics. Second, the effects can reverse from positive to 
negative and vice versa, since there may exist a threshold which is the value of the 
coefficient of the normal term and the squared term divided by -2. 
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The effects of inflation on cost per borrower are negative and significant at the 
level of 5%. This result suggests that high inflation tends to make MFIs consider 
reducing costs for borrowers. On the contrary, cost per borrower tends to increase with 
the increasing income of households, since the financial products and services of the 
MFIs may not be appropriate for their financial demands. Therefore, the poor tend to 
move to commercial banks after being lifted out poverty. In addition, the results also 
provide strong evidence that the negative coefficient on dummy “before crisis” shows 
that the global financial crisis may increase the cost per borrower and MFIs need to 
minimise or reduce their costs in those circumstances. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Due to the limitations of the literature on the effect of financial structure on 
performance, this study makes a contribution in several ways. First, the most common 
performance indicators for microfinance were employed to investigate the impact of 
financial leverage on performance with the heterogeneity of MFI characteristics. 
Second, this study introduced new evidence and possible explanations from an explicit 
perspective that might be relevant in the context of scale of operation, profit status, 
regulated status and legal status. Third, this study employed system GMM and used the 
squared terms of all variables in order to identify their threshold relationships and to 
search for deeper explanations. This study therefore provides several new and 
interesting findings that contribute additional empirical evidence to the literature on the 
impact of financial structure on performance.  
The global financial crisis and high inflation rate create obstacles for MFIs and 
poor borrowers by increasing the cost of living, cost of capital and other expenses. 
Therefore, MFIs tend to consider reducing costs for borrowers and to help them solve 
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their financial problems and repay their loans. However, poor borrowers prefer to deal 
with local commercial banks after becoming wealthier and being lifted out poverty since 
they may require larger loans to meet their financial demands and enjoy the advantages 
of local commercial banks. 
Profitable and regulated MFIs who take on considerably more commercial funds 
(including debts and savings) are therefore expected to have more revenue than costs 
and to have higher sustainability, efficiency and outreach. This finding would encourage 
the transformation process of MFIs from simply achieving their social mission to 
becoming profitable and regulated businesses in order to provide other financial 
services to their clients (especially savings), as well as to become self-sufficient and 
remain viable. Profitable MFIs are cost efficient since they tend to pay more attention to 
the purposes of loans and to provide sufficient loans sizes to the appropriate borrowers 
on a commercial basis. On the contrary, regulated MFIs have been found to be less 
efficient and to face many disadvantages from being regulated, such as cost increases 
from licensing fees, savings mobilisation, capital requirements, control of interest rates 
and networks. The cost of compliance, as well as the cost of savings mobilisation and 
regulation, is very high. This causes an increase in expenses and results in a lower 
revenue than costs. Therefore, MFIs need to achieve a significant scale and degree of 
sustainability before becoming regulated and profitable.  
The differences in legal status tend to contribute to the impact of financial 
structure on performance in various ways. However, the results follow the theoretical 
predictions for profitable and regulated MFIs. Therefore, the possible explanations for 
the impact of financial structure on microfinance performance are relevant to the 
context of profit and the regulated status of MFIs.  
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There is a positive relationship between scale of operation and outreach. This 
suggests that MFIs need to upscale their operations in order to expand their outreach to 
the poor. Therefore, there is a possible trade-off between the depth and breadth of 
outreach due to funding constraints. There is an interesting issue here, which is that 
successful MFIs tend to shift their mission and practices with the changes in their 
clients, who will become less poor and need larger loans over time. This means that 
MFIs are able to reach larger numbers of the poor and have the ability to offer bigger 
loans to meet the increasing demands of the poor after expansion their scale of 
operation. The result is a trade-off between the wealthier and poorer clients among 
existing clients.  
Consistent with the economies of scale theory, MFIs gain higher efficiency from 
expanding their breadth of outreach. The findings of this study seem to be inconsistent 
with the conclusions of Hermes et al. (2011), who evaluated the trade-off between the 
outreach and efficiency of MFIs between 2000 and 2010 by using average loan balance 
as a proxy for outreach and by using cost per borrower as a proxy for efficiency, 
concluding that there was a negative relationship, as had been found in the previous 
studies. However, the reality is that the conclusions of the two studies are totally 
consistent. The negative relationship found in Hermes et al. (2011) was between 
efficiency and depth of outreach, while the positive correlation between efficiency and 
breadth of outreach found in this study is because there exists a trade-off between depth 
and breadth of outreach. 
Inconsistent with the conclusions of other studies, that smaller loans have higher 
costs, this study contributes additional evidence for the positive correlation between 
loan size and loan cost. That is, larger loan sizes are associated with higher loan costs. 
Data reported from MFIs to MIX Market show that loan size and loan costs for large 
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MFIs are higher than for small MFIs by a factor of 1.2 to 5.0. Loan size tends to creep 
up, partly because as borrowers become successful and wealthier and they want larger 
loans. As loan size grows, MFIs perhaps need to be especially careful about selecting 
and monitoring borrowers and they also require higher labour inputs, as well as 
refinancing costs. Therefore, an increase in loan size also increases loan costs. In 
addition, the average cost per dollar lent is lower for larger loans, while the average cost 
per borrower is higher. 
This chapter suggests that there is a threshold relationship between variables. This 
tends to lead MFIs to having a threshold shift to higher frequencies in order to achieve 
higher self-sufficiency, efficiency and outreach. This chapter has also shed new light on 
the important role of scale of operation and the effect of the global financial crisis on 
microfinance performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SCALE OF OPERATION 
IN MICROFINANCE 
 
The number of MFIs increased rapidly during the period 1995 to 2011 (MIX 
Market, 2011). Several MFIs improved their efficiency, became self-sufficient and 
played an increasingly important role as financial intermediaries in local financial 
economies for poverty reduction (Djeudja and Heidhues, 2005; Hossian and Knight, 
2008; UN, 2011). Therefore, understanding the differences between large and small 
MFIs is necessary in order to choose the optimal size which is most suitable for their 
operations and for being regulated, profitable, self-sufficient and viable. Consistent with 
Zacharias (2008), the results reported in the previous chapter strongly suggest that scale 
of operation may relate to financial structure and have a positive impact on 
performance. The main goal of this chapter is to carry out further investigation into the 
relationship between scale of operations and efficiency (RQ4), as well as the effect of 
the global financial crisis on microfinance performance, based upon differences in size 
(RQ5). The findings of this study are expected to contribute to the existing knowledge 
by providing possible explanations for both funders and MFI managers who seek 
recommendations and solutions for choosing the most suitable size for their operations. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first presents the relationships between 
scale of operation and efficiency and the second section the effect of the global financial 
crisis of 2007/2008 on microfinance performance. 
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5.1. The Impact of Scale of Operation on Microfinance Performance 
5.1.1. Motivations` 
Like other industries, scale of operation matters for a number of reasons, since 
MFIs have reacted differently to macroeconomic changes and tend to have different 
funding opportunities depending on scale.
160
 In the presence of the non-trivial fixed 
costs of raising external funds, large MFIs tend to have cheaper access to outside 
financing and are more likely to diversify their financing sources. However, each MFI 
must choose the most suitable scale for its operation depending on its pros and cons. 
The optimal scale is the theoretically most competitive size for achieving the greatest 
efficiency and profitability from economies of scale. This suggests that MFIs ideally 
aim for the lowest possible expenses and the highest possible profit per unit, as well as 
the smallest possible negative effects from market changes. In addition, optimal scale 
also refers to the speed, extent of growth and the target sizes for the expansion of small 
MFIs (Beck et al., 2008).  
Scale of operation (also called firm size) is defined by many different factors, 
such as number of employees, number of customers, capital investment, volume of 
output, total assets, total revenue and value of input used.
161
 However, total assets and 
volume of output are the most common indicators used to classify scale of operation in 
banking and finance.
162
 In microfinance, MFIs are divided into three categories based 
                                                 
160
 See Roberts (1977), Gibson (2008), Zacharias (2008) and Little (2011). 
161
 See Kimberly (1976); Kumar et al., (1999); Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007) and 
Articles Base (2010). 
162
 See Grossman and Hart (1982 and 1986), Hart (1995) and Articles Base (2010). 
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on total assets or gross loan portfolio (see Table 5.1). This classification established the 
general picture of MFIs grouped by size. 
Table 5.1 Size of MFIs 
Unit: US$ Small Medium Large 
Total assets  1 to 20 million > 20  to 100 million > 100 million 
Gross loan portfolio ≤ 2,000,000 2,000,000 to 8,000,000 > 8,000,000 
Source: MIX Market (2008, 2011) 
Table 5.2 Number of MFIs in the period 1995 to 2011 (adjusted) 
Year  Small  Medium   Large   Total  Growth Rate 
1995 3 - - 3 - 
1996 18 8 2 28 833.33% 
1997 44 14 10 68 142.86% 
1998 69 23 15 107 57.35% 
1999 90 37 19 146 36.45% 
2000 126 59 23 208 42.47% 
2001 199 73 40 312 50% 
2002 320 104 73 497 59.29% 
2003 496 147 119 762 53.32% 
2004 574 203 164 941 23.49% 
2005 677 232 219 1,128 19.87% 
2006 665 283 264 1,212 7.45% 
2007 659 348 354 1,361 12.29% 
2008 624 362 393 1,379 1.32% 
2009 462 342 408 1,212 -12.11% 
2010 592 385 473 1,4,50 19.64% 
2011 503 341 480 1,324 -8.69% 
Source: MIX Market (2011). 
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Table 5.2 shows that the number of MFIs with different scales increased from 
three to 1,324 during the period 1995 to 2011. The growth rate of all MFIs increased 
rapidly in the period 1995 to 2003 (around 50%) and decreased in the period 2006 to 
2009. The number of large MFIs increased continuously, from two in 1996 to 480 in 
2011, while the number of small MFIs increased from three to 677 in the period 1995 to 
2005, but started to decrease from 2006. The number of medium MFIs also increased, 
from eight to 362 in the period 1996 to 2008, but decreased in 2009 (see Figure 5.1). 
This suggests that changes in the quantity and scale of operation over the last five years 
are due to the impact of scale on performance, as well as the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008. This creates alerts to notify of the emerging trends in microfinance industry 
(including merger and acquisition) that would play a vital role in shaping future. Several 
small MFIs would still exist to meet high demand for the financial needs of the poor but 
are shadowed by the consolidation anticipated in the segment. Downscaling and 
upscaling have become an impetus fuelling the spurt in MFI growth in order to achieve 
its mission and avoid the negative macroeconomic impact. 
Figure 5.1 Number of MFIs in the period 1995 to 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MIX Market (2011) 
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Figure 5.2 shows that large MFIs reached more borrowers (from 10 to 20 times as 
many) and had higher efficiency and profitability than small and medium MFIs in the 
period 1996 to 2009. Consistent with Morduch (2000), the small MFIs did not achieve 
sustainability and had a negative return on total assets (ROA) until 2001. Large MFIs 
had larger loan sizes than small ones, from 2.5 to 5 times higher, while cost per 
borrower was 1.2 to 2 times higher (see Figure 5.3). According to the results from the 
survey in 2002 by the MicroBanking Bulletin, large MFIs, particularly in Latin 
America, accessed more funds and achieved higher financial leverage than small ones. 
Commercial debts make up a greater proportion of the funding of large MFIs.
163
 This 
suggests that large MFIs may have a deeper financial integration than smaller ones 
(WWB, 2003). Therefore, consolidation of MFIs would be a step in the right direction 
to increase their capital base and lead to healthy competition between MFIs and 
definitely better regulation and management of the microfinance sector. 
Figure 5.2 Outreach of MFIs in the period 1996 – 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MIX Market (2011) 
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 Commercial funds are at 75% or above of the market rate (WWB, 2003). 
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Figure 5.3 Performance of MFIs in the period 1995 to 2009
164
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MIX Market (2011) 
5.1.2. Models  
This section aims to evaluate the impact of scale of operation on performance in 
order to contribute to the existing literature by providing possible explanations for the 
relationship between scale of operation, sustainability and efficiency. It is, therefore, 
hypothesised that positive relationships exist between scale of operation, sustainability 
and efficiency. This hypothesis can be broken into basic three sub- hypotheses (SH): 
                                                 
164
 See Appendix 5.1 
0.800
0.900
1.000
1.100
1.200
1.300
1.400
1.500
1.600
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Large MFIs Medium MFIs
Small MFIs
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
180.00
Large MFIs Medium MFIs Small MFIs
-0.010
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
Large MFIs Medium MFIs
Small MFIs
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Large MFIs Medium MFIs Small MFIs
Panel A: Operational Self-Sufficiency Panel B: ROA 
Panel C: Cost Per Borrower Panel D: Loan Size 
169 
 
(SH5.1) Scale of operation can help MFIs to become efficient (H0). 
(SH5.2) Scale of operation can help MFIs to become sustainable (H0). 
(SH5.3) There exists an optimal scale of operation that helps MFIs achieve 
sustainability and efficiency (H0). 
To achieve the above objectives, we also perform the regression model RM5.1 
and RM5.2 derived from the previous chapter to answer the research question RQ4. 
                                 ∑   
  
          ∑   
  
                (RM 5.1) 
                                 ∑   
  
          ∑   
  
                (RM 5.2) 
where SOPitc denotes the scale of operation dummy variable of MFIi at time t located in 
country c. Scale of operation is typically categorised into three groups: large, medium 
and small. FSVitc represents other firm-specific variables, including financial leverage 
(DTE) and dummy variables referring to the profit and regulated status (DP and DR); 
MEVitc represents macroeconomics factors, including inflation, GNI per capita and a 
dummy variable referring to the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 (before and after 
crisis); α is constant; β is a variable coefficient and                   is an error term 
that includes    (the unobserved complete set of the MFI-specific effect),    (the 
unobserved time effect) and      (the idiosyncratic error). 
There are also possible interactions between scale of operation and other firm-
specific variables that could come into play. Therefore, we create an interaction by 
multiplying scale of operation by financial leverage and the dummy variables in terms 
of the profit and regulated status of MFIs. In addition, we also use the squared term of 
the variables to investigate whether there is an optimal scale of operation that helps 
MFIs achieve sustainability and become efficient. In order to investigate whether 
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Vietnam (young industry) differs significantly from Bangladesh, as well as the rest of 
the world, we create and add dummies in the regression models RM5.1 and RM5.2.  
 5.1.3. Estimation Results 
Table 5.3 shows that the results from our basic specifications using sustainability 
and efficiency measures for the performance of MFIs. Our preferred system GMM 
estimates in the regression models RM5.1 and RM5.2 suggest that scale of operation 
plays an important role in the financial performance of MFIs. The results 
overwhelmingly support our main hypothesis in this section. In particular, the financial 
leverage of large and medium MFIs appears to boost sustainability and efficiency. 
Consistent with Zacharias (2008), Gibson (2008) and Little (2011), as well as the 
findings of the previous chapter, large MFIs tend to have more funding opportunities 
and cheaper access to outside financing than small ones. Therefore, they may take on 
more debts in their financial structure and also create greater revenues than expenses. 
The effect of financial leverage on sustainability changes from negative for the first 
term to positive for the squared term (see MS5.2), while the effect of financial leverage 
on efficiency changes from positive to negative in the quadratic model (see MS.5.4). 
Taken together, these results suggest that there exists an optimal scale of operation that 
helps MFIs achieve sustainability and become efficient. 
The second major finding in this chapter was that expanding scale of operation 
and taking on more debts had a positive effect on sustainability (i.e. they help MFIs to 
achieve sustainability) but a negative one on efficiency (i.e. they help MFIs to enjoy 
advantages from economies of scale and become more efficient). This may point to the 
fact that scale of operation matters greatly to the financial performance of MFIs. 
Therefore, in order to achieve higher levels of performance, small MFIs must operate at 
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the most suitable size, which is consistent with the findings of Coase (1937), Stigler 
(1974) and Canback et al. (2006). However, economies of scale cannot be applied by all 
MFIs (Riordan and Williamson, 1985). In addition, the results also show that MFIs 
should consider expanding their scale of operation, together with being profitable and 
cost efficient, as well as sustainable. When donor subsidies are phased out and the 
accompanying donor controls are removed, MFIs may need to be profitable, just like 
any business activities competing for their owner’s limited resources. This study 
supports the prior research findings that profitable MFIs are cost efficient (Charitonenko 
and Campion, 2003; Rosenberg, 2009; Masood and Ahmad, 2010). Clearly, 
sustainability has been referred to full financial sustainability which is considered as the 
ability to cover the opportunity costs of capital. Consistent with Cull et al. (2007), this 
finding sheds light on the trade-off between depth of outreach and sustainability. The 
results suggest that there is no evidence supporting this trade-off, since profitable MFIs 
are cost effective and have the ability to increase their average loan size.  
The results of this investigation show that regulated status was positively related 
to sustainability. This suggests that regulated MFIs may have higher operational self-
sufficiency than unregulated ones. Consistent with Christen and Rosenberg (2000), 
Omino (2005), Davis (2009), Arun and Murinde (2010) and WSBI (2011), regulated 
MFIs tend to attract more investment funds from the private sector and international 
organisations in order to have lower costs of capital. These advantages enable regulated 
MFIs to enjoy higher earnings and sustainability. However, the cost of compliance and 
the cost increases from being regulated may be high and lead to higher costs per 
borrower. Therefore, converting into regulated MFIs tends to make them less efficient 
in some cases (Masood and Ahmad, 2010). This is the reason why for-profit and 
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regulated MFIs prefer to provide loans to clients who are are better off, rather than the 
poorest ones, in order to cut costs. 
Table 5.3 Impact of scale of operation on sustainability and efficiency 
 
Variables lnOSS lnCPB 
MS5.1 MS5.2 MS5.3 MS5.4 
Lag 1  
(lnOSS or lnCPB) 
0.6149*** (0.0532)  0.8582*** (0.0528)  
DLarge 0.1448** (0.0639) 0.2342** -0.0652* (0.0734) -0.0065 
DMedium 0.0333 (0.0531) 0.0058 -0.0218 (0.0811) 0.1909 
DProfit 0.1359* (0.0756) 0.0685 -0.0241* (0.1707) -0.0571 
DRegulated 0.0055 (0.0777) 0.0549 0.0033 (0.1286) 0.0721 
DTE -0.0227* (0.0173) -0.0009 0.0014** (0.0006) 0.0469 
DTE
2
  0.0224***  -0.0045 
Inflation -0.0006 (0.0009) -0.0009 -0.0012 (0.0014) -0.0176** 
Inflation
2
  3.08e-06  0.0001** 
lnGNI -0.0147 (0.0423) -1.5624* 0.1778*** (0.0558) 5.7363*** 
lnGNI
2
  0.1347**  -0.4267*** 
Beforecrisis 0.1179*** (0.0434) 0.1386** -0.0071 (0.0451) -0.0999 
DTE*DLarge 0.0004* (0.0001) 0.0128 -0.0013** (0.0006) -0.0554* 
(DTE*DLarge)
2
  -0.0001  0.0016* 
DTE*DMedium 0.0001* (0.0007) 0.0025 -0.0004 (0.0006) -0.0067 
(DTE*DMedium)
2
  -0.0001  0.0001 
DProfit *DLarge 0.1338* (0.1063) -0.0122 -0.0985 (0.1894) -0.2575 
DProfit *DMedium 0.2172* (0.1184) -0.1402 -0.1009 (0.2338) -0.0243 
DRegulated *DLarge 0.0317 (0.1012) 0.28738 -0.2395* (0.1510) 0.1293 
DRegulated *DMedium 0.1931** (0.0813) 0.3133** -0.0203 (0.1823) 0.2308 
DBangladesh 0.1167** (0.0563) 0.3992*** -0.1873* (0.1227) -2.0484*** 
DVietnam -0.0559* (0.0613) -0.0761 -0.2257* (0.1232) -1.2030*** 
Observations 449 601 331 465 
AR (1)
a
 -2.44**  -2.10**  
AR (2)
b
 0.78  -0.92  
Wald Test 707.23***  634.68***  
Sargan Test
c
 259.74 
P-value = 0.630 
 137.38 
P-value = 0.902 
 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in system GMM for the dynamic estimation model. 
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The results of this research support the idea that increases in the cost of capital 
and cost of living due to high inflation encourage MFIs to reduce the cost per borrower 
in order to be more efficient and sustainable. On the other hand, an increase in GNI per 
capita causes a rise in cost per borrower and a decrease in sustainability since the poor 
tend leave MFIs and move to commercial banks after achieving a higher income and 
being lifted out of poverty. This result points to the fact that over time the borrowers of 
MFIs become less poor. They therefore require larger loans to meet their higher 
financial requirements and prefer to deal with local commercial banks due to their 
advantages, as indicated in the findings of the previous chapter. In addition, the result 
also indicates that MFIs may have had higher self-sufficiency during the period before 
the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. In general, therefore, the findings of this 
section suggest that we need to carry out further investigations into the impact of the 
global financial crisis on performance of MFIs during and after the crisis in order to 
examine their reactions to macroeconomic changes (see the following section). 
Taken together, these results suggest that access to commercial funding could 
enable MFIs to expand their outreach. Therefore, MFIs are recommended to move away 
from being heavily subsidised by local governments and donors and to rely more on 
deposits as a source of loanable funds, as well as on commercial debts. This is 
consistent with several previous studies. The results also suggest that MFIs may be able 
to provide larger loans only when they have tapped commercial sources of funding 
(debts) and deposits, since these other sources barely cover 5% to 10% of existing 
needs. Even though debts are generally priced at the market rate, which new and small 
MFIs may find expensive, debt and deposits have become popular sources of funds. The 
inability of MFIs to obtain sufficient funds is a major hindrance in the growth of 
microfinance. In the absence of adequate funds, the growth and outreach of MFIs 
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become restricted; to overcome this problem MFIs should look for other sources to fund 
their loan portfolio. Some of these alternative fund sources are through convertion to 
for-profit MFIs, portfolio buyouts and securitisation of loans, which only a few large 
MFIs are currently doing. 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that the 
sustainability of MFIs is increasing in Bangladesh (the country dummy variable is 
positively and significantly related to sustainability). This may point to the fact that 
most MFIs in Bangladesh are sustainable ones. In fact, Bangladesh is known as the 
birthplace of microfinance and competition there  has markedly increased during the last 
decade. The microfinance industry has put mechanisms in place to develop 
commercialisation and innovation in order to reduce subsidised funds. In addition, Grameen 
Bank and the BRAC are considered as leading MFIs, not only in Bangladesh but also across 
the world. However, the main reason that increases the sustainability of MFIs in Bangladesh 
is that there is an increase in competition between commercial MFIs to reach as many poor 
people as possible in the long run. It became clear that this outreach is only possible on a 
sustainable and efficient basis. Sustainability in general means the ability of a program to 
continuously carry out activities in pursuit of its statutory objectives, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter. According to this approach, MFIs need to have the ability to continue 
operating as financial development institutions for the poor. 
Compared with Bangladesh, in Vietnam, a large number of microfinance 
programs still depend on government non-profit programs and donor subsidies. One of 
the major goals for MFIs is to achieve sustainability in order to maintain viable and 
further grow in their operations. Therefore this finding gives the alert to MFIs which do 
not achieve sustainability. However, operating sustainably tends to depend on many 
factors inside and outside the MFI. Institutional transparency, good governance, cost 
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allocation, savings and at least reaching break-even are major firm-specific factors of 
success. At the same time, MFIs have to operate under favourable macroeconomics 
factors such as easy, low-cost access to a large number of economically active poor 
clients, a favourable legal environment without regulative interest rate ceilings and 
demand for relatively large average loan sizes. 
5.2. The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 on Performance 
5.2.1. Research Objectives 
The global financial crisis (credit crunch) of 2007/2008, which started in the US 
in the summer of 2007 with a credit boom and housing bubble and ended in 2009, is 
considered as the worst financial crisis in history (Reuters, 2009). It has been compared 
to others such as the US Great Depression of 1929/1930, the Russian crisis of 
1992/1993 and the Asian crisis of 1997/1998. A result was the collapse of large 
financial institutions; several banks went bankrupt and governments needed to take 
intervene and take over their operations. The financial crisis has caused the decline and 
failure of many key businesses and a slow down in several economies due to tightened 
credit (Bailey and Elliott, 2009; Te Velde, 2009). The economic recession was 
particularly caused by a decline in GDP growth, falling housing prices and a drop-off in 
business investment. It typically indicates that the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 
had a negative impact on consumers and stock markets worldwide. It is spreading 
quickly in emerging markets but little is known about its impact on the microfinance 
sector. However, microfinance is considered as a part of the financial market. Therefore, 
it has also tended to have a negative impact on microfinance. This explains why MFIs 
have slowed the growth of gross loan portfolios after a decade of exceptional growth 
(Te Velde, 2008; UN, 2009; CGAP, 2011b).  
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There is a rapidly growing body of literature studying the impact of the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 on microfinance performance and funding. However, most 
studies focus on the degree of financial integration to explain the drop-off in funding 
and the slow down in gross loan portfolio of MFIs, as well as the issue of systemic risk, 
lending technologies and lending interest rates to the poor. In light of the findings of the 
previous section, MFIs tend to expand their scale of operation in order to become 
efficient and achieve sustainability, as well as to avoid and minimise the negative 
effects of macroeconomic changes. Therefore, to shed further light on the effect of the 
global financial crisis on microfinance performance, this study will carry out further 
investigation into the factors affecting the gross loan portfolio and sustainability of 
MFIs. It aims to provide new empirical evidence with possible explanations from the 
scale of operation. Returning to the main research question (RQ5) posed at the 
beginning of this study, it is now possible to break it into the three following sub-
research questions: 
(RQ5.1) How does gross loan portfolio vary in the period before and after the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008? 
(RQ5.2) How does sustainability vary in the period before and after the global financial 
crisis of 2007/2008? 
(RQ5.3) How can MFIs minimise the negative effect of the global financial crisis by 
expanding scale of operation? 
It is hypothesised that the global financial crisis has had a negative impact on 
performance. This section sets out to determine whether performance varied in the 
period before, during and after the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 and whether 
expanding scale of operation can help MFIs minimise the impact of the crisis (SH5.6). 
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5.2.2. Models 
In this investigation, we perform regression models RM5.3 and RM5.4 by using 
operational self-sufficiency (OSS, log) and gross loan portfolio (GLP, log) as dependent 
variables to assess sustainability and the gross loan portfolio of MFIs, while financial 
leverage (DTE), number of active borrowers (NAB, log) and cost per borrower (CPB, 
log), are firm-specific variables. 
                        ∑   
  
          ∑   
  
                (RM 5.3) 
                        ∑   
  
          ∑   
  
                (RM 5.4) 
In an attempt to test the hypotheses, we create interaction dummy variables 
between year and scale of operation by multiplying the scale of operation dummy by 
year dummy to create interaction dummy variables. Consistent with Krauss and Walter 
(2009) and Bella (2011), year dummy is created to represent the years before, during 
and after the global financial crisis from 2006 to 2010. 
5.2.3. Empirical Results 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the results from our basic specifications using 
sustainability measures for the performance of MFIs. Our preferred system GMM 
estimates in the regression models RM5.3 and RM5.4 suggest that microfinance 
performance varies in the period before and after the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008. The results overwhelmingly support our main hypothesis in this section. In 
particular, the links between microfinance, domestic conditions and international capital 
markets have grown stronger. The sharp rates of MFI growth during the last two 
decades across the world have resulted in an increase in the scale of operation, have 
forced the microfinance industry to diversify its funding structure and have increased 
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their client base. As a result, MFIs have adopted better management practices and 
information systems. Therefore, the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 is likely to have 
a negative effect on most MFIs and has forced them to slow the growth of loan 
portfolios after enjoying a decade of exceptional growth. However, the impact of the 
economic crisis varies depending on scale of operation. As expected, larger MFIs are 
less affected and started recovering at the end of 2009. They were able to expand their 
loan portfolio in 2010. Small and medium MFIs appear to be struggling more with 
liquidity issues and funding problems. Overall, the operations of most MFIs have had 
less impact from macroeconomic factors, especially the crisis, since they may have a 
low degree of financial integration in the financial market and depend on subsidised 
funds and grants fully committed by local governments and international organisations. 
This is totally consistent with the findings of WWB (2003), Krauss and Walter (2006 
and 2009), Littlefield and Kneiding (2009), Bella (2011) and CGAP (2011b). 
This study has shown that in general the gross loan portfolio growth rate of MFIs 
dropped in 2008 (see table 5.4). However, it might not be the same in the case of large 
MFIs, whose gross loan portfolio changed only slightly during the financial crisis of 
2008 to 2010, while smaller MFIs were more affected and started to suffer a negative 
impact earlier. This also suggests a significant drop in the loan portfolio of private 
MFIs, since public MFIs are heavily dependent on subsidies from local governments 
and international donors. A large number of MFIs that were established as non-profit 
NGOs have converted themselves into regulated MFIs, partially funded by private 
funds. The high rates of growth of the last two decades make the crisis and gross loan 
portfolio relevant from a macroeconomic perspective. Therefore, all these conversions 
have contributed to an increase in the systemic risk of the microfinance industry based 
on the links between MFIs and the general economic environment. 
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Table 5.4 Impact of the global financial crisis on gross loan portfolio 
 
Variables lnGLP 
Lag 1 lnGLP 0.5850*** (0.0603) 0.6423*** (0.0658) 0.6199*** (0.0881) 
DTE 0.0503** (0.0247) 0.0351* (0.0248) 0.0205 (0.0288) 
lnNAB 0.3986*** (0.0606) 0.3661*** (0.0673) 0.3677*** (0.0929) 
lnCPB 0.3596*** (0.0657) 0.3150*** (0.0618) 0.3159*** (0.0849) 
lnOSS 0.3719*** (0.1311) 0.2294** (0.1053) 0.2286* (0.1292) 
Inflation -0.0036*** (0.0007) -0.0045*** (0.0016) -0.0044** (0.0019) 
lnGNI 0.0745 (0.0633) -0.0040 (0.0671) 0.0278 (0.07190 
2006  0.1088** (0.0459)  
2007  0.0188 (0.0519)  
2008  -0.0796* (0.0122)  
2009  -0.1399** (0.0591)  
2010  -0.1057* (0.0563)  
Large-2006   0.1617*** (0.0588) 
Medium-2006   0.2137** (0.1077) 
Large-2007   0.1428** (0.0664) 
Medium-2007   0.0897 (0.1112) 
Large-2008   0.1117* (0.0723) 
Medium-2008   -0.0638 (0.0941) 
Large-2009   0.0309 (0.0458) 
Medium-2009   -0.1753* (0.0905) 
Large-2010   0.0478 (0.0641) 
Medium-2010   -0.0614 (0.0718) 
Observations 452 328 328 
AR (1)a -2.36** -2.39** -2.26** 
AR (2)b -0.07 0.25 0.35 
Wald Test 326.02*** 368.17*** 383.69*** 
Sargan Testc 357.14 (p-value = 0.765) 94.47 (p-value=0.326) 103.34 (p-value=0.242) 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in system GMM for the dynamic estimation model. 
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Table 5.5 Impact of the global financial crisis on sustainability 
 
Variables lnOSS 
Lag 1 lnOSS 0.4984*** (0.0642) 0.4071*** (0.0799) 0.3988*** (0.0740) 
DTE -0.0565*** (0.0166) -0.0536*** (0.0174) -0.0578*** (0.0152) 
lnNAB -0.2153*** (0.0419) -0.2141*** (0.0740) -0.2278*** (0.0780) 
lnCPB -0.2169*** (0.0388) -0.2077*** (0.0742) -0.2219*** (0.0781) 
lnGLP 0.2342*** (0.0377) 0.2376*** (0.0746) 0.2519*** (0.0778) 
Inflation 0.0003 (0.0007) 2.97e-06 (0.0013) -0.0407 (0.0018) 
lnGNI -0.0665* (0.0445) -0.0421 (0.0416) -0.0407 (0.0486) 
2006  0.0538 (0.0467)  
2007  0.0141 (0.0449)  
2008  -0.0703 (0.0637)  
2009  -0.1478**8 (0.0531)  
2010  -0.0124 (0.0583)  
Large-2006   0.0096* (0.0469) 
Medium-2006   0.0933* (0.0721) 
Large-2007   0.0221* (0.0517) 
Medium-2007   0.0721* (0.0739) 
Large-2008   -0.0897 (0.0788) 
Medium-2008   -0.1113* (0.0889) 
Large-2009   -0.0463 (0.0519) 
Medium-2009   -0.1972** (0.0801) 
Large-2010   0.0157* (0.0531) 
Medium-2010   -0.1012* (0.0887) 
Observations 443 328 328 
AR (1)a -2.48** -2.56** -2.68** 
AR (2)b 1.34 0.88 0.71 
Wald Test 307.45*** 310.74*** 359.82*** 
Sargan Testc 323.45 (p-value = 0.446) 314.63 (p-value=0.406) 3.57 (p-value=0.615) 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in system GMM for the dynamic estimation model. 
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One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that the 
relationship between sustainability and year went from positive to negative during the 
financial crisis of 2008-2010. The fact is that the global financial crisis presented an 
obstacle to microfinance performance by increasing the cost of capital and other MFI 
expenses, as well as by increasing the cost of living in many countrie, without 
increasing wages. The poor may have problems in the repayment of loans since income 
does not catch up with increasing prices. In this case, larger MFIs may be more affected 
since they always have a larger number of active borrowers than smaller ones. 
Therefore, a drop off in business investment across the world tends to affect the gross 
loan portfolio of MFIs which have a high degree of financial integration and operational 
self-sufficiency. However, the gross loan portfolio of larger MFIs only changed slightly 
during the financial crisis of 2008-2010, as discussed above. Taken together, these 
results suggest that large MFIs have wealthier clients who may have been less affected 
by the financial crisis. The poorest of the poor are commonly the ones who will be most 
affected, irrespective of the continent, country, urban or rural area where they live.  
Table 5.5 also suggests that large MFIs may have recovered earlier than expected 
in 2010. Consistent with Sorkin (2009) and Krugman (2009 and 2010), large MFIs tend 
to have a degree of efficient protection from poor economic situations or negative 
effects produced by market changes. In addition, large MFIs play important roles in an 
economy and their failure may be disastrous. Therefore, local governments and central 
banks step in to help when they find themselves in a bad situation.  
In general, the negative effect of the global financial crisis erupted in late 2007 in 
relation to the performance of MFIs. This result follows the theoretical predictions for 
performance and answers the research questions presented at the beginning of this 
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section; that is, microfinance performance varied during the period before and after the 
global financial crisis according to the heterogeneity of size.  
The contributions of this study are two-fold. First, the results show that the 
negative impact may be weak since MFIs tend to have a low level of self-sufficiency 
associated with a low degree of financial integration. This finding points to the fact that 
MFIs still rely heavily on subsidised funds and grants that are fully committed by local 
governments and international organisations. Therefore, a drop off in business 
investment or a sudden reversal of international capital flows may have less impact on a 
short-term basis.  
Second, MFIs which have a larger scale of operation are less affected and have 
earlier recovery. The global financial crisis was an obstacle to the performance of MFIs 
by increasing operating expenses and causing problems in the repayment of loans for 
borrowers. The poor have been especially affected since they have to spend more than 
they earn on daily food when prices go up. As explained in the previous chapter, MFIs 
make an effort to be cost effective in order to be sustainable and to help the poor to pay 
off borrowed money. This finding suggests that there is an optimal scale of operation 
that leads to the higher sustainability of MFIs and helps them to minimise the negative 
effects of the global financial crisis. 
5.3. Conclusion 
In the context of the microfinance industry, the findings from this study make 
several contributions to the current literature through its empirical investigation to 
analyse the impact of scale of operation on microfinance performance.   
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A key finding of this study is that larger MFIs achieve higher efficiency, 
profitability, sustainability and outreach (breadth and depth) than smaller ones. They 
have also higher financial leverage to create revenues greater than expenses and have 
been less affected by the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. Therefore, this study 
sheds new light on the important role of scale of operation and calls for mergers and 
acquisitions between small MFIs. It also calls for the restructuring and strengthening of 
the microfinance sector after the drop off in business investment and the sudden reversal 
of international capital flows due to the global financial crisis. This would enable MFIs 
to access long-term debts and to mobilise deposits in order to become efficient and 
viable.  
Another interesting finding is that regulated MFIs may have higher sustainability 
and lower efficiency due to cost increases and the presence of cost of compliance. This 
finding contributes additional empirical evidence on the advantages and disadvantages 
of being regulated. The advantage of being regulated is that MFIs can attract more 
investment funds from the private sector (including savings mobilisation), which leads 
to an optimal mix of financing for low capital costs. On the other hand, there is a cost 
increase from licensing fees, savings mobilisation, capital requirements, control of 
interest rates and other costs related to networks and administration. 
The links between microfinance, domestic conditions and international capital 
markets have grown stronger, which means that the global financial crisis has had a 
significant effect on the performance of most MFIs. It has been forced them to slow the 
growth of their loan portfolios after enjoying a decade of exceptional growth. However, 
the impact of the economic crisis varies according to scale of operation. Small and 
medium MFIs appear to be struggling more with liquidity issues and funding problems, 
while large MFIs are less affected and have recovered earlier. However, in general, the 
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operations of most MFIs have been less affected by macroeconomic factors, especially 
the global financial crisis, since they may have a low degree of financial integration in 
the financial market and depend on subsidised funds and grants fully committed by 
local governments and international organisations. Therefore, a drop off in business 
investment or a sudden reversal of international capital flows may have less impact on a 
short-term basis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY OF VIETNAM 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In developing countries, microfinance programs are carried out by MFIs that have 
been sponsored by local governments, donors and international organisations because of 
poor participation by the private sector, especially local commercial banks.
165
 The 
increasing number of MFIs contributing to the microfinance industry has led to a 
substantial increase in competition between them. Therefore, achieving higher 
efficiency and sustainability associated with operating at the most competitive size 
tends to offer MFIs more opportunities to have cheaper access to outside financing and 
to diversify their financing sources.  
Due to the heterogeneity of characteristics, microfinance performance responds in 
different ways to changes in return to firm-specific and macroeconomic factors, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. This increases the need to carry out an empirical 
investigation of previous theoretical work that focuses on the particular case of 
Vietnam. This study determines the impact of financial structure on microfinance 
performance in Vietnam in an effort to compare the results of this country against a 
cross-section of others. It provides an overview of the correlation between financial 
structure and microfinance performance in Vietnam to help funders evaluate and 
determine financing and investment decisions.  
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 See Hossain and Knight (2008), Hermes et al. (2008) and Bogan (2009). 
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There are a number of reasons for choosing Vietnam to carry out an investigation. 
First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no study available which 
investigates the correlation between financial structure and microfinance performance in 
the Vietnamese context by using the models proposed in the previous chapters. Second, 
Vietnam is one of the fastest growing developing economies which is classified as a 
poor country (USDA, 2010; AusAID, 2011; BBC News, 2011)
166
. Therefore, 
microfinance is playing an increasingly important role in poverty reduction in this 
country. Third, international investment is important to most economies and can be 
particularly vital for developing countries, including Vietnam, which are seen as having 
significant potential for investment. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents a country 
profile of Vietnam, including key events and facts about poverty reduction and 
microfinance that provide the best evidence for the explanations of the empirical 
investigations. The second section presents the effect of financial structure on 
microfinance performance, with particular regard to Vietnam. 
6.2. Vietnam Country Profile 
6.2.1. Poverty Reduction – The Picture in Brief 
Vietnam became unified in 1975 as a one-party Communist state after nearly three 
decades of war and has struggled to find its feet. During most of the 1990s, GDP growth 
averaged 7.9% per year, higher than the 5.5% growth average for East Asia and the 
Pacific region (excluding China), or the 5.6% growth for South Asia (ADB, 2003). The 
basic elements of market forces and private enterprises were introduced in the late 
                                                 
166
  The annual growth of GDP is around 7.5%, while in other developing countries it is 
around 6% per year (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2000). 
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1980s and the stock exchange was opened in 2000. However, the country has struggled 
to restrain its trade and budget deficits. The inflation rate began to increase in 2008, 
reached double digits at the beginning of 2010, approached 20% by the end of 2011 and 
decreased slightly in 2012. Food prices have risen unabated over the years. 
Table 6.1 Poverty Reduction: Vietnam vs. Other Asian Countries 
Country Period %-Point Reduction 
Per Year 
Average Growth of 
Per Capita GDP (%) 
Vietnam 1993-1998 -4.1 6.8 
Other Asian Countries 
East Asia and Pacific 1993-1998 -2.0 5.6 
Bangladesh 1992-1996 -1.7 2.8 
Cambodia 1994-1997 -1.0 2.6 
China 1993-1998 -2.5 10.4 
India 1992-1997 -1.4 3.8 
Philippines 1994-1997 -1.3 1.9 
Indonesia 1990-1996 -2.1 6.4 
Thailand 1992-1996 -1.0 7.2 
Source: ADB (2003). 
The series of reforms from the centrally-planned to the socialist market-oriented 
economy paved the way for the country’s spectacular growth in the 1990s and had 
impressive impacts on poverty reduction. Poverty was halved between 1993 and 2002, 
from 58% to 29%, and stood at around 20% of the total population
167
 in 2004.
168
 This 
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 The Vietnamese population in 2010 was around 87 million people (GSO, 2011). 
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indicator has continued to decline to around 15% due to job creations in the private 
sector and reforms in agriculture. It has been estimated that one-third of the total 
population are still poor (equivalent to 29 million people). Table 6.1 shows that poverty 
in Vietnam fell by an average of 4.1% per year. In contrast, in the East Asia and the 
Pacific regions it fell by only 2% per year. Consistent with the results from the cross-
country regressions of Dollar and Kraay (2001), economic growth has been the key 
determinant of poverty reduction in Vietnam.  
In addition, around 90% of the poor are currently living in rural areas
169
 and 45% 
of these were below the poverty line (Le et al., 2011). A large proportion of them are 
not absolutely poor, but are clustered around the poverty line (Sunderlin and Huynh, 
2005). There appears to be a large potential market for profitable MFIs. Consistent with 
Navajas et al. (2000) and Adjei and Arun (2009), the poor need to be assisted to escape 
from poverty permanently by accessing financial providers. Therefore, microfinance is 
playing an increasingly important role in Vietnam as an effective tool for poverty 
reduction. It has been one of the most powerful instruments during the past few years 
(Ngo and Nguyen, 2007). In fact, it is still a new concept in Vietnam and has gained 
much attention since 2005
170
 due to the contributions of Muhammad Yunus
171
 in 
Bangladesh with Grameen Bank. 
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 See BWTP (2004), Lopez (2005), Sunderlin and Huynh (2005) and CIA (2011). 
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 According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, around 70% of the total 
population were living in rural areas in 2009 (Vietnam Online, 2011). 
170
  Source: International Year of Microcredit (2005). 
171
  See Grameen Bank (2011). 
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6.2.2. Microfinance 
Microfinance in Vietnam was developed from rural finance (the difference 
between microfinance and rural finance was discussed in the previous chapter) and has 
a strong link with the local financial system. Therefore, this section is divided into three 
parts, the financial system, rural finance and microfinance, in order to investigate the 
stages of development and degree of financial integration. 
6.2.2.1. Financial System 
Table 6.2 The Vietnamese Financial System  
Financial Institutions   Number Charter Status 
State-owned commercial banks 5* State-owned 
State-owned policy banks 1 State –owned, non profit 
Joint-stock commercial banks 35 Joint-stock 
Branches of foreign banks 50 Branches of foreign bank 
Joint-venture banks 4 Joint-venture 
Foreign banks 5 100% foreign-owned 
Financing companies 18 Financing 
Financial leasing companies 12 Leasing 
Representative offices of foreign banks 49 Representative 
People's Credit Fund (PCF) 915 Credit union 
Total 1,094  
MFIs (excluding VBSP) 18 Credit Institution 
* Three100% state-owned banks restructured and converted to joint-stock commercial banks. 
Source: SBV (2009 and 2012). 
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The financial system in Vietnam was reorganised in 1990 from a state-owned 
bank system to a commercial one to allow for the entry of the private sector under the 
supervision of the Central Bank (see table 6.2). This system has come a long way in 
recent years but is still underdeveloped due to a weak legal framework, the absence of 
international systematic accounting and a lack of financial disclosure, basic banking 
technology and skilled staff. State-owned commercial banks dominate and take the lead 
in the financial market, with total assets and loans outstanding accounting for 70% of 
the total assets and credits of all financial providers (VTO, 2008; SBV, 2009 and 2011). 
Other commercial banks account for 20% of total assets and 15% of the total credit 
market. Therefore, all commercial banks account for around 85% of the total credit 
market. Foreign banks (including 100% foreign banks and branches of foreign banks) 
mainly serve foreign investment firms and account for about 10% of the total credit 
market. 
According to SBV (2012), the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) is the 
only one among 1,094 financial institutions which provides microfinance to the poor, 
while the People's Credit Fund (PCFs) and the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD) have traditional banking activities in rural areas (rural finance). 
In addition, MFIs are not mentioned as a part of the financial system, although they are 
currently licensed and have operated in the same way as other financial institutions 
under the same regulations and supervision. This result suggests that local commercial 
banks in Vietnam are the main financial providers. Consistent with Ugur (2006) and 
Delfiner and Peron (2007), they have a greater effect on microfinance performance and 
funding than other financial institutions due to the restrictions of legal status and 
operational structure. However, each financial provider has its advantages and 
disadvantages when providing microfinance to the poor (see Appendix 6.1). 
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6.2.2.2. Rural Finance   
Rural finance refers to traditional banking activities for bankable people in rural 
areas for agricultural and rural development. In the early 1990s, rural finance was seen 
as the operations of traditional credit cooperatives and the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) in rural areas, where around 90% of the 
poor live.
172
 In the past few years, rural finance activities have been carried out by 
VBARD and PCFs, which focus on traditional banking activities, while VBSP focuses 
purely on microfinance in rural areas.
173
  
First, traditional credit cooperatives were established in 1956 by the State Bank of 
Vietnam (SBV) but were managed by local People's Committees (Putzeys, 2002; 
BWTP, 2004). The term “cooperative” refers to commercial cooperation, not mutual 
self-help. Loans were taken out of business and became non-performing. Most credit 
cooperatives collapsed due to a lack of reserve assets and deposits insurance and were 
no longer automatically refinanced by SBV (Putzeys, 2002; Kovsted et al., 2003). This 
collapse led to the establishment of new small private enterprises (PCFs) in 1993, which 
had a major negative effect on belief in the financial system (SBV, 2012). A profound 
mistrust led depositors to withdraw money and buy gold and hard currency to keep at 
home.
174
 PCFs operate as credit cooperatives in economically active regions and better 
off areas and do not target the poor. They use a credit union methodology to provide 
loans to their members, who have invested a certain sum of money in buying shares (i.e. 
they have enough funds available to invest). Therefore they are often bankable people 
(Nghiem et al., 2006; Ngo and Nguyen, 2007). 
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 See Putzeys (2002), Quach, Mullineux and Murinde (2003) and BWTP (2004). 
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 This finding is consistent with the results from interviews carried out by Ngo (2012). 
174
 See Oh (2000), Putzeys (2002), BWTP (2004) and Lensink et al. (2008). 
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Second, VBARD was established in 1988 as a special state-owned bank designed 
to target agriculture and rural areas. VBARD became the biggest financial provider in 
rural areas, with an extensive network around the country. This commercial bank had 
two separate divisions: traditional banking and microfinance. VBARD provides 
traditional banking activities to people in rural areas, like other local commercial banks 
as a profit business. On the other hand, VBARD provided subsidised rural credit to the 
poor through individual lending and joint-liability groups based on cooperation with 
mass organisations (such as the Women’s Union and Farmers’ Union) until the Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) was established in 1995 (Ngo and Nguyen, 2007; 
SBV, 2009). VBSP was established as a non-profit state-owned bank to focus on 
poverty reduction and was called by its first name, Vietnam Bank of the Poor (VBP), 
which was developed from a part of VBARD.  
During its early days, even if VBARD did not directly target the poor, it was 
estimated that 47% of its clients were poor. This indicator suggests that there was a 
trade-off between traditional banking and microfinance activities in rural areas at 
VBARD. This may point to the fact that VBARD transferred microfinance to VBSP in 
2003 in order to focus on wealthier borrowers with traditional banking. Consistent with 
surveys carried out by Ngo and Nguyen in 2007, VBSP tends to compete with VBARD 
and PCFs to provide larger loans to wealthier borrowers, perhaps because their 
borrowers tend to require larger amounts of money to meet their financial needs when 
they become successful and wealthier.  
From the point of view of rural finance, microfinance is considered as a part of 
rural finance in rural areas. However, microfinance focuses on the poor who are near-
bankable and non-bankable people and is different from rural finance, which conducts 
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traditional banking activities and focuses on bankable people.
175
 There have been 
several studies which have mistakenly used the term rural finance instead of 
microfinance.
176
 This misconception leads to an analysis of rural finance providers as 
microfinance providers and also leads to biased conclusions. 
6.2.2.3. Microfinance 
Table 6.3 Microfinance Providers in Vietnam. 
Providers In Theory In Practice 
Formal  Formal financial providers VSPB 
Semi-Formal MFIs MFIs: 17 NGOs, 1 NBFI 
Informal  Relatives and moneylenders Relatives and moneylenders 
Total 19 MFIs (excluding informal providers) 
Sources: SBV (2009) and MIX Market (2011). 
Poverty reduction programs in Vietnam started in the 1990s, but attention was 
paid to microfinance, which was isolated from rural finance and has been officially 
applied in some rural areas since 1999. Therefore, there are a large number of poor 
people without access to finance since local commercial banks do not provide loans to 
them without collateral and future cash flows. A poor track record in terms of applying 
microfinance by the private sector suggests that local government has acted as regulator 
and main active microfinance provider via non-profit state-owned bank (VBSP) (Ngo 
and Nguyen, 2007). Consistent with BWTP (2004) and MIX Market (2011), the gross 
loan portfolio of VBSP is between 90% and 95% of the total loan portfolio provided to 
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 See Seibel (2005), MFI and World Bank (2005) and Ngo and Nguyen (2007). 
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 See Dao (1998), Putzey (2002), BWTP (2004), Quach (2005), Nghiem et al. (2006) 
and APEC-TATF (2011). 
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the poor. This also suggests that MFIs in Vietnam are non-profit, have low operational 
self-sufficient and depend on VBSP, which has a large scale of operation and an 
operational structure like local commercial banks. 
In theory, financial providers can be potential microfinance providers, such as 
local commercial banks and rural finance providers traditionally classified as formal 
financial providers in the microfinance system.
177
 There is potential competition in the 
microfinance industry if MFIs upscale and local commercial banks downscale in 
providing loans to the poor. This study once again points out the potential disadvantage 
of the upscaling of MFIs in Vietnam. 
Presently, there are around 19 microfinance programs registered with SBV to be 
non-profit MFIs (see table 6.3). Funds for microfinance include 90% from local funds 
and 10% from international funds. This may point to the fact that local commercial 
banks and other financial providers have low motivation and limited investment funds 
for non-profit programs. In a steadily expanding sector such as microfinance, 10% of 
total funds are from international sources, which seems very small and so can translate 
into significant opportunities for foreign investors. Consistent with Hsu (2007), there is 
a large investment gap for local and international funders in commercial microfinance in 
Vietnam. 
We found that there is some misunderstanding and incorrect explanations in 
several studies, in particular with regard to Vietnam, which leads to biased and limited 
conclusions. Therefore, correction is required based on a comprehensive review of 
microfinance activities and MFIs in Vietnam. First, microfinance activities in VBARD 
were totally transferred to VBSP during the period 1995 to 2003 and VBARD currently 
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operates like other commercial banks which operate traditional banking in rural areas. 
However, VBARD is still mentioned as one of the main microfinance providers in some 
recent studies, such as APEC TATF (2011).
178
 Second, there was no rural bank (called 
rural shareholding bank) at the end of 2007 based on the records of SBV due to the 
mergers and acquisitions in the banking system (SBV, 2011). However, the rural bank 
is still mentioned as a current financial institution in some studies, such as Haq, Hoque 
and Pathan (2008). Third, PCFs are credit institutions working in commercial rural 
finance by providing loans only to their members, who are considered as bankable 
people since they must have a certain amount of money to buy shares to be owners 
(SBV, 2011). Their interest rates were 3.5% above the interest rate ceiling set for local 
commercial banks (WB, 2009). This indicates that PCFs are not microfinance providers 
but are still mentioned as such in many studies.
179
  
6.2.3. Outline of the Success of and Challenges to Microfinance in Vietnam 
This section is mainly based on the annual reports of SBV, VBSP and the data 
collected from MIX Market, as well as the results from the survey carried out by Ngo 
and Nguyen in 2007 in Vietnam. The survey determined the financial demands of the 
poor and their possibility of accessing microfinance and evaluated the impact of 
microfinance services and rural financial services provided to the poor by financial 
institutions in rural areas. This survey was sponsored by CARE International in 
Vietnam under the community resilience to natural disasters project. However, we also 
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 See BWTP (2004), Quach (2005), Nghiem et al. (2006), Haq et al. (2008), WB 
(2009) and APEC-TATF (2011). 
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  See BWTP (2004), Quach (2005), Nghiem et al. (2006), Thapa (2007) and APEC-
TATF (2011). 
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checked and updated the results of the survey in 2007 before using them in this study by 
conducting personal interviews in 2012. The participants in the personal interviews 
were the directors and staff of VBSP and VBARD who participated in the focus group 
and training workshop in 2007. 
6.2.3.1. Success   
The rapid expansion of local commercial banks in rural areas was followed by the 
establishment of VBSP in 2003 to help to improve rural finance activities (VBSP, 
2009). An increasing number of people have been reached by the formal financial 
system, with reasonable interest rates that reduce the negative impact from the 
operations of moneylenders. Moreover, Decree No.28/2005 also encourages and 
controls microfinance activities by requiring any organisation that has microfinance 
activities to apply for a license from 2007 (SBV, 2009 and 2011). This means that all 
microfinance programs must convert to licensed MFIs; if not, they are considered as 
illegal businesses. Among the 19 licensed MFIs mentioned above, several are operating 
as a small part of the projects carried out by NGOs and international organisations for a 
specified period of time (only for a maximum of one or tow years), apart from VBSP, 
CEP, TYM and Binh Minh CDC. This result indicates that there exist many programs 
and organisations which do not have a license from SBV to provide microfinance.  
Microfinance in Vietnam is carried out by 19 non-profit MFIs with different legal 
statuses (one microfinance bank, 17 NGOs and one NBFI). Total outstanding loans 
were US$ 4 billion, with 7.8 million borrowers at the end of 2009 (MIX Market, 2011). 
VBSP accounted for around 90% of the total loan portfolio and 18 MFIs accounted for 
around 10% of the total. In 2009, the total outstanding loans of VBSP were VND 
72,660 billion (equivalent to around US$ 3.5 billion) for 7.5 million borrowers, an 
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increase of 38.4% compared to 2008. Operational self-sufficiency was around 76.24% 
(lower than the required level of 100%). Capital on the total assets ratio was 22.25%, 
and the debt to equity ratio was 3.4, while ROA was negative, at -1.84%. This suggests 
that VBSP may be focusing on the breadth of outreach (social mission) and needs to 
improve its financial performance to become viable. 
Table 6.4 Funders, Networks and Service Providers in Vietnam 
 Organisation 
Funders CORDAID, Habitat for Humanity, MicroCredit Enterprises, 
Oikocredit, Oxfam, Rabobank Foundation, and SBFIC. 
Networks BWTP, CASHPOR, Habitat for Humanity International, M7 
Group, Save the Children, and VMFWG 
Service Providers CORDAID, Habitat for Humanity, Kiva, Planet Rating and 
SBFIC. 
Source: MIX Market (2011). 
There are several donors and funding agencies which support microfinance. 
According to a report by MIX Market (2010), there are 18 MFIs by seven funders, five 
networks and five service providers in Vietnam (see table 6.4 and Appendix 6.2). The 
total outstanding loans were US$ 0.4 billion, with 0.3 million borrowers. Operational 
self-sufficiency was 138% (higher than the minimum level of 100%). The capital to 
total assets ratio was 45.74%, and the debt to equity ratio was 1.61, while ROA was 
4.4%. This suggests that NGOs and NBFIs may have a more efficient performance than 
VBSP due to their operational structure. In addition, there are around 50 programs 
mostly carried out by NGOs which have microfinance activities as a small part of their 
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projects. Therefore, they are not counted as MFIs. These MFIs are not allowed to 
mobilise savings due to the legal restrictions in banking and finance. 
MFIs in Vietnam are public owned (by local governments) and semi-public 
owned (by international subsidy funds), without participation from the private sector 
(such as local commercial banks). They offer loans to the poor at low interest rates
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(output) based on soft loans and subsidy funds (input) from local government and 
international donors (see table 6.4). These MFIs run by international donors are small 
NGOs or subsidised programs (such as the subsidised child care program, the rural 
clean water and sanitation programs and the community resilience to natural disasters 
projects), which are not legally licensed to provide microfinance (i.e. they need a license 
to provide loans) and to collect savings from the public (excluding VBSP).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, savings currently do not provide a sufficient 
volume of funding for the lending activities of MFIs.
181
 Therefore, they have problems 
in obtaining more investment funds in order to expand their strong growth due to 
funding constraints. Based on the experiences of MFIs around the world (De Schrevel, 
2005; Hermes and Lensink, 2007), debts and savings tend to be the ideal funds for MFIs 
in Vietnam. Nevertheless, debts at the market price will increase expenses and also have 
a negative effect on the efficiency ratio. In the case of providing loans to MFIs, local 
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 Compared to the market interest rates of local commercial banks in 2011/2012 with 
an average of 18% per year, the current interest rates at VBSP are around 8% per year. 
This is decided by the State’s preferential policies for the poor and shows the efforts of 
the state budget to allocate public funds for microfinance programs (Ngo, 2012). This 
finding is consistent with the findings from the survey of 2007 carried out by Ngo and 
Nguyen on behalf of Care International in Vietnam. 
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  The findings of Ngo and Nguyen (2007) and Ngo (2012) are totally consistent with 
the findings of Wisniwski (1999) and Branch and Klaehn (2002). 
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commercial banks provide these indirectly to the poor, who tend to prefer them to MFIs 
because of their current advantages
182
 (Isern and Porteous, 2005). 
6.2.3.2. Challenges   
Microfinance has shown tremendous growth in terms of efficiency over the past 
few years. The main objective of microfinance is to satisfy the unmet financial demand 
of the poor on a much larger scale for poverty reduction. Therefore, much progress has 
been made in the last few decades, but several remaining issues need to be addressed. In 
Vietnam, some main challenges are faced by MFIs.  
First, during its early days, microfinance was mainly driven by local government 
and NGOs. During the last few years, new entrants have established various 
microfinance investment funds in order to finance MFIs. Therefore, the lack of legal 
and regulatory frameworks for microfinance has become one of the main factors that 
discourages the inflow of large amounts of international funds to microfinance in 
Vietnam. This challenge is consistent with the suggestions of King (2008).  
Second, MFIs tend to lack the funds to increase outreach since none of them are 
profitable and are not allowed to mobilise savings, apart from VBSP. In addition, there 
was a drop-off in business investment and a sudden reversal of international capital 
flows after the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. This problem requires MFIs to 
access long-term debts and develop attractive products in order to mobilize savings and 
reduce the cost of capital. Furthermore, MFIs also need to apply new technologies to 
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  Compared to MFIs, banks likely have several advantages over non-bank, micro-
lending NGOs such as a large network of branches and financial services, well-
established internal controls and administrative and accounting systems, own sources of 
funds (deposit and equity capital), and etc. These advantages tend to give banks a 
special edge over MFIs in providing microfinance services (Baydas et al., 1997). 
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lower transactions costs in order to become efficient and improve customer satisfaction 
and become viable. 
Third, the availability of grants and soft loans from local government and 
international organisations tends to deter MFIs from pursuing more commercial debts 
and savings mobilisation which would help them lower the cost of capital and also 
increase outreach. 
Fourth, MFIs need to become profitable in order to be viable and to expand 
outreach. However, few MFIs have the management capacity to successfully manage a 
commercial financial intermediary, since they began as NGOs with a social mission 
through the provision of loans to the poor. Therefore, MFIs need to improve 
management capacity to develop commercial microfinance. 
6.3. Impact of Financial Structure on Microfinance Performance in Vietnam 
6.3.1 Research Objectives 
This chapter aims to investigate the impact of financial structure on microfinance 
performance in Vietnam to help funders evaluate and determine financing decisions. 
This objective has been explored by addressing the same research question posed in 
Chapter 4: how does financial structure in terms of financial leverage affect the 
sustainability and profitability of MFIs in Vietnam? It is, therefore, hypothesised that 
financial leverage can help MFIs have higher sustainability and profitability. To 
accomplish the above objectives, we perform a regression model RM4.1 in chapter 4 by 
adding country dummy and creating interaction with other variables to test whether 
Vietnam differs significantly from the rest of the world. 
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Microfinance in Vietnam is a very young industry since it became established in 
the 10 years from 1999 (see table 6.5). The data were collected from MIX Market and 
SBV, as reported by all MFIs in Vietnam. This limitation tends to lead to limited 
conclusions from the analysis. However, the results of this study fill a gap in the extant 
literature by providing the impact of financial structure on microfinance performance in 
the Vietnamese context. 
Table 6.5 Research Population for the period 1999 to 2010 
Regulated Status 100% 
Profit Status Profit Non-Profit 
Number of MFIs 0 (0%) 19 (0%) 
Total MFIs 19 MFIs (82 Observations) 
Number of MFIs 1 0 1 17 0 
% 5.26% 0% 5.26% 89.48% 0% 
Charter Type Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank 
Source: MIX Market (2011). 
6.3.2 Empirical Results 
Table 6.6 shows the results from our basic specification using OSS and ROA as 
the sustainability and profitability measures. We find that financial leverage affects 
microfinance performance in Vietnam in the anticipated way. It follows the theoretical 
predictions and other findings from the literature. The effect of funding on performance 
in the case of Vietnam is positive (i.e. MFIs in Vietnam may take on more debt to 
increase sustainability and profitability by creating greater revenue than costs). 
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Table 6.6 Impact of financial leverage on sustainability in Vietnam 
 
 Cross-Country Vietnam Cross-Country Vietnam 
Variables RM4.1 (lnOSS) lnOSS RM4.1 (ROA) ROA 
Lag 1 lnOSS 0.5946*** (0.0481) 0.1655*** (0.0366) 0.4972*** (0.1237) 0.4275*** (0.0740) 
DTE -0.0379*** (0.0001) -0.0467* (0.0363) -0.1554* (0.0796) -0.0084* (0.0120) 
lnGLP 0.0356*** (0.0151) 0.0147* (0.0246) 0.0348***  (0.0547) 0.0176** (0.0083) 
Pwomen -0.1771 (0.1161) -0.4011 (0.1025) -0.1899 (0.1295) -0.0687 (0.0366) 
Regulated  -0.0074 (0.0551) -0.0302 (0.0422) -0.2432 (0.1829) -0.0001 (0.0075) 
Profit 0.1199 (0.1161) 0.1247* (0.1007) 0.2028 (0.3999) 0.0032 (0.0140) 
Micro Bank -0.0963* (0.0909) -0.0036 (0.0299) -0.0799 (0.2980) -0.0144* (0.0124) 
Credit Union 0.0387  (0.1527) 0.0817 (0.0878) 0.1216 (0.6628) 0.0207 (0.0184) 
NGO 0.0072 (0.1407) 0.0934 (0.0171) -0.0336 (0.4255) 0.0110 (0.0210) 
NBFI -0.1081** (0.0955) -0.0454 (0.0486) -0.0107* (0.2795) -0.0177* (0.0131) 
Inflation 0.0009 (0.0025) 0.0004 (0.0103) 0.0110 (0.0110) 0.0009 (0.0031) 
lnGNI -0.0566* (0.0448) -0.1822* (0.1299) -0.1813* (0.0562) -0.0175* (0.0541) 
Before crisis 0.0973*** (0.1721) 0.0273* (0.0282) 0.2732* (0.1733) 0.0103* (0.0087) 
Vietnam  -1.0956* (0.6026)  -0.2829* (0.3245) 
DTEvietnam  0.0490* (0.0352)  0.0082* (0.0122) 
lnGLPvietnam  0.0289* (0.0173)  0.0130* (0.0069) 
Pwomenvietnam  -0.3354*** (0.0823)  -0.0495* (0.0274) 
Inflationvietnam  0.0035 (0.0080)  0.0003 (0.0022) 
lnGNIvietnam  0.1843* (0.1039)  0.0004* (0.0452) 
Observations 425 412 425 304 
AR (1)
a
 -2.62*** -2.48*** -2.56*** -2.53*** 
AR (2)
b
 0.51 0.97 0.83 0.96 
Wald Test 367.70*** 362.39*** 352.43*** 470.81*** 
Sargan Test
c
 247.60 
 (p-value=0.601) 
232.64  
(p-value=0.723) 
198.65 
(p-value=0.842) 
198.65 
(p-value=0.842) 
Note: ***, **, and * are statistically significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The value of the standard error is in parentheses. 
a
 Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences. 
b 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences. 
c
 Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in system GMM for the dynamic estimation model. 
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The results show that there were negative impacts of the financial structure on the 
profitability and sustainability of MFIs in Vietnam. The funding sources and the 
operational structures are the key factors creating the difference between Vietnam and 
other countries. Other findings based on this result are that: (i) there was no commercial 
microfinance and participation of the private sector; (ii) microfinance programs carried 
out by local government had lower efficiency than those of international donors and  
(iii) there were around 90% of local public funds and 10% of international funds. This 
means there were significant investment opportunities for local and foreign investors. 
The most obvious finding to emerge from this study is that most MFIs in Vietnam 
are regulated but remain heavily dependent on grants and subsidies, as well as local 
government, which is an unsustainable practice. However, taking on more low cost 
debts tends to help MFIs achieve greater revenue than costs. In particular, cross-border 
and hard currency debts from international investors often appear cheaper than other 
local commercial debts because of lower nominal interest rates. This means that 
international funds may have longer tenures, be cheaper and often require less collateral 
than local debts for a number of reasons. First, foreign funders are more familiar with 
risks in the microfinance sector. Second, social motivation tends to lead them to accept 
terms that are below the levels that would maximise profits. Third, they have also 
started competing against each other more, which may result in them offering lower 
interest rates. Therefore, many MFIs base debt financing decisions primarily on price 
(cost of capital) in order to obtain the lowest cost funding. International funds play an 
important role as a core funding strategy, as well as deposit mobilisation. Consistent 
with Hsu (2007), there is a large gap for local and international investors in commercial 
microfinance in Vietnam, since only 10 % of total funds are from international sources. 
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Therefore, a drop-off in business investment or a sudden reversal of international capital 
flows may have a negative effect on microfinance in Vietnam. 
However, the findings of the previous chapters suggest that there exist some 
thresholds and if financial leverage goes beyond these, the relationship between it and 
microfinance performance reverses. This tell us that, as financial leverage increases, the 
level of sustainability and profitability increases at first due to the low cost of capital , 
but then it turns negative beyond the threshold. Therefore, MFIs need to operate at the 
most suitable size.  
The evidence from this study suggests that providing loans to women tends to 
result in MFIs in Vietnam having lower sustainability and profitability. This is 
consistent with the findings of Cull et al (2007). Women ask for loans that are smaller 
than those of their male counterparts. This suggests that there is mission drift via 
average loan size and the proportion of women served. Therefore, the crowding out of 
poor clients is rooted in subsidy uncertainty, which leads to the trade-off between 
maximising utility by serving the poor and lending to more profitable wealthier clients 
in order to build up precautionary savings in the fear that subsidies could dry up. This is 
the main reason why VSPB tends to offer loans to wealthier clients and VBARD has 
changed its focus to wealthier clients instead of the poor, as discussed previously. 
We also find that sustainability and profitability are negatively related in Vietnam 
(significant at the level of 5%). This may point to the fact that MFIs focus on lending to 
the poor due to their social mission or the requirements of sponsors. In fact, all MFIs in 
Vietnam are non-profit with different legal statuses, while MFIs across the world are 
61% non-profit and 39% profit. Consistent with De Sousa-Shields (2004), MFIs in 
Vietnam focus on the breadth of outreach and on the poorest people. In addition, all 
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MFIs are forced to register to obtain licenses to provide microfinance to the poor under 
Decree No.28/2005 (SBV, 2009 and 2011). Therefore, they need to have the same 
operational structure as other financial institutions under old and new Laws on Credit 
Institutions
183
 (SBV, 2011). This may have a negative impact on the performance of 
MFIs in Vietnam. VBSP has commercial operation structure like credit unions or 
commercial banks (i.e. they have an operational structure like profitable MFIs) but 
operate as non-profit MFIs based on subsidy funds and grants. This finding is totally 
consistent with the prediction of pecking order theory in several studies (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001), which suggests that 
external funds (debts and equity) increase costs and may lower profits when non-profit 
institutions try to increase productivity and reduce costs instead of increasing profit.  
Gross loan portfolio (GLP, log) was found to be positively related to sustainability 
and profitability. This result is consistent with the finding of the cross-country analysis 
discussed in chapter 4. As explained above, all MFIs in Vietnam rely heavily on subsidy 
funds and grants from local government and NGOs and focus greatly on social vision or 
the breadth of outreach (De Sousa-Shields, 2004). Therefore, larger numbers of active 
borrowers are always the main target. This means that the efficiency of non-profit MFIs 
is evaluated by the indicators of outreach (the breadth) instead of cost per borrower or 
cost per loan when evaluating profit MFIs. Outreach also becomes more important than 
the other indicators representing the performance of MFIs. The results also suggest that 
MFIs can expand their scale of operation in order to achieve financial mission (higher 
                                                 
183
  The Law on Credit Institutions (the New Law) was approved on 16 June 2010 and 
became effective on 1 January 2011. 
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sustainability and profitability) and social mission. MFIs need to find new funding 
sources and take on more subsidy funds and soft loans in order to achieve their targets.  
6.4. Conclusion 
Microfinance has been established in Vietnam 14 years ago, but it is still a new 
concept due to the lack of participation by the private sector. Local government (local 
funds) and NGOs (international funds) currently play important roles in providing loans 
to the poor for poverty reduction through non-profit programs. The interesting finding 
of this study is that there is a large gap for local and international investors in 
commercial microfinance. In addition, findings from the previous chapter show that the 
global financial crisis of 2007/2008 had a negative impact on microfinance 
performance. This low degree of financial integration suggests that MFIs in Vietnam 
have been less affected from the global financial crisis than others. Therefore, a drop-off 
in business investment or a sudden reversal of international capital flows may have a 
negative impact on funding in Vietnam in the long term. 
The relationship between financial structure and microfinance performance was 
mainly affected by the characteristics of MFIs. Therefore, the possible explanations for 
the impact of financial structure on microfinance performance are relevant to the 
context of regulatory and profit status. In non-profit institutions, decreasing costs (input) 
are the key solution for improving efficiency while profit (output) is not the main 
objective. Another new and interesting finding is that non-profit MFIs tend to use the 
number of active borrowers as the main indicator to evaluate their efficiency which is 
also investigated by evaluating and determining financing and investment decisions. 
The results follow the theoretical predictions for the impact of financial leverage on 
performance and Vietnam differs only slightly from the rest of the world. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This chapter is the concluding chapter of the thesis and provides a summary of the 
main findings based on the results of each chapter. These findings are presented to show 
how they meet the objectives and answer the research questions posed at the beginning 
of the thesis. Based on the findings, some limitations are outlined and proposals made 
for further research. 
This study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the impact of financial structure 
on microfinance performance with the heterogeneity of MFI characteristics by using a 
cross-country analysis and case study of Vietnam. It gives possible explanations that are 
mainly relevant in the context of firm-specific characteristics, such as scale of operation, 
profit and legal status. Based on this analysis and explanation, funders can determine 
financing decisions or take corrective actions when needed based on the correlation 
between financial leverage and the key performance indicators of MFIs. To achieve this 
aim, comprehensive reviews of microfinance and funding, as well as empirical 
investigations into the impact of financial structure and scale of operation on 
microfinance performance, have been conducted, with data taken from MIX Market, 
MFIs and the Central Bank of Vietnam. The study employed system GMM on the same 
data set in order to answer the empirical questions which are clearly defined at the 
beginning of this study and also in each chapter. 
208 
 
In the context of the microfinance industry, this study contributes to the literature 
on the links between financial leverage, scale of operation and microfinance 
performance in several ways. 
First, the study has investigated the impact of financial structure on the most 
common performance indicators for microfinance with the heterogeneity of MFI 
characteristics due to the limitations of the extant literature on the effect of financial 
structure on microfinance performance. Previous studies have tended to focus on the 
link between financial structure and one aspect of the performance of MFIs. Therefore, 
their explanations and conclusions are fairly limited.  
Second, this study introduces new evidence and possible explanations from an 
explicit perspective that might be relevant in the context of scale of operation, profit 
status, regulated status and legal status. Previous studies have tended to use lending 
method, share of lending to women, age and savings as independent variables in order 
to explain the impact of financial structure on microfinance performance. 
Third, in the context of the microfinance industry, this study carries out further 
empirical investigation to analyse the impact of scale of operation and its interaction 
with financial structure on the performance of MFIs.  
Fourth, this study conducts an empirical investigation into the relationship 
between financial structure and microfinance performance in the Vietnamese context in 
order to test whether Vietnam differs significantly from the rest of the world. 
Fifth, this study employed system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which is a 
new methodology, currently in use in the empirical investigation of financial 
performance in banking and finance. 
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7.1. How does financial structure in terms of financial leverage affect the different 
aspects of microfinance performance? 
This study has found that in general financial leverage affects microfinance 
performance in Vietnam in the anticipated way, following the theoretical predictions 
and other findings from the literature. The real effects of funding on performance in 
theory can be positive or negative due to their contribution to financial revenue (i.e. 
MFIs may take on more debt to increase profitability by creating greater revenue than 
costs). It depends on the differences in the characteristics of MFIs that contribute to the 
impact of financial structure on performance in various ways. Any funding source has 
associated costs that increase financial expenses and have negative effects on net 
income. Therefore, MFIs need to earn enough revenue to cover their total costs based on 
using commercial funds to provide subsidised loans to the poor.  
Profitable and regulated MFIs who take on considerably more commercial funds 
(including borrowings and savings) are therefore liable to have more revenue than 
expenses and to have higher sustainability, efficiency and outreach. This encourages the 
transformation process of MFIs from simply achieving their social mission to becoming 
profitable and regulated businesses in order to be self-sufficient and remain viable. 
Profitable MFIs are cost efficient since they pay more attention to many purposes of 
loans and to provide sufficient loans sizes to appropriate borrowers. On the contrary, 
regulated MFIs have been found to be less efficient and to have many disadvantages 
from being regulated, such as cost increases from licensing fees, savings mobilisation, 
capital requirements, control of interest rates, networks and administration. The cost of 
compliance, as well as the cost of savings mobilisation and regulation, is very high. 
These disadvantages may cause an increase in expenses and result in revenue which is 
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lower than expenses. Therefore, MFIs need to achieve a significant scale of operation 
and degree of sustainability before becoming regulated and profitable.  
The results suggest that the impact of financial structure on microfinance 
performance is mainly relevant in the context of scale of operation, profit status, 
regulated status and legal status. The differences in legal status tend to contribute to the 
impact of financial structure on performance in various ways. However, the results 
follow the theoretical predictions for profitable and regulated MFIs. Therefore, this 
study moves beyond the explanations currently in use in the empirical literature in the 
context of lending methodology, age and gender and introduces new evidence and 
explanations for the effect of financial structure on the performance of MFIs. 
7.2. Is there any trade-off between the financial and social performance of MFIs? 
The significant impacts of financial leverage on operational self-sufficiency and 
gross loan portfolio indicate that there is a positive relationship between sustainability 
and outreach in some MFIs. The results suggest that MFIs may take on more debts to 
achieve a positive impact on sustainability and to have the ability to expand their 
outreach. This may point to the fact that MFIs can expand their outreach to achieve 
sustainability based on the advantages of economies of scale. MFIs need to convert 
from credit-only NGOs into regulated MFIs in order to provide other financial services 
to their clients. Consistent with the previous findings, this convertion allows MFIs to 
take on more debts, especially savings, as well as to offer a greater basket of products 
and services. However, it is a lengthy process and requires a great deal of resources; for 
example costs are high and a large number of resources are required to change the 
organisational structure.  In addition, there is also a risk of broken brand promise if 
brand expectations are not reached across subsidiaries. Due to the causal relationship 
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between the sustainability and outreach, sustainable MFIs tend to serve the large 
majority of borrowers, since on average, sustainable MFIs are much larger than 
unsustainable ones. This suggests that we should weight the results by number of 
borrowers or gross loan portfolio. It would make no sense to give each of the hundreds 
of tiny MFIs the same weight as one large one. Furthermore, most of the investors who 
identify themselves as socially responsible will not apply a negative screen or accept a 
lower return and higher risks than any other commercial investors. Clearly, government 
MFIs tend to be unsustainable and will continue to be so. However, the proposition that 
microfinance can be a perfectly viable business in most settings has been demonstrated 
very compellingly by now. 
In addition, there is a threshold that makes the relationship between variables 
reverse if it goes beyond that point. Clearly, the results also provide strong evidence that 
there is an optimal mix of efficiency in terms of sustainability and outreach. 
Furthermore, the results tend to vary with the heterogeneity of MFI characteristics. This 
also provides us with evidence of a trade-off between sustainability and outreach 
beyond this threshold. However, the positive and significant relationship between loan 
portfolio size and outreach suggests that MFI managers need to focus on increasing the 
level of thresholds in order to achieve a higher level of operational self-sufficiency and 
a wider outreach.  
7.3. Is there any trade-off between the depth and breadth of outreach? 
The findings suggest that MFIs need to expand their operations in order to reach a 
larger number of active borrowers and to provide larger loans to them (i.e. in the case of 
wealthier borrowers who have been lifted out of poverty). The results point to a very 
interesting issue concerning the trade-off between the depth and breadth of outreach. 
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There is a possible trade-off between this due to funding constraints. However, in the 
case of expanding scale of operation, successful MFIs adapt their mission and practices 
in line the changes in their clients, which is associated with upscaling in microfinance 
and the ability to provide larger loans to borrowers. It is common sense for larger MFIs 
to have the ability to provide larger loans to them and reach larger numbers of 
borrowers. Therefore, the result is not “trade-off” as the term is generally understood 
instead a trade-off between the wealthier and poorer clients instead. 
Consistent with Hamilton et al. (2008), Rosenberg (2009) and economies of scale, 
large MFIs achieve higher efficiency by expanding their breadth of outreach (number of 
active borrowers). The findings of this study seem to be inconsistent with the 
conclusions of Hermes et al. (2011), who evaluated the trade-off between the outreach 
and efficiency of MFIs between 2000 and 2010 by using average loan balance as a 
proxy for outreach and cost per borrower as a proxy for efficiency, concluding that there 
was a negative correlation, as had been found in previous studies. However, the reality 
is that the conclusions of the two studies are totally consistent. The negative correlation 
found in Hermes et al. (2011) was between efficiency and depth of outreach, while a 
positive relationship between efficiency and the breadth of outreach was found in this 
study. Therefore, this study has contributed additional evidence to the existing literature 
that there is a significant positive relationship between efficiency and breadth of 
outreach. 
 
 
 
213 
 
7.4. How does scale of operation, together with financial leverage, affect 
microfinance performance (social and financial performance)? 
The number of MFIs increased rapidly during the period 1995 to 2011 (MIX 
Market, 2011). Several MFIs improved their efficiency, became self-sufficient and 
played an increasingly important role as financial intermediaries in local economies for 
poverty reduction (Djeudja and Heidhues, 2005; Hossain and Knight, 2008; United 
Nations, 2011). Therefore, understanding the differences between large and small MFIs 
is necessary in order to choose the most suitable size for operations with regard to being 
regulated, profitable, self-sufficient and viable.  
One of the key findings of this study is that larger MFIs achieve higher efficiency, 
profitability, sustainability and outreach (breadth and depth) than smaller ones. They 
also have a higher financial leverage by taking on more debts to create greater revenues 
than expenses and have suffered less impact than medium and small MFIs from the 
global financial crisis of 2007/2008. Therefore, this study sheds new light on the 
important role of scale of operation and calls for mergers and acquisitions between 
small MFIs. It also calls for the restructuring and strengthening of the microfinance 
sector after the drop-off in business investment and the sudden reversal of international 
capital flows due to the global financial crisis. This would enable MFIs to access long-
term debts and to mobilise deposits in order to become efficient and viable. 
7.5. How did the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 effect microfinance 
performance? 
Macroeconomic factors tend have an impact on financial institutions in a number 
of ways, including MFIs. This study has considered the effects of the global financial 
crisis of 2007/2008 on microfinance performance. A global financial meltdown will 
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affect the livelihoods of almost everyone and every business in an increasingly inter-
connected economy. The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 caused the decline and 
failure of many key businesses and a slowdown in several economies due to tightened 
credit, which is associated with a decline in GDP growth, falling housing prices and a 
drop-off in business investment (Baily and Elliott, 2009; Te Velde, 2009). This suggests 
that the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 had a significant negative impact on stock 
markets worldwide. As part of the financial market, the global financial crisis has also 
tended to impact negatively on the microfinance sector. Consistent with Te Velde 
(2008), the United Nations (2009) and CGAP, (2011b), MFIs have had to slow down 
the growth of gross loan portfolios after a decade of exceptional expansion. However, 
the results of this study show that the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 has had  a 
relatively small effect on microfinance performance because of the low level of self-
sufficiency, as well as the low degree of financial integration.  
This finding points to the fact that MFIs rely heavily on subsidised funds and 
grants that are fully committed by local governments and international organisations. 
Therefore, a drop-off in business investment or a sudden reversal of international capital 
flows may have less impact on a short-term than on a long-term basis. It is suggested 
that an empirical investigation be carried out over a longer period after the global 
financial crisis to evaluate its effects. 
Consistent with the global financial crisis, the negative impact of high inflation 
and GNI per capita on microfinance follows the theoretical predictions for 
macroeconomic factors. In the case of high inflation, borrowers have problems with the 
repayment of loans due to increasing prices and the cost of living (without an increase 
in wages), as well as MFI expenses. Therefore, MFIs tend to consider reducing costs for 
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borrowers to help them solve their financial problems and repay their loans. The results 
may point to the fact that MFIs work with borrowers in order to solve financial 
problems. On the other hand, when poor households achieve a higher income (GNI per 
capital) and are lifted out of poverty, they prefer to deal with local commercial banks for 
larger loans to meet their financial demands and to enjoy the commercial banks’ 
advantages. The results point out many important issues, such as the downscaling of 
local commercial banks and the upscaling of MFIs in microfinance, the trade-off 
between the wealthier and poorer MFI clients and the development of successful MFIs 
by adapting their mission and practices with the changes in their clients. 
7.6 Other findings.  
First, another interesting finding is that regulated MFIs have higher sustainability 
and lower efficiency due to the presence of cost of compliance and cost increases. This 
finding contributes additional empirical evidence to the advantages and disadvantages 
of being regulated. The advantage of being regulated is that MFIs can attract more 
investment funds from the private sector (including savings mobilisation), which leads 
to an optimal mix of financing at a low capital cost. On the other hand, there is a cost 
increase from licensing fees, savings mobilisation, capital requirements, control of 
interest rates and other costs related to networks and administration. These 
disadvantages may be the main barrier which prevents small MFIs from becoming 
regulated, which may explain why MFIs are still relying heavily on subsidised funds 
and grants from local governments and international organisations. This result also 
indicates the demand to be regulated in order to be mobilise savings, which is an 
important low-cost fund for lending in banking and microfinance. In addition, MFIs 
also improve themselves by high performance to achieve a sufficient volume of savings. 
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Therefore, this study has established that there is a strong correlation between profit and 
regulated status. 
Second, consistent with Cull et al. (2007), Hermes et al. (2011) and the 
diseconomies of scale theory, cost per borrower (loan cost) tends to increase with 
average loan balance (loan size). Over time, loan size tends to creep up, partly because 
as borrowers become successful and wealthier they want larger loans, as mentioned and 
discussed in the previous findings. This finding has contributed additional evidence to 
the literature concerning loan size and loan cost; that is, the average cost per dollar lent 
(cost per loan) is lower for larger loans, while the average cost per borrower is higher. 
The results point to the fact that providing larger loans may increase loan costs, perhaps 
because there is an increase in monitoring, refinancing costs and other non-financial 
operating expenses. In light of this argument, it is not completely accurate to say that 
smaller loans have higher costs. Therefore, this study suggests using cost per loan and 
also cost per borrower to compare the costs of different loan sizes. 
Third, due to the heterogeneity of characteristics, microfinance performance 
responds in different ways to changes in return to firm-specific factors and 
macroeconomic factors. The results of the case study of Vietnam and the cross-country 
analysis are slightly different, for a number of reasons which are relevant in the context 
of scale of operation, as well as the profit status, operational structure and regulation 
and supervision in the local economy. 
 All MFIs in Vietnam are non-profit with different legal statuses, while MFIs 
in other countries are 61% non-profit and 39% profit. This suggests that 
MFIs may provide loans to the poor at very low interest rates due to their 
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social mission or the requirements of sponsors and that the legal status has 
not little effect on their operations. 
 MFIs in Vietnam depend heavily on subsidy funds from the government 
(VSBP), and international grants from donors (INGOs), explicitly as equity 
or the opportunity cost of extra equity (such as technical assistance, training 
and equipment) (Schreiner, 2000). This is the key difference in the 
objectives between MFIs in Vietnam and in other countries (including the 
NGO and non-profit sample). Consistent with De Sousa-Shields (2004), 
they focus on the breadth of outreach and on the poorest people. 
Fourth, in non-profit institutions, decreasing costs (input) is the key solution for 
improving efficiency when profit (output) is not the main objective. Therefore, non-
profit MFIs tend to use the number of active borrowers as the main indicator to evaluate 
their efficiency, which is also considered by funders when evaluating and determining 
financing and investment decisions. This finding points to the dangers of using and 
explaining performance indicators, with particular regard to the efficiency of MFIs. 
Fifth, MFIs in Vietnam also rely heavily on the international investments of 
donors and international organisations as well as local government. The results also 
suggest that international funds play an important role in achieving more efficient 
performance in poverty reduction in Vietnam. Consistent with Hsu (2007), there is a 
large gap for local and international investors in commercial microfinance in Vietnam, 
since only 10 % of total funds are from international sources. Therefore, a drop-off in 
business investment or a sudden reversal of international capital flows may have a 
positive impact on microfinance funding in Vietnam. 
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Sixth, a new and interesting finding is that there is some misunderstanding and 
incorrect explanations in several studies, in particular with regard to Vietnam, which 
leads to biased and limited conclusions. Therefore, correction is required based on a 
comprehensive review of microfinance activities and MFIs in Vietnam. First, 
microfinance activities in VBARD were totally transferred to VBSP during the period 
1995 to 2003 and VBARD currently operates in the same way as other commercial 
banks which operate traditional banking in rural areas. However, VBARD is still 
mentioned as one of the main microfinance providers in some recent studies, such as 
APEC TATF (2011).
184
 Second, there were no rural banks (called rural shareholding 
banks) at the end of 2007 based on the records of SBV because of the mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking system.
185
 However, the rural bank is still mentioned as a 
current financial institution in some studies, such as Haq, Hoque and Pathan (2008). 
Third, PCFs are credit institutions dealing with commercial rural finance by providing 
loans only to their members, who are considered as bankable people since they must 
have money to buy the required shares to be members (SBV, 2011). Their interest rates 
were 3.5% above the interest rate ceiling set for local commercial banks (World Bank, 
2009). This indicates that PCFs are not microfinance providers but are still mentioned 
as such in many studies.
186
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 See BWTP (2004), Quach (2005), Nghiem, Coelli and Rao (2006), Haq, Hoque and 
Pathan (2008), World Bank (2009) and APEC TATF (2011). 
185
  Source: SBV (2011). 
186
  See BWTP (2004), Quach (2005), Nghiem, Coelli and Rao (2006), Thapa (2007) 
and APEC TATF (2011). 
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7.7. Research limitations 
This study has certain research limitations and some of these limitations can be 
seen as recommendations for further research. 
 Limitations of the data: Annual data are self-reported from local 
microfinance programs to MIX Market. The lack of comparable accounting standards 
used for MFIs creates limitations for a cross-country analysis. A large number of MFIs 
do not provide up to date data to MIX Market creates data selection bias. Microfinance 
is considered as a young industry since is has been set up in developing countries 
(including Vietnam) within the past 10 to 15 years. Therefore, the unequal and limited 
periods of establishment of MFIs make any sample size small and it is impossible to 
establish a good data set. Any conclusions from the proceeding analysis will therefore 
be somewhat limited. This has been the nature of MFI analysis: limited data followed 
by limited conclusions.  
 Limitations of a case study: A case study is a study conducted by using an 
individual sample involving only a single country (Vietnam); therefore, the conclusions 
may be not representative for the whole population due to insufficient information, 
which can lead to inappropriate results. This means the effects of financial structure on 
microfinance performance in a case study of Vietnam may be not representative of  
microfinance programs around the world. 
 Limitations of correlations: Correlation is the research conducted to 
demonstrate the relationships between variables. This study involved MFI data 
submitted to MIX Market, and the relationship between the variables was only 
investigated in some situations (by charter type, profit status and firm size).  Thus, it is 
220 
 
uncertain whether the findings can be generalised to other MFIs (who do not submit 
data) or other situations. 
 The lack of wide empirical evidences concerning the relationship between 
financial structure and microfinance performance or the lack of empirical evidences 
concerning the relationship between local banks and large international banks could be a 
limitation of this thesis. 
 The global financial crisis started in 2007/2008 and ended in 2009; 
therefore, its effects on MFIs during the period 2007-2009 are not clear and need to be 
investigated over a longer period. 
7.8. Recommendations for further research 
From the findings presented above, the following recommendations are made. 
 The same study should be conducted on local commercial banks to establish 
the differences between them and MFIs. This research would provide a comparison of 
the impact of financial structure on the performance of different financial institutions.  
 The effect of mergers and acquisitions on the existence of MFIs should be 
investigated in order to provide an idea of future MFI developments. 
 An empirical study should be conducted to examine the impact of local and 
international banks on microfinance. This research would clarify the roles of local and 
international banks in the development of microfinance. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
POVERTY AROUND THE WORLD 
Panel A: Percentage of the world’s population living on less than $1 per day in 
2007-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations (2008). 
 
Panel B: Percentage of the world’s population suffering from hunger in 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations (2006). 
 
 223 
 
 
Panel C: Gini Coefficient – A Measure of Income Inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CIA (2009). 
 
 Panel D: Countries based on World Bank Income Group in 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     High income        Upper-middle income        Lower-middle income        Low income 
Source: World Bank (2006). 
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Panel E: Percentage of the world's population in poverty from 1981 to 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2009). 
 
Panel F: Percentage of the world's population living on less than $1 per day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations (2008). 
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APPENDIX 2.2 
SAVING UP AND SAVING DOWN 
Panel A:  Saving Up and Saving Down 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rutherford (2000). 
 
 
Panel B: Combination between Saving Up and Saving Down 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rutherford (2000) 
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APPENDIX 2.3 
THE DEMAND FOR MICROFINANCE 
 
Panel A: Percentage of the poorest people who had access to microfinance in 2007 
Region Number of the 
poorest people 
Percentage of the poorest 
people with access to 
microfinance 
Asia 123 million 68.09% (83.7 million) 
Africa and Middle East 60.4 million 6.9 % (11.4 million) 
Latin America and Caribbean 9.4 million 20.2% (1.9 million) 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
0.8 million 28.8% (0.23 million) 
Source: Daley_Harris (2007, p.27) 
Panel B: Outreach Indicators by Region 
 Number of 
Active 
Borrowers 
(million) 
Average 
Loan Balance 
per Borrower 
(USD) 
Number of 
Voluntary 
Savers 
(million) 
Average 
Savings 
Balance per 
Savers (USD) 
Africa 21.974 228 27.082 105 
Asia 32.915 195 18.374 39 
Eastern European / 
Central Asia 
6.040 590 0 N/A 
Latin America 13.755 581 2.422 741 
Middle East / 
North Africa 
13.463 286 0 N/A 
Source: MBB (2003). 
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Panel C: Types of microfinance used by the poor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brett Matthews, Mathwood Consulting Company 
Source: Rutherford (2000) 
193.6 million clients had access to microfinance services. Among them, 97.23 
million were part of the poorest group. Approximately 90.1 percent of the poorest 
clients reported lived in Asia, a continent that was home to approximately 63.5 percent 
of the world’s people living on less than US$1 a day. The growth from 7.6 million of 
the poorest at the end of 1997 to 92.9 million at the end of 2006 represents a growth of 
1,123 percent during the nine year period. 
In Asia, where almost 123 million of the poorest households have access to 
microfinance, around 83.7% of these are being reached. In Africa and the Middle East, 
only 6.9% of all poorest households have access to finance
1
. The percentage in Latin  
America and the Caribbean is 20.21%, while in Europe and Central Asia about 28.8% 
of the poorest have access to financial services. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the 
relationships between the poorest households in each region and the number of them 
within reach of microfinance in each region at the end 2006.  
 
                                                 
1
  See Daley-Harris (2007, p.27). 
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Supply of Microfinance 
 
Formal Providers 
 
 
Semi-formal Providers 
 
 
Informal Providers 
Government programs; 
mass organizations; 
specialized funds; 
international organizations 
 
Financial activities of formal 
financial institutions 
 
Financial assistance from 
family, friends, or 
moneylenders 
 
 
APPENDIX 2.4 
MICROFINANCE PROVIDERS 
 
 
Panel A: Popular Categories of Microfinance Providers 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ADB (2011). 
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Panel B: Microfinance Providers based on Source of Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Microfinance Providers 
Internal Providers 
(Local Providers) 
External Providers 
(International Providers) 
    Formal financial institutions. 
    Government. 
    NGOs 
    Informal providers. 
    International organizations. 
     INGOs 
     Large banks 
     Other financial institutions. 
Profit 
programs 
Non-profit 
programs 
Non -profit 
programs 
Profit 
programs 
   Government 
    NGOs 
    Commercial banks 
     MFIs 
     Informal funds 
    Large banks 
     INGOs 
     Other financial institutions 
     INGOs 
     International organizations (WB, ADB) 
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APPENDIX 2.5 
MFI CLASSIFICATION 
Panel A:  MFI Category based on Charter Type 
 
Note: (a) The term “banks” in this category means microbanks or microfinance 
banks that have functions and operate like local commercial banks in rural areas. In 
general, they are the same as rural banks or credit unions, but with different legal and 
charter status. 
(b) NBFIs are Non- Bank Financial Institutions 
Source: MIX Market (2011). 
 
Panel B: MFI Category based on Profit Status 
 
Source: MIX Market (2011). 
 
MFIs 
 NON-
PROFIT 
PROFIT 
NBFIs NGOs CREDIT 
UNIONS 
BANKS RURAL 
BANKS 
 
MFIs 
 
BANKS
(a)
 
 
RURAL 
BANKS 
 
CREDIT 
UNIONS 
 
NBFIs
(b)
 
 
NGOs 
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APPENDIX 2.6 
DOWNSCALING AND UPSCALING IN MICROFINANCE 
Panel A: Downscaling and Upscaling in Commercial Microfinance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Models of Upscaling in Commercial Microfinance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct 
Indirect 
 
Direct 
Financial Institutions 
Intermediate organizations: 
MFIs, NGOs, MOs 
 
Individual 
 
Group 
 
Internal 
 
Upgrade 
 
NGOs 
 
Mass Organizations 
 
MFIs 
 
Group 
 
Individual 
 
LFIs 
 
IFIs 
 
IOs 
 
The poor 
 
External 
 
Indirect 
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APPENDIX 5 PERFORMANCE OF MFIs BY SIZEs 
Panel A. Performance of Large MFIs (in USD) 
Year Total Assets Loan Cost Debt to Equity Portfolio Size Number of  Borrowers OSS ROA Loan Size Total expense/ Assets 
1996 41,859,866 na 5.46 33,108,466 11,251 1.496 na 1,557 na 
1997 25,318,692 95.77 5.60 20,556,959 29,208 1.239 0.040 742 0.242 
1998 35,980,706 129.59 4.13 30,817,853 37,120 1.219 0.042 748 0.245 
1999 38,964,490 127.88 3.83 26,833,000 35,924 1.120 0.025 650 0.248 
2000 45,104,563 123.59 4.46 36,821,001 39,588 1.165 0.029 646 0.221 
2001 27,986,201 109.26 5.74 17,751,147 38,719 1.117 0.031 649 0.191 
2002 30,174,555 100.08 4.31 17,914,538 35,452 1.237 0.033 675 0.181 
2003 29,534,861 116.02 3.00 21,586,088 32,544 1.236 0.030 867 0.160 
2004 34,860,811 127.37 4.28 26,452,051 39,038 1.226 0.031 975 0.167 
2005 35,796,620 139.90 4.32 27,719,763 43,974 1.208 0.030 873 0.172 
2006 40,195,331 148.78 4.49 27,689,499 41,873 1.222 0.032 991 0.172 
2007 41,557,587 143.92 4.59 29,400,061 46,268 1.179 0.027 976 0.180 
2008 44,560,855 159.57 4.34 31,917,238 45,770 1.153 0.023 964 0.194 
2009 48,391,607 150.01 4.56 34,255,123 52,585 1.120 0.018 916 0.189 
Source: MIX Market (2011) 
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Panel B. Performance of Medium MFIs 
Year Total Assets Loan Cost Debt to Equity Porfolio Size Number of  Borrowers OSS ROA Loan Size Total expense/ Assets 
1996 9,615,104 na 0.97 5,937,046 14,376 1.109 na 538 na 
1997 11,610,516 111.82 1.13 6,862,494 6,961 1.064 0.015 1,563 0.221 
1998 7,817,239 137.75 1.12 4,825,155 11,931 1.102 0.007 443 0.270 
1999 5,463,802 78.72 1.35 4,332,607 15,742 1.098 0.015 368 0.245 
2000 6,488,395 86.37 1.48 4,597,453 16,451 1.137 0.028 315 0.246 
2001 6,430,428 78.76 1.46 4,555,204 11,688 1.101 0.023 454 0.219 
2002 5,964,459 84.42 1.70 4,260,921 12,812 1.141 0.029 405 0.237 
2003 6,358,352 89.73 2.52 4,288,356 11,914 1.121 0.026 450 0.216 
2004 5,807,535 95.49 2.41 4,241,327 9,719 1.125 0.021 499 0.209 
2005 5,954,813 101.43 2.87 4,382,171 9,943 1.121 0.022 470 0.206 
2006 6,177,043 90.69 3.13 4,532,179 12,133 1.130 0.025 398 0.215 
2007 6,123,311 105.96 3.03 4,438,306 10,280 1.128 0.021 518 0.211 
2008 6,057,439 132.62 3.12 4,431,981 10,502 1.116 0.020 480 0.229 
2009 6,672,857 126.82 2.52 4,764,448 10,521 1.081 0.015 451 0.228 
Source: MIX Market (2011). 
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Panel C. Performance of Small MFIs 
Year Total Assets Loan Cost Debt to Equity Porfolio Size Number of  Borrowers OSS ROA Loan Size Total expense/ Assets 
1995 114,772 na -10.31 67,166 1,533 0.265 na 41 na 
1996 1,673,167 24.01 0.63 1,096,003 4,116 1.131 -0.079 177 0.235 
1997 1,439,597 41.41 0.56 857,187 4,764 0.957 0.015 217 0.347 
1998 1,257,053 74.06 0.65 941,233 3,448 0.959 0.001 170 0.364 
1999 1,112,171 85.06 0.78 700,336 2,837 0.912 -0.006 149 0.290 
2000 971,428 82.89 0.87 648,437 2,832 0.936 -0.001 197 0.305 
2001 904,967 73.14 0.88 560,432 2,331 1.037 0.010 157 0.286 
2002 810,382 72.78 1.17 501,510 2,567 1.014 0.007 137 0.256 
2003 786,418 56.93 1.34 506,802 2,412 1.062 0.007 191 0.237 
2004 810,219 63.35 1.69 561,737 2,564 1.070 0.018 157 0.245 
2005 824,907 57.03 1.81 603,473 2,376 1.079 0.016 197 0.226 
2006 939,037 76.15 1.75 654,786 2,125 1.082 0.017 262 0.245 
2007 1,065,094 87.12 1.81 744,702 1,967 1.086 0.019 327 0.232 
2008 1,103,245 119.28 1.74 800,304 1,616 1.100 0.019 369 0.270 
2009 1,310,166.29 123.02 1.53 904,421 2,242 1.058 0.011 395 0.267 
Source: MIX Market (2011).
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APPENDIX 6.1 
ADVANTANGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF FINANCIAL PROVIDERS 
Organization Advantages Disadvantages 
Non-Profit 
VBSP  Focus on lending to the poor. 
 Impressive outreach achieved in 
short time. 
 Good relationships with local 
government and mass organizations. 
 Subsidized credit. 
 No financial sustainability. 
 Strong dependence on 
government (funds) and VBARD 
(staff, offices). 
 Limit on savings mobilization. 
 Not focused on near-bankable 
borrowers. 
MFIs  Focus on sustainability. 
 Targets are clearly identified. 
 Market approach. 
 Effective in reaching the poor 
 
 Limited funds. 
 Depend on donors and 
borrowings. 
 High associated costs due to not 
having their own networks. 
 Do not have full license. 
Profit  
Commerical 
Banks 
 Wide range of branches, financial 
services and products. 
 Market approach. 
 Give loans to MFIs. 
 Effective operations 
 Focused on commercial credit. 
 Focused on urban credit. 
PCFs  Market approach to credit services. 
 Owned by members. 
 Focus on local savings 
mobilization. 
 Commune-based credit service. 
 Most loans are short-term. 
 Initial growth is focused on 
richer areas and richer clients. 
VBARD  Largest network  
 Market approach 
 
 Do not target bottom of the 
poor pyramid. 
 Focus on commercial credit. 
Money-lenders  Convenient, simple and local. 
 Market interest approach. 
 Lenders know borrowers well. 
 Good local savings mobilization. 
 Independent operation. 
 High cost to the poor. 
 Very poor are excluded. 
 High interest rates. 
 Small and short-term loans 
 Isolated operation. 
Source: based on Dao (2002). 
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APPENDIX 6.2 
MICROFINANCE PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM (in USD) 
MFI Assets CTA Cost per loan DTE Deposits GLP NB OSS ROA ROE 
Binhminh CDC 753,055.01 0.4486 35.9448 1.23 213,556.84 596,311.98 4,063 0.9891 -0.0026 -0.0051 
CEP 29,816,369.78 0.347 19.565 1.88 9,371,889.57 28,297,376.98 134,141 1.6829 0.0975 0.29 
CEP BRVT 1,327,367.83 0.4223 NA 1.37 364,671.92 1,080,726.67 8,000 NA NA NA 
Dariu 1,286,822.94 0.8416 18.0797 0.19 181,215.38 1,196,776.55 10,841 1.3558 0.0651 0.0786 
Fund for Women’s Development NA NA NA NA  190,305.98 1,719,144.33 9,812 NA NA NA 
M7 Can Loc 748,683.36 0.3854 12.3497 1.59 459,382.34 752,369.11 5,148 1.275 0.0327 0.0845 
M7 DB District 215,664.67 0.6787 6.1892 0.47 69,298.28 209,129.70 3,344 1.8122 0.0787 0.1136 
M7 DBP City 333,513.65 0.4651 11.6775 1.15 178,406.31 335,435.69 2,487 1.4501 0.0504 0.1054 
M7 Dong Trieu 964,807.23 0.3329 11.2937 2 485,099.84 966,711.62 8,485 1.4068 0.0458 0.1268 
M7 Mai Son 853,907.71 0.5005 9.5528 1 267,148.65 650,931.49 3,995 1.8735 0.0691 0.1312 
M7 Ninh Phuoc 402,936.81 0.7745 15.6631 0.29 90,551.88 381,400.62 4,610 0.8555 -0.0308 -0.0411 
M7 Uong bi 731,244.86 0.3878 20.2241 1.58 403,475.86 739,845.79 3,092 1.4606 0.0608 0.141 
TYM 11,911,407.80 0.3781 14.4057 1.64 2,428,082.59 9,836,184.51 40,282 1.637 0.0795 0.227 
VBSP 4,026,350,446.79 0.2225 35.4985 3.49 217,231,898.19 3,929,035,634.99 7,536,960 0.7624 -0.0184 -0.0746 
WU Ha Tinh 2,844,224.48 0.1842 NA 4.43 313,637.10 2,681,343.08 23,400 NA NA NA 
Source: MIX Market (2011). 
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